Administrative Law

The appellant, G.T., challenged a Consent and Capacity Board decision confirming the criteria for issuing a Community Treatment Order (CTO) under the Mental Health Act.

The appeal focused on whether there was informed consent by the substitute decision maker (SDM) and whether the Board erred by relying on uncorroborated hearsay.

The court found that the SDM was properly informed and consented to the treatment plan, and that the Board did not make a palpable and overriding error.

The appeal was dismissed.

The defendants, including William Adamson Skelly and two corporations, were convicted of 11 counts of operating a place of refreshment without a license and 6 counts of operating a refreshment vehicle without a license, contrary to the City of Toronto Municipal Code.

The sentencing hearing addressed the appropriate penalties, considering general and specific deterrence, proportionality, and totality.

The court imposed fines of $1,500 for 10 counts and suspended sentences for 7 counts, finding that daily charges for the same offence over a short period were unaligned with proportionality and totality principles.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario addressed the test for bad faith under s. 57(1)(b) of the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006 (RTA) and the potential liability of purchasers in "own use" evictions.

The Landlord and Tenant Board (Board) and Divisional Court had erred by unduly narrowing the bad faith assessment to the landlord's knowledge at the time of notice and by failing to consider the purchaser's good faith.

The Court held that the Board must consider all relevant evidence, including events after the notice, and assess the good faith of both the landlord and the purchaser.

The appeal was granted, and the matter remitted to the Board for redetermination.

This is an appeal from a Superior Court order upholding an arbitral award of $29.2 million in favour of All Communications Network of Canada, Co. (ACN) against Planet Energy Corp. (Planet).

Planet sought to set aside the award, arguing it was unable to present its case due to denied discovery rights and that the award violated public policy by contravening the Energy Consumer Protection Act, 2010 (ECPA).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the application judge applied the correct standard of review and that Planet failed to demonstrate a breach of procedural fairness or that the award offended public policy.

The appellant, found Not Criminally Responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD) for prior offences, appealed a 2019 Ontario Review Board disposition that continued his conditional discharge and imposed new alcohol and drug testing requirements.

The appellant argued the Board erred in its application of the significant threat test and provided insufficient reasons.

The Court of Appeal found that the Board's determination that the appellant posed a significant threat was not supported by the evidence and lacked proper analysis regarding the degree of risk or gravity of apprehended harm.

The court emphasized that factors such as lack of insight, potential medication non-compliance, or substance abuse do not automatically establish a significant threat without specific analysis of the risk of serious criminal conduct.

The appeal was allowed, and an absolute discharge was granted, although the issue was rendered moot by a subsequent 2020 Board decision granting an absolute discharge.

A mother sought a motion for the return of her infant son to her care or to the paternal grandparents' care following the Children's Aid Society's temporary suspension of all supervised access and parenting support programs due to COVID-19.

The court dismissed the motion seeking return to parental care and the alternative claim for residence with paternal grandparents, finding insufficient evidence and lack of cooperation with court directions.

The court upheld the Society's temporary suspension of face-to-face access as justified by public health concerns, while acknowledging the importance of physical contact between mother and child under normal circumstances.

The plaintiff moved to amend a judgment to replace initials with full names, arguing that the use of initials prevented discussion and enforcement.

The court had previously ruled that subsection 87(8) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, which prohibits identifying a child or their family, applied.

The court found it was not functus officio as no order had been entered.

It determined that using full names would pose a high risk of violating the Act, especially given prior related decisions that had used names.

The court dismissed the request to use full names in the public judgment but ordered that a new, sealed court file be created with the parties' full names for enforcement purposes, granting judgment of $25,000 against the defendants.

It also ordered that all related public decisions be amended to use letters (AA, BB, CC) instead of names or initials.

The applicant, Phoenix Panton-Sawyers, sought a writ of habeas corpus, certiorari, and mandamus to quash an assessment order made under s. 672.11 of the Criminal Code.

