Administrative Law

The moving party municipality sought leave to appeal a decision of the Ontario Municipal Board that approved official plan and zoning bylaw amendments permitting a mixed-use high-density development.

The municipality argued the Board failed to have regard to its new official plan, exceeded its jurisdiction regarding community benefits, and provided inadequate reasons.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding that the Board's decision on the applicable official plan and height issues were matters of fact or mixed fact and law entitled to deference.

The court also held that the Board did not impose community benefits and that its reasons were adequate and met the duty of procedural fairness.

The applicant, a midwife, brought a motion for an order requiring the College of Midwives of Ontario to file the complete record of proceedings relating to an Inquiries, Complaints and Reports Committee (ICRC) decision about another midwife.

The applicant had made a mandatory report about the other midwife, and the ICRC decided to take no action but made critical comments about the applicant's report.

The applicant sought the record for her application for judicial review.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that the ICRC did not exercise a statutory power of decision with respect to the applicant, and that the College was prohibited from producing the record under the confidentiality provisions of the Regulated Health Professions Act.

The respondent, IIROC, brought a motion to quash an application for judicial review commenced by the applicants, an investment dealer and its CEO.

The applicants sought to quash a notice of hearing and other disciplinary steps taken by IIROC.

The Divisional Court granted the motion to quash, finding it plain and obvious that the application could not succeed.

The court held that it lacked jurisdiction under section 2(1) of the Judicial Review Procedure Act because IIROC's disciplinary powers arise from contract, not statute or public authority.

Furthermore, the application was premature as the issues should be determined at first instance by the IIROC Hearing Panel.

The applicants sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision finding they discriminated against the respondents, two Black men, by asking them for identification in a lawyers' lounge.

The Divisional Court quashed the Tribunal's decision, finding no evidence of differential treatment or a causal nexus to race.

The Court held that the Tribunal improperly reversed the burden of proof by requiring the applicants to provide a non-discriminatory explanation for routine identification checks without the respondents first establishing a prima facie case of discrimination.

The appellant municipality appealed a decision of the Ontario Energy Board declining to review its previous decision that allowed a wind energy company to build distribution facilities on municipal road allowances.

The municipality argued the Board erred in interpreting its review power too narrowly and that the presence of an original panel member on the review panel created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's interpretation of its review rules was reasonable and that the participation of an original member in a reconsideration process does not raise a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The applicant City sought judicial review of an arbitration award regarding the promotion rights of a firefighter.

The arbitrator had ruled that the firefighter was not qualified for promotion to Lieutenant because he did not have fifteen years of continuous service in the Fire Fighting Division, interpreting 'service' as synonymous with 'seniority'.

The Divisional Court quashed the award, finding the arbitrator's interpretation unreasonable.

The Court held that the collective agreement clearly distinguished between 'service' and 'seniority', and the arbitrator improperly inserted the word 'continuous' into the provision, contrary to the parties' expressed intent.

The applicant employer sought judicial review of two Ontario Labour Relations Board decisions certifying the respondent union and refusing reconsideration.

The employer argued the union fraudulently misrepresented the delivery date of its certification application, causing the employer's response to be deemed late.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Board's refusal to reconsider was reasonable because the employer had notice of the delivery date dispute prior to the initial decision and failed to raise it in a timely manner.

The employer brought an application for judicial review to quash an arbitration award that found supervisors were included in the bargaining unit.

The employer argued the arbitration board chair denied natural justice by circulating a draft award without a prior meeting of the panel, and that the majority's interpretation of the collective agreement was unreasonable.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no agreement to hold a meeting prior to drafting, that the employer nominee had an opportunity to participate, and that the majority's interpretation of the recognition clause was reasonable.

The applicants sought leave to appeal two decisions of the Assessment Review Board regarding the property tax assessment of parking lots and a development site in downtown Toronto.

The core issue was whether 'air rights' or development rights should be classified as 'land' or 'real property' under the Assessment Act, which would allow them to be classified as 'vacant land' or 'excess land' and taxed at a lower rate.

The Divisional Court found no serious debate that air rights are not land for the purposes of the Act, as they have no physical existence and are merely attributes of the land.

The applications for leave to appeal were dismissed.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Minister of Natural Resources granting a permit under the Endangered Species Act, 2007 for a highway project.

At the opening of the hearing, the respondents brought a preliminary motion to strike three affidavits filed by the applicant.

