Arbour

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault with a weapon, procuring, and theft.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal substantially for the reasons of the majority in the Quebec Court of Appeal, with LeBel J. dissenting.

The respondent leased a building to the federal government.

When the lease was expiring, the parties engaged in negotiations for a renewal but failed to reach an agreement.

The government then issued a call for tenders, which the respondent bid on but lost to a competitor.

The respondent sued in tort, alleging negligence in the conduct of the negotiations and in the preparation and evaluation of the tender.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the tort of negligence does not extend to pure economic loss arising from commercial negotiations, citing policy reasons against imposing a duty of care in arm's-length bargaining.

The Court also found no liability in the tendering process, concluding that while an implied contractual duty to treat all bidders fairly exists, the minor breach in this case did not cause the respondent's loss.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder.

He appealed the conviction, arguing that the trial judge's charge on reasonable doubt misled the jury.

The trial judge did not have the benefit of the Supreme Court's decision in Lifchus.

The majority of the Court of Appeal held that the charge was in substantial compliance with Lifchus and dismissed the appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding that the charge, read as a whole, did not give rise to a reasonable likelihood that the jury misapprehended the correct standard of proof.

The appellant was convicted of assault and extortion following a jury trial where the complainant and the accused gave contradictory versions of events.

The trial judge's charge to the jury, given prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Lifchus, described reasonable doubt as a 'real' or 'serious' doubt and asked the jury to assess 'all of the evidence' to determine guilt.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding the jury charge defective.

The charge failed to clearly explain that the standard of proof is higher than a balance of probabilities but less than absolute certainty, and it failed to properly instruct the jury on how to handle conflicting evidence in accordance with W. (D.).

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder after shooting the victim in the back of the head while he slept.

At trial, the appellant argued self-defence based on an overwhelming fear of the victim, supported by psychiatric evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in his instructions to the jury on self-defence, the expert evidence, and character evidence, and erred by allowing the Crown to ask if he would submit to a blood test and a Crown psychiatric assessment.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that while errors were made, they caused minimal prejudice and the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code applied because the evidence was overwhelming and the verdict would inevitably have been the same.

The accused was charged with sexual assaults on two young male children.

At trial, he sought to introduce expert psychiatric evidence, including penile plethysmograph test results, to show he lacked the distinctive personality traits of someone who would commit such offences.

The trial judge excluded the evidence, finding it did not meet the Mohan criteria for admissibility, and convicted the accused.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction, holding that the trial judge properly exercised his gatekeeper function in excluding the novel scientific evidence due to its lack of reliability and failure to establish a standard profile for the distinctive group of offenders.

The accused was acquitted of trafficking in cocaine and possession of proceeds of crime.

The Crown appealed, arguing the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding the admissibility of co-conspirator hearsay evidence under the Carter test.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the accused's appeal, confirming that the trial judge made two clear misdirections in formulating the Carter test.

The Court held that the Crown met the heavy burden of establishing with reasonable certainty that, had the jury been properly charged, the verdict would not necessarily have been the same.

The Musqueam Indian Band surrendered reserve land to the Crown for leasing.

The land was subdivided, serviced, and leased to individuals for 99 years.

The leases provided for rent reviews, stating rent should be 6 percent of the 'current land value' of 'unimproved lands'.

The parties disagreed on whether 'current land value' meant fee simple value off-reserve or leasehold value on-reserve, and whether 'unimproved' meant unserviced.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that 'current land value' refers to the hypothetical fee simple value of the land on the reserve, which requires a 50 percent discount from comparable off-reserve land to account for Indian reserve features.

The Court also held that 'unimproved' means unserviced, so servicing costs must be deducted from the land value.

The applicant, Stepping Stone, sought leave to intervene on an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada prior to leave to appeal being granted.

The Court noted that under the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada, applications for leave to intervene are normally considered only after leave to appeal has been granted, except in exceptional circumstances.

Finding no exceptional circumstances, the Court adjourned the motion to intervene pending the disposition of the application for leave to appeal.

The Crown appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada from a judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal that dismissed its appeal from the accused's acquittal on charges of sexual assault.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, adopting the dissenting reasons of Rosenberg J.A. from the court below.

The appellant's newborn child was apprehended by the respondent child and family services agency at the hospital without a warrant, pursuant to s. 21(1) of the Manitoba Child and Family Services Act.

The appellant challenged the constitutionality of the provision, arguing that warrantless apprehension in non-emergency situations violates the right to security of the person under s. 7 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the apprehension of a child infringes the parent's right to security of the person, the infringement accords with the principles of fundamental justice.

