Arbour

The City of Calgary enacted a bylaw freezing the number of taxi plate licences.

The respondents challenged the bylaw, arguing it was ultra vires the City under the new Municipal Government Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the standard of review for a municipality delineating its jurisdiction is correctness.

Applying a broad and purposive approach to interpreting municipal legislation, the Court found that the Act granted the City the power to limit the number of taxi plate licences.

The appeal was allowed and the bylaw was upheld.

The appellant, a financial advisor, borrowed $100,000 to purchase a departing colleague's client list and sought to deduct the purchase price and the interest on the borrowed funds from his employment income.

The Minister of National Revenue denied the deductions.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that both the purchase price and the interest payments were payments 'on account of capital' and were therefore precluded from deduction under section 8(1)(f)(v) of the Income Tax Act.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Law Society of Upper Canada maintained a custom photocopy service and self-service photocopiers in the Great Library.

Legal publishers sued for copyright infringement.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the publishers' headnotes, summaries, and compilations were 'original' works protected by copyright, the Law Society's custom photocopy service constituted fair dealing for the purpose of research.

The Court also held that providing self-service photocopiers with a warning notice did not amount to authorizing copyright infringement.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder and filed a notice of appeal, but died before the appeal could be heard.

Seven years later, the Crown moved to abate the appeal.

The Court of Appeal held it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal but declined to exercise its discretion to do so.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that while an appellate court retains jurisdiction to hear an appeal rendered moot by the death of an appellant, this discretion should be exercised sparingly and only in exceptional circumstances where it is in the interests of justice.

The Court found no such exceptional circumstances in this case.

The applicant brought a motion for reconsideration of an application for leave to appeal, arguing that the Court lacked jurisdiction to dismiss the application because one of the panel judges had retired before the judgment was released.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the motion, holding that section 41.1(1) of the Judges Act explicitly permits a retired judge to continue participating in judgments for up to six months after retirement.

Since the judgment was issued within this six-month window, the retired judge was entitled to participate.

The appellant was convicted of armed robbery based solely on the testimony of a disreputable accomplice.

The trial judge found independent evidence confirming the accomplice's account of the robbery, but none of it implicated the appellant.

The trial judge nonetheless convicted the appellant, finding the confirmatory evidence sufficient to restore faith in the accomplice's truthfulness.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that independent confirmatory evidence under the Vetrovec framework does not need to implicate the accused, even when the accused's participation is the only disputed issue.

The appellant entered into a 36-month exclusive agency contract with the respondent, which included an early termination clause allowing the respondent to terminate on three months' notice after the 18th month.

The respondent wrongfully repudiated the contract at 16 months.

The trial judge awarded damages based on the full 36-month term less a 25 percent discount, and awarded solicitor-and-client costs due to unfounded allegations of dishonesty.

The Court of Appeal reduced the damages to reflect the early termination clause as the maximum exposure, and reduced the costs to a party-and-party scale.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal on damages, affirming that damages for breach of a contract with alternative modes of performance are assessed based on the mode least burdensome to the defendant.

However, the Court allowed the appeal on costs, restoring the trial judge's award of solicitor-and-client costs.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal regarding whether art. 2474 of the Civil Code of Québec precludes the conventional subrogation of an insurer to the rights of a hypothecary creditor against its debtor.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the subrogation was obtained pursuant to a separate hypothecary clause, meaning the debtor could not be considered the insured under that separate contract.

The Court noted that issues relating to intentional fault and the right to reimbursement must be determined at trial.

The respondents, owners of a second-hand store, purchased goods from an undercover police officer who hinted the goods were stolen.

They were charged with laundering proceeds of crime under s. 462.31 of the Criminal Code, specifically for transferring the possession of property.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the French version of s. 462.31, which is narrower than the English version, must be favoured under the rules of bilingual statutory interpretation.

Under the French version, the act of purchasing property does not constitute a 'transfer of possession'.

The Court also clarified that the term 'convert' does not require an intent to conceal.

The appeal by the Crown was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of robbery, assault causing bodily harm, kidnapping, and possession of a dangerous weapon after the victim was severely beaten.

At trial, the defence sought to cross-examine Crown witnesses on the theory that the beating was over a drug debt, based on police reports.

The trial judge ruled that defence counsel could only pursue this cross-examination if she provided substantive evidence of the drug debt theory, forcing the defence to call police officers as witnesses and lose the right to address the jury last.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the trial judge erred in law by requiring an evidentiary foundation rather than a good faith basis for the cross-examination.

