Aston J.

The respondent Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal brought a preliminary motion to dismiss the applicant's application for judicial review for delay.

The applicant sought to review a decision from December 2000, having applied for reconsideration six times until November 2007, and commenced the judicial review in January 2011.

The Divisional Court applied the three-part test for delay and granted the motion, finding extreme delay, a vague explanation, and real possibility of prejudice to the Tribunal's process.

The applicant sought an adjournment of its application for judicial review to develop new evidence.

The Divisional Court addressed preliminary issues and exercised its discretion under the Judicial Review Procedure Act to decline to hear the application.

The court found the matter was not a review of a quasi-judicial decision, primarily concerned commercial interests, would require the court to perform a trial function, and that the applicant lacked standing.

The application was quashed without a determination on the merits.

The applicant chiropractor sought judicial review of a decision by the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board, which upheld a written caution issued by the College of Chiropractors of Ontario regarding the tone and language of a letter sent to a patient.

The applicant argued the Board failed to address a claim of reasonable apprehension of bias concerning a committee member who had co-authored an academic article critical of the applicant's treatment philosophy.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no merit to the bias claim and concluding that the Board's decision to uphold the written caution was reasonable.

The applicant insurer sought judicial review of a Director's Delegate decision finding that the respondent's notice requesting arbitration was filed within the 90-day limitation period under the Insurance Act.

The Divisional Court upheld the decision, agreeing that the mediator's report was 'given' when received by the parties, and that delivering the notice to the general reception of the Financial Services Commission satisfied the filing rules.

The application for judicial review was dismissed with costs.

The Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services applied for judicial review of an Information and Privacy Commissioner order requiring the public disclosure of the first three digits of postal codes and the number of sexual offenders in each area from the Sex Offender Registry.

The Ministry argued the Commissioner erred in interpreting the law enforcement exemptions under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Commissioner applied the correct legal test, did not misapprehend the evidence, and reasonably concluded that the Ministry failed to establish that disclosure would cause endangerment or non-compliance with reporting requirements.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Health Services Appeal and Review Board under the Independent Health Facilities Act.

The Divisional Court found that the Board erred in law by asking itself the wrong question, limiting its consideration to whether the Director had the authority to revoke the appellant's licence rather than whether the revocation was a reasonable exercise of discretion.

The court rescinded the Board's decision and remitted the matter back for a re-hearing, noting that the Board's process is a hearing where it may substitute its own opinion for that of the Director.

The Ontario Nurses Association brought a motion to review and set aside a decision of Molloy J., which struck out an affidavit containing correspondence between an arbitration chair and the employer's nominee.

The underlying judicial review application by the Board of Health alleged a denial of natural justice because the arbitration board did not discuss the evidence before the chair issued a proposed decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, agreeing with Molloy J. that the correspondence was unnecessary to introduce as evidence because the facts it sought to establish were already addressed in the chair's reasons and were not disputed.