The Court found that requiring prior judicial authorization in non-emergency situations would place an unacceptable risk on the child, and that a prompt, fair post-apprehension hearing provides sufficient procedural protection.

The accused was convicted of sexual assault.

At trial, he challenged the constitutionality of the 'rape shield' provisions in s. 276 of the Criminal Code, which restrict the admissibility of evidence of a complainant's prior sexual activity.

The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the constitutionality of the provisions, finding that they do not violate the accused's right to make full answer and defence, the right to a fair trial, or the right against self-incrimination.

The Court held that the provisions properly balance the accused's rights with the need to protect the integrity of the trial process and the privacy of complainants.

The accused pleaded guilty to 15 counts arising from a home invasion robbery and was sentenced to 10.5 years imprisonment.

On appeal, the accused sought to introduce fresh evidence in the form of two expert psychological/psychiatric reports.

The Court of Appeal admitted the reports and reduced the sentence.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the Palmer criteria for admitting fresh evidence apply equally to appeals against sentence as they do to appeals against conviction.

The Court found the expert reports inadmissible because they were based on a version of facts rejected by the trial judge, thus lacking sufficient probative value to affect the result.

However, the Court substituted a sentence of 8.5 years due to an error in principle by the trial judge.

The Province of Alberta introduced a new school funding scheme that pooled all revenues in a central fund and distributed them on a per-student basis.

Separate school boards, but not public school boards, were permitted to opt out of the scheme and continue raising funds directly from ratepayers.

The appellants challenged the scheme, arguing it violated a constitutional right to reasonable autonomy, discriminated against public school boards, and violated a principle of mirror equality.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that school boards do not have a constitutional right to reasonable autonomy, the funding scheme does not discriminate against public school boards as it meets a standard of fairness, and the constitutional provisions do not guarantee mirror equality between public and separate school boards.

The accused was charged with sexually assaulting a young child.

At trial, the defence cross-examined the complainant on her two-and-a-half-year delay in reporting the abuse, suggesting fabrication.

The Crown called a child psychologist to testify that delayed disclosure is common and does not indicate falsehood.

The trial judge admitted the expert evidence, and the accused was convicted.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial, holding the expert evidence was inadmissible.

The Crown appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada solely on the admissibility of the expert evidence.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the expert evidence was not necessary because the principle that delay does not equate to falsehood is not outside the normal experience of a jury and could be addressed through a proper jury instruction.

The respondent, a former provincial cabinet minister, faced sexual harassment complaints before the British Columbia Human Rights Commission.

The proceedings were delayed for over 30 months.

The respondent sought a stay of proceedings, arguing the delay violated his section 7 Charter rights to liberty and security of the person due to the severe stigma and psychological stress he suffered.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the Charter applies to the Commission, the respondent's section 7 rights were not engaged because the state did not interfere with his fundamental life choices or psychological integrity in a manner protected by section 7.

Furthermore, under administrative law principles, the delay did not compromise the fairness of the hearing and was not so inordinate as to amount to an abuse of process.

The appeal was allowed and the stay of proceedings was lifted.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal that ordered a new trial after finding a statement made by the accused in a police van inadmissible.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the Court of Appeal erred by reassessing the trial judge's weighing of the evidence on the voir dire without showing a serious, specific, and determining error.

The guilty verdicts for first degree murder and conspiracy to murder were restored.

The appellant, a young person, objected to the Youth Court's administrative practice of routinely distributing its weekly docket to local school boards.

The docket disclosed the appellant's name, charges, and trial details.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that this practice violated the non-disclosure provisions of the Young Offenders Act.

The Court found that the docket constituted a record linking the young person to an offence, and its general distribution to school boards was not authorized under the statutory exceptions for the administration of justice or school safety.

The appellants, non-band aboriginal communities, challenged their exclusion from the proceeds of Ontario's first reserve-based commercial casino (the First Nations Fund).

The province had restricted the distribution of the fund to First Nations communities registered as bands under the Indian Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the exclusion did not violate s. 15(1) of the Charter, as the casino project was a targeted ameliorative program designed to support the self-reliance and self-government of First Nations bands, and the exclusion did not demean the appellants' human dignity.

The Court also held that the province did not act ultra vires its jurisdiction under s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867, as it was simply exercising its spending power.

The appellants, members of an Indian band, were convicted of mischief relating to a highway blockade.

They appealed, seeking to introduce fresh evidence that the trial judge had prior professional dealings with some of the appellants and a co-accused while he was a practising lawyer.

The Crown conceded that this raised a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Supreme Court of Canada admitted the fresh evidence, allowed the appeal, set aside the convictions, and ordered a new trial before a different judge.