Andrew Vaughan

During a pre‑trial voir dire, the Crown sought to admit two statements made by one accused following separate arrests.

The defence challenged the voluntariness of the second statement given during a police interview after consultation with counsel.

The court reviewed the confession rule and assessed inducements, oppression, operating mind, and the overall interview context.

Although the accused was properly cautioned and treated appropriately before the interview, the officer’s aggressive tone, physical positioning, and comments undermining confidence in defence counsel raised concerns.

Considering the totality of the circumstances, the court found a reasonable doubt about voluntariness and excluded the November 18, 2009 statement while admitting the earlier statement.

In a multi‑accused jury trial involving numerous serious offences including robbery, kidnapping, firearms offences, and conspiracy, the court determined several pre‑trial jury selection issues.

The Crown sought an order empanelling fourteen jurors and selecting two alternate jurors under s. 631 of the Criminal Code due to the expected length and complexity of the trial.

The court granted the application, finding additional jurors advisable to reduce the risk of mistrial if jurors were excused.

The court also permitted a race‑based challenge for cause under s. 638(1)(b) given that the accused were members of visible minority groups, and established appropriate challenge questions referencing potential bias.

Finally, the court ruled that rotating triers would be used and ordered the exclusion of other jurors from the courtroom during the challenge process in the exercise of inherent jurisdiction.

The Crown sought to admit a roadside statement made by a vehicle passenger identifying himself to police during a traffic stop.

The defence argued the Crown had not proven the accused was the declarant and that the statement was involuntary because no caution was given.

The court held that for admissibility the Crown need only show “some evidence” that the accused was the declarant, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

On the evidence, identity was established and the statement was voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt because there were no inducements, oppression, or lack of operating mind.

The absence of a caution did not render the statement involuntary where the accused was not detained or suspected of an offence.

The accused was charged with aggravated assault and assault with a weapon after stabbing the complainant, who was the husband of the accused's landlord.

The complainant confronted the accused over suspicions of an affair with his wife, leading to a physical altercation.

The accused testified that the complainant attacked him, held him by his shirt, and threatened to kill him, prompting the accused to use a knife to defend himself.

The court found the complainant's evidence lacked credibility and accepted the accused's version of events.

The court concluded that the Crown failed to disprove self-defence beyond a reasonable doubt, finding the force used was reasonable in the circumstances.

The accused was acquitted of all charges.

A criminal lawyer pleaded guilty to fraud under $5,000 for defrauding his client's sister of $1,000.

The accused falsely represented that he could obtain the dismissal of criminal charges against his client through bribery of police officers.

After the Crown decided to stay the charges, the accused continued the fraudulent scheme, threatening that the case could be reopened if payment was not made.

The court imposed a six-month custodial sentence followed by two years of probation, finding that incarceration was necessary to reflect denunciation and general deterrence given the accused's position of trust as a lawyer and the serious breach of professional integrity.

This sentencing decision concerned prolonged intrafamilial sexual abuse by a step-grandfather against two child complainants over a number of years.

The court applied the Kienapple principle to stay the sexual assault counts duplicative of sexual interference counts, then emphasized denunciation and general deterrence as the dominant sentencing objectives for repeated child sexual abuse involving breach of trust.

Despite the offender's advanced age, health issues, and lack of criminal record, the court found substantial aggravating factors, including the complainants' very young ages, repeated abuse, use of pornography, inducements, secrecy, and profound harm.

A global custodial sentence of five years was imposed on the remaining counts, all concurrent, together with DNA, sex offender registry, child-contact prohibition, and weapons prohibition orders.