The Divisional Court granted the motion, striking two affidavits in their entirety and most of the third, emphasizing that judicial review is generally restricted to the record before the decision-maker.

The court noted that fresh evidence is only admissible in exceptional circumstances, which were not present, and criticized the parties for not resolving the evidentiary record prior to the hearing.

The applicants brought a joint motion on consent for an order allowing their application for judicial review of several decisions of the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario.

The Divisional Court granted the motion, quashed the Tribunal's decisions, and ordered that the matter be adjudicated in a hearing de novo before a differently constituted panel of the Tribunal.

The applicants sought leave to appeal an Assessment Review Board decision classifying their properties, which were under construction for residential condominiums, as multi-residential rather than residential for property tax purposes.

The Divisional Court found no error in the Board's interpretation that buildings under construction constitute 'vacant land' under O. Reg. 282/98, as they were not yet being used.

The Court also upheld the Board's finding that the properties were principally zoned for multi-residential development.

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed.

The applicant insurer sought judicial review of a Director's Delegate decision that overturned an arbitrator's order granting an adjournment and requiring the insured to attend an independent medical examination.

The insured had delivered new orthopedic reports shortly before the scheduled arbitration.

The Divisional Court exercised its discretion to hear the interlocutory judicial review, finding that proceeding without the examination would deny the insurer procedural fairness and amount to trial by ambush.

The Court held that the Director's Delegate unreasonably fettered the arbitrator's discretion to ensure a fair hearing by requiring 'extraordinary circumstances' for an adjournment.

The decision of the Director's Delegate was quashed and the arbitrator's decision restored.

The applicant insurer sought judicial review of a Director's Delegate decision finding that the respondent's notice requesting arbitration was filed within the 90-day limitation period under the Insurance Act.

The Divisional Court upheld the decision, agreeing that the mediator's report was 'given' when received by the parties, and that delivering the notice to the general reception of the Financial Services Commission satisfied the filing rules.

The application for judicial review was dismissed with costs.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision dismissing his application alleging employment discrimination based on race and place of origin.

The Divisional Court found that the Tribunal's decision was entirely reasonable, as the Vice-Chair had thoroughly reviewed the evidence, assessed credibility, and provided cogent reasons for preferring the respondent's evidence.

The application for judicial review was dismissed with costs.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Child and Family Services Review Board.

The applicant had complained about the Children's Aid Society's failure to respond to his request to correct records and facilitate access to his children.

The Board ordered the CAS to comply with complaint review procedures, which the CAS subsequently did.

When the applicant attempted to complain further about the CAS's response, the Board closed its file.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for judicial review, holding that the Board was functus officio after issuing its final decision and had no jurisdiction to hear further complaints on the matter.

The applicant sought leave to appeal a decision of the Ontario Municipal Board affirming a Committee of Adjustment's authorization of minor variances for a neighbouring commercial property.

The applicant argued the Board member erred in law by failing to properly address the tests for a 'minor' variance, 'desirability', and 'impact' under s. 45(1) of the Planning Act, and that the reasons were insufficient.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding no errors of law, that the Board member's reasons were adequate, and that the matter did not raise an issue of general importance warranting the court's attention.

The applicant union sought judicial review of an arbitrator's decision upholding the employer's refusal to pay a grievor for sick days and holidays.

The employer had rejected the grievor's medical notes after a supervisor overheard a rumour that the grievor planned to call in sick and manipulate her blood pressure to obtain a note.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the arbitrator reasonably admitted the rumour evidence not for its truth, but to explain why the employer requested further medical information.

The court upheld the arbitrator's conclusion that the union failed to meet its onus of proving illness due to the insufficiency of the medical notes provided.

The applicants sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision finding they breached the procedural duty to accommodate the respondent employee's disability.

The applicants argued the employee had repudiated his employment contract, negating any duty to accommodate.

The Divisional Court held the Tribunal's conclusion that the employer failed to sufficiently inquire into the employee's medical condition was reasonable.

The Court also declined to dismiss the application for undue delay, accepting counsel's explanation of ill health.

The application for judicial review was dismissed with costs.

The applicants sought relief under the Arbitration Act and judicial review under the Judicial Review Procedure Act to challenge an arbitrator's award.

The Divisional Court held it lacked jurisdiction under the Arbitration Act, as such applications must be brought before the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court also held that judicial review is a public law remedy unavailable to challenge a private consensual arbitrator's award.

The application for judicial review was quashed, and the remaining relief was referred to the Superior Court.