Anne M. Mullins

The applicant brought a motion to adjust child and spousal support based on the respondent's actual income, which was higher than previously reported.

The respondent, who is self-employed, had a fluctuating income that dropped significantly in 2015 according to an expert report.

The applicant sought to impute income for 2015 based on a three-year average under section 17(1) of the Federal Child Support Guidelines.

The court ordered support based on the expert's income valuations for 2012-2014, but declined to average the income for 2015, instead using the expert's estimated lower income for that year and suspending spousal support.

Following an 11-day jury trial for a motor vehicle accident, the plaintiff was awarded $3,000 in damages, which was reduced to $500 due to the statutory deductible.

The defendants were successful on the threshold motion.

Both parties sought costs.

The court found divided success and noted the recovery was within Small Claims Court jurisdiction.

The court awarded the plaintiff $9,000 in trial costs and the defendants $2,500 in costs for the threshold motion.

The plaintiff abandoned a motion for directions regarding garnishment and priority issues.

The non-party, Fraser Mason, sought costs of $63,644.52 on a partial indemnity scale for the abandoned motion.

The court found the claimed amount excessive, noting that portions of the costs related to other aspects of the litigation and that both parties had engaged in aggressive litigation tactics.

The court fixed costs at $10,000 payable by the plaintiff to Fraser Mason, but stayed enforcement until Fraser Mason paid outstanding costs awards previously ordered against him.

The defendant radiologist moved for summary judgment dismissing the medical malpractice claim against him, arguing the plaintiffs failed to tender expert opinion evidence on causation.

The plaintiffs cross-moved for leave to admit late-served expert reports from a gastroenterologist and a radiologist.

The court granted the plaintiffs leave to admit the late reports, finding that their exclusion could cause a miscarriage of justice and the defendants would not suffer undue prejudice given the trial's adjournment.

Relying on the newly admitted expert evidence regarding standard of care and breach, the court dismissed the defendant's summary judgment motion, concluding that a genuine issue requiring a trial existed and that an inference of causation might be drawn at trial.

The issue of costs thrown away due to the trial's adjournment was reserved to the trial judge.

The applicant, facing numerous charges including conspiracy and trafficking fentanyl, brought a Rowbotham application for state-funded counsel.

While the court found that representation by counsel was essential for a fair trial and that the applicant had exhausted Legal Aid options, it concluded she had not established a lack of financial means.

The court noted that the applicant's spouse earned a significant income and had a legal obligation to support her, which she had not pursued.

The application was dismissed without prejudice to a future application on a better evidentiary basis.

Mr. Notaro appealed his conviction for driving with more than the legal concentration of alcohol, contrary to s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's dismissal of a Charter application to exclude breath test results, arguing the arresting officer failed to consider "fresh mouth alcohol" before administering a roadside screening device.

The Superior Court of Justice, applying a palpable and overriding error standard of review, found that the trial judge implicitly accepted the officer's awareness of the mouth alcohol issue and reasonably concluded that no circumstances warranted a delay or further inquiry.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by AgriCorp awarding it compensation under the AgriStability program, arguing that the participation of AgriCorp staff at multiple stages of the decision-making process created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that AgriCorp is essentially a delegate of the Minister exercising executive functions, and the required level of impartiality is that of an 'open mind'.

The court concluded that AgriCorp maintained an open mind and that the staff's involvement did not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The plaintiff alleged she suffered injuries while using a shoulder press machine at a gym and sued the operator for negligence, claiming the machine was defective and not properly maintained.

A jury found that the plaintiff had signed a membership agreement containing waiver provisions and that the defendant took reasonable steps to bring those provisions to her attention.

The trial judge determined the enforceability and scope of the waiver.

The court held that the membership agreement remained in effect through automatic renewal and that the waiver clearly and unambiguously released the defendant from liability for negligence, including claims arising from use of gym equipment.

The waiver was also sufficient to exclude liability under the Occupiers’ Liability Act.

The claim was barred by the waiver.

The appellant appealed an order bifurcating the trial of liability and damages, arguing that bifurcation cannot occur without consent when a valid jury notice exists.

The respondent municipality cross-appealed the motion judge's refusal to strike the jury notice, arguing that section 108 of the Courts of Justice Act prohibits jury trials when a municipality is a party.

The Divisional Court granted leave for the cross-appeal and held that the rules and statute operate to prohibit the filing of a jury notice where a municipality is named.

The court allowed the cross-appeal, set aside the jury notice as a nullity, and consequently dismissed the appellant's appeal regarding bifurcation.