The Court concluded the error fatally impacted the fairness of the trial and could not be saved by the curative proviso, allowing the appeal and ordering a new trial.

The appellant advanced a commercial loan to the respondent with an effective annual interest rate exceeding 90 percent, violating the criminal interest rate provisions of the Criminal Code.

The respondent sought a declaration that the agreement was illegal.

The application judge applied 'notional severance' to reduce the interest rate to the legal maximum of 60 percent.

The Court of Appeal reversed this, applying the traditional 'blue-pencil' test to strike out the interest provision entirely.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that notional severance is available as a remedy for statutory illegality under s. 347 and was appropriate in this case given the commercial context and the parties' intentions.

The Crown brought a motion to quash the accused's appeal and strike the notice of appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the motions, holding that the dissenting opinion in the court below was on a question of law, which gave the accused an appeal as of right.

The appellant, a store owner who sold hemp products and marihuana seedlings, was convicted of possession and trafficking of cannabis sativa.

He challenged the constitutionality of the prohibition on simple possession of marihuana under the Narcotic Control Act, arguing it infringed section 7 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that while the availability of imprisonment engages the right to liberty, the prohibition accords with the principles of fundamental justice.

The Court rejected arguments based on privacy, overbreadth, and statutory interpretation regarding THC levels.

The appellants challenged the constitutionality of the Narcotic Control Act provisions prohibiting the possession of marihuana for personal use and for the purpose of trafficking.

They argued that the prohibition, and the potential for imprisonment, violated section 7 of the Charter because marihuana use causes little or no harm to others (the 'harm principle').

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the prohibition is a valid exercise of Parliament's criminal law power.

The Court rejected the argument that the 'harm principle' is a principle of fundamental justice under section 7.

The Court found that the state has a legitimate interest in protecting vulnerable groups and society from the harms associated with marihuana use, and that the availability of imprisonment is not grossly disproportionate.

The appeals were dismissed.

The accused was convicted of possession of contraband cigarettes and faced a mandatory minimum fine of $9,600 under the Excise Act.

Finding the accused unable to pay and concluding that jail was inappropriate, the trial judge imposed a conditional sentence in default of payment.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that a conditional sentence is a form of imprisonment and cannot be used merely to enforce an unpaid fine where the offender genuinely lacks the means to pay.

The Court set aside the conditional sentence but stayed further collection procedures since the sentence had already been served.

The appellants, Ontario residents, sold a Florida lot to the respondents.

A dispute arose, and the respondents obtained a default judgment in Florida for US$260,000 after the appellants failed to properly defend the action.

The respondents sought to enforce the judgment in Ontario, which had grown to approximately C$800,000.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the 'real and substantial connection' test applies to the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.

The Court found that the Florida court properly took jurisdiction and that the appellants failed to establish the defences of fraud, natural justice, or public policy.

The appeal was dismissed, and the foreign judgment was enforced.

The respondent Indian bands began logging on Crown land without authorization, claiming aboriginal title.

The Minister of Forests issued stop-work orders and commenced enforcement proceedings.

The bands argued they lacked funds for a complex trial and sought an order for interim costs (costs in advance and in any event of the cause).

The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the Court of Appeal's decision to grant interim costs, establishing a three-part test for such awards in public interest litigation: the party must be genuinely impecunious, the claim must be prima facie meritorious, and the issues must transcend individual interests and be of public importance.

The appellant purchased stock in bulk from a company in financial difficulty but failed to comply with the Bulk Sales Act.

The seller applied the proceeds of the sale against its debts owed to its two highest-ranking secured creditors.

The respondent, an unsecured creditor, commenced proceedings against the appellant seeking an accounting under s. 16(2) of the Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the buyer's duty to account must be interpreted purposively.

Since the proceeds were paid to priority-ranking creditors and the respondent was not deprived of any money it would have received on a ratable distribution, the appellant was not liable to account to the respondent.

The RCMP obtained a warrant to search a lawyer's office for billing records related to a client suspected of money laundering.

The search was conducted without notice to the lawyer and lasted 13.5 hours.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the search was unreasonable under s. 8 of the Charter because the police failed to minimize the impairment of solicitor-client privilege and failed to notify the lawyer.

The Court also held that information about a lawyer's fees and disbursements is presumptively protected by solicitor-client privilege, as it arises out of the solicitor-client relationship.

The appellant municipality appealed a decision striking down a by-law that limited the size of billboards to 80 square feet.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that while the by-law infringed freedom of expression under section 2(b) of the Charter, it was saved under section 1 as it minimally impaired the respondent's freedom of expression.