The assessment was ordered after her conviction for assault and breach of probation, to determine if she was not criminally responsible due to mental disorder.

The applicant argued the trial judge lacked jurisdiction to make the order due to insufficient evidence.

The court first addressed a preliminary procedural issue regarding virtual presence for habeas corpus applications during the COVID-19 pandemic, finding virtual presence sufficient under s. 774.1 of the Criminal Code.

On the merits, the court found that the trial judge had jurisdiction, as there was a significant body of evidence—including the irrational nature of the assault, the applicant's history of violent conduct, and her ongoing diagnosis of schizophrenia with non-compliance with medication—to reasonably doubt her criminal responsibility and necessitate an assessment.

The application was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of picking up a passenger for compensation without proper authorization at Pearson International Airport, contrary to section 39.1(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

He was fined $1,000 and placed on probation for one year.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the conviction on three grounds: (1) that the trial court reversed the burden of proof; (2) that he was entrapped by police; and (3) that the enforcement of section 39.1(1) at the airport violated the constitutional principle of interjurisdictional immunity.

The appeal court dismissed the conviction appeal but allowed the sentence appeal, reducing the fine to $500 and varying the probation condition to permit the appellant to pick up fares at the airport if properly licensed by the airport authority.

The Children's Aid Society brought a summary judgment motion seeking a finding that two children were in need of protection on grounds of risk of physical harm and risk of emotional harm, a disposition order of deemed sole custody to the mother, and an order for supervised access to the father.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the Society had not established a genuine issue requiring trial on either ground for finding.

The court noted that while the father exhibited difficult behaviour, there was no credible evidence of a mental health disorder causally connected to risk of physical harm, and no evidence of emotional harm to the children.

The court also expressed concerns about the disposition sought and the practical feasibility of the proposed access arrangement.

The appellant, a disbarred lawyer whose licence was revoked on December 10, 2014, appealed two orders that permanently enjoined him from advertising, holding himself out, and practising as a lawyer in Ontario.

The appellant challenged the fairness of the proceedings and claimed various bases for his right to practise law.

The Court of Appeal upheld the permanent injunctions, finding that the appellant had clearly breached section 26.1 of the Law Society Act by continuing to hold himself out as a lawyer and offer legal services after his disbarment.

The court rejected all of the appellant's arguments regarding procedural fairness and his claimed rights to practise law.

The City of Mississauga appealed a stay of proceedings issued by a Justice of the Peace on the basis of an alleged section 8 Charter violation.

The respondent was charged with obstructing an inspector from carrying out an inspection under a municipal bylaw regulating tow truck drivers.

The Justice of the Peace found that the second inspector's examination of the vehicle constituted an unauthorized search in violation of section 8 of the Charter.

On appeal, the court found that the Justice of the Peace erred by failing to apply the proper legal framework established in R. v. Jarvis regarding when Charter protections apply in a regulatory context.

The court determined that section 8 of the Charter had no application to the facts because the bylaw was regulatory in nature, the inspectors had no penal purpose, and the respondent had no reasonable expectation of privacy in a licensed tow truck subject to regulatory inspection.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

This is a motion to dismiss a child protection application for want of jurisdiction.

The respondent parents challenged whether the court retained jurisdiction to hear the protection application following alleged failures by the Children's Aid Society to comply with statutory prerequisites for removal of children to a place of safety.

The parents argued that two removals—on April 30, 2018 and June 1, 2018—were warrantless removals without proper grounds and that the Society failed to bring the matter to court within the required five-day statutory period.

The court found that while the April 30 removal lacked proper consent and statutory authority, the children were returned to parental care on May 15, 2018, creating a discrete event.

The June 1 removal was brought to court within the statutory timeframe and was supported by exigent circumstances.

The court dismissed the motion to dismiss, finding jurisdiction was retained.

An appeal concerning the calculation of a bonus payable to a subordinate debt and equity financing fund upon the sale of a borrower company.