The appellant appealed a jury verdict awarding her $2,500 in general damages (netting $0 after the statutory deductible) and a costs award of $140,000 following a motor vehicle accident trial where liability was admitted.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by failing to charge the jury on the 'Thin Skull Rule' and by making comments that raised a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the jury verdict was reasonable and the trial judge's comments did not show bias.

The court also granted leave to appeal the costs order but dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly considered the Rule 57.01 factors despite not providing written reasons.

The tenant appealed a decision of the Landlord and Tenant Board dismissing her application for a rent abatement and moving costs.

The tenant had vacated the rental unit shortly after moving in, citing issues with second-hand smoke from other tenants and inadequate heat.

The Divisional Court found no error of law in the Board's determination that the landlord had not been given sufficient time to address the smoking issue and had not interfered with the reasonable supply of heat.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant municipality sought judicial review of an interest arbitration award that imposed a 24-hour shift schedule for its suppression firefighters for a two-year trial period.

The Divisional Court applied a reasonableness standard of review and upheld the award.

The court found that the Arbitration Board reasonably relied on the principles of comparability and replication, noting that the vast majority of firefighters in Ontario work 24-hour shifts.

The Board also reasonably discounted the municipality's concerns regarding health, safety, and operational risks, as well as the expert evidence presented.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The appellant landlords appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision awarding the respondent tenant $1,252 for excess rent and filing costs.

The appellants argued that the tenant was deemed to have accepted the rent increases under s. 118 of the Residential Tenancies Act and that the increases were deemed lawful under s. 136 because more than a year had passed.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the rent increases were void because the landlords failed to provide the required statutory notice under s. 116, rendering both s. 118 and s. 136 inapplicable.

The plaintiff brought an action against his sister, the defendant, alleging she misappropriated funds from their late father's estate while acting as his power of attorney.

The plaintiff sought over $800,000, claiming their father lacked capacity to make inter vivos gifts and was subjected to undue influence.

The court found that the father had the requisite capacity to make the gifts, initiated them independently, and was not under the defendant's undue influence.

The court also approved the passing of accounts prepared by an independent accountant, dismissing the plaintiff's claims for damages and ordering him to pay $150,000 in costs.

The defendants brought motions seeking summary judgment dismissing an action alleging extortion, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and negligence in relation to mortgage financing.

They argued the claims were statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002 and alternatively sought a stay based on prior court orders restricting proceedings by a principal associated with the plaintiff corporation.

The court accepted documentary evidence showing that the interest rate, commitment letter, and finder’s fee had been disclosed, and found the action was commenced more than two years after the latest possible date of discoverability.

Summary judgment was granted dismissing the action as statute-barred.

In the alternative, the court ruled the action would be stayed pursuant to an earlier order concerning the plaintiff’s principal being a vexatious litigant and granted leave to appeal an order permitting that individual to represent the corporate plaintiff.

Following the striking of the applicant’s pleadings for persistent failure to comply with disclosure orders, the matter proceeded on an uncontested basis primarily addressing relief claimed in the respondent’s Answer.

The court addressed issues of child support, spousal support, and equalization of net family property following a lengthy marriage and separation in 2008.

The respondent alleged disability following a motor vehicle accident, but the medical evidence was insufficient to establish an inability to work, leading the court to maintain an imputed income of $100,000 for support purposes.

Child support was ordered for one remaining dependent child and terminated for the older child upon completion of post-secondary education.

Spousal support payable to the applicant was terminated after the applicant’s pleadings were struck, and the court ordered an equalization payment from the applicant to the respondent.

The defendant brought a motion seeking a determination that a construction lien was registered outside the time limits prescribed by the Construction Lien Act.

The moving party argued the lien was invalid because the only invoice for work performed had been delivered more than 45 days before the lien was registered.

The responding party produced time records showing additional work at the project site within 45 days of the lien registration.

The court found insufficient evidence to determine whether the work fell within the lien period and noted disputes about the date of last work and substantial completion.

Concluding that genuine issues requiring a trial remained, the court dismissed the motion for summary judgment.

An insurer sought a declaration determining which of two insurance policies responded to liability arising from a motor vehicle collision involving a rented vehicle operated by an employee of a production company.

The dispute turned on whether the vehicle had been leased under a single agreement exceeding 30 days, triggering coverage under a commercial general liability policy, or under a series of shorter rental contracts that would leave coverage under a standard automobile policy.

The respondent argued the issue was barred by issue estoppel following earlier proceedings and an appellate decision.

The court held that the prior appellate ruling set aside the earlier decision only because the evidentiary record was insufficient and therefore did not create issue estoppel on the substantive question.

Interpreting the limited documentary record, the court concluded the rental arrangement constituted a single agreement of more than 30 days and that the respondent insurer was required to respond.