The lower court determined the bonus at $242,552.79 based on net proceeds excluding $55.125 million in debt created through a pre-sale reorganization.

The appellate court reversed in part, holding that the $55.125 million should be included in the bonus calculation as it formed part of the proceeds of sale and was created in violation of the loan agreement's consent requirement.

The court upheld the lower court's rejection of arguments that the bonus contravened the criminal rate of interest, was unconscionable, or was ultra vires the lender's statutory mandate.

The bonus was recalculated at $793,800.48.

The defendant, the University of Western Ontario, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claim.

The plaintiff, a former Ph.D. student, alleged breach of contract and fiduciary duty due to inadequate supervision and misleading information about funding after his thesis supervisor died.

The court granted summary judgment, dismissing the action, on the basis that the plaintiff's complaints were academic issues that should have been resolved through the university's internal processes, subject to judicial review, rather than a civil action.

The court emphasized the university's expertise, the policy of judicial deference to academic decisions, and the more effective remedies available through internal university mechanisms.

The Crown brought an application under s. 117.05 of the Criminal Code seeking forfeiture of a firearm seized from the respondent and a five-year weapons prohibition order.

The respondent had been arrested following an incident in which a vehicle was shot at a remote campsite.

The respondent's statement to police was excluded at his criminal trial, resulting in dismissal of weapons charges.

The court found that reasonable grounds existed to believe the respondent lacked the responsibility and discipline required of gun owners, and ordered forfeiture of the firearm.

However, the court declined to impose a weapons prohibition order, citing the Crown's delay in bringing the application, the respondent's effective prohibition since the seizure, and the absence of evidence of a pattern of troubling behaviour.

The plaintiff moved for an order to permit counsel to refer to audio transcription files and summaries from the court reporting system in closing arguments at trial, and to provide copies to opposing counsel and the trial judge, instead of using certified transcripts.

The motion was dismissed.

The court held that certified transcripts by an authorized transcriptionist are required, citing significant difficulties in deciphering audio, time-consuming review, increased costs, and potential issues on appeal if uncertified audio recordings were used.

The court emphasized the importance of certified transcripts for the integrity of the court record and efficiency.

Emmanuel Village Residence Inc. (EVR) brought a motion to increase an administration charge in a receivership proceeding, which had been consolidated with a forfeiture application by the Attorney General of Ontario (AGO) under the Civil Remedies Act.

The AGO opposed the increase and the continuation of a sealing order.

The court granted EVR's motion, increasing the administration charge from $350,000 to $700,000, finding that it would be "clearly not in the interests of justice" to deny payment to the professionals facilitating the sale of the property.

The court also granted the continuation of the sealing order until the property is sold.

This is a reference hearing under section 74 of the Firearms Act concerning the denial of a Possession and Acquisition License (PAL) application.

The Chief Firearms Officer refused the application based on concerns about the applicant's mental health history, weapons prohibitions under the National Defence Act that were not disclosed, fraudulent or questionable references, and a pattern of threatening and assaultive behaviour during military service.

The applicant challenged the refusal as unreasonable.

The court upheld the CFO's decision, finding that the applicant lacked the responsibility and discipline required of gun owners, demonstrated emotional immaturity and a quick temper, and failed to provide credible references.

The applicant, a Liberal candidate in the 2014 Ontario provincial election for the electoral district of Thornhill, sought a recount of ballots pursuant to Section 71 of the Election Act.

On election night, unofficial results showed the applicant winning by 85 votes.

However, the official tabulation conducted the following day showed the respondent, a Progressive Conservative candidate, winning by the same 85-vote margin.

The applicant alleged improper rejection of ballots and improper tabulation by the returning officer.

The court ordered a recount, finding that the discrepancy between the unofficial and official tallies, combined with the extremely narrow margin of victory and concerns about voter confidence in the democratic process, established a prima facie case for relief under Section 71(1)(b) of the Election Act.