COURT FILE NO.: 10/50000732/0000

DATE: 20121120

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

– and –

G.B.[1]

Michael Wilson, for the Crown

Andrew Vaughan, for the Defendant

HEARD: November 7, 2012

DUCHARME j:

reasons for sentence

I. INTRODUCTION

[1] After a judge alone trial, I have found G.B. guilty of the following counts:

Count #1, a charge of committing a sexual assault on A.C., contrary to s. 271(1) (a) of the Criminal Code.

Count #2, a charge of touching A.C. for a sexual purpose, contrary to s. 151 (a) of the Criminal Code.

Count #3, a charge of inviting A.C. to touch a part of your body for a sexual purpose, contrary to s. 152 (a) of the Criminal Code.

Count #5, a charge of committing sexual assault on C.B., contrary to s. 271(1) (a) of the Criminal Code.

Count #6, a charge of touching C.B. for a sexual purpose, contrary to s. 151 (a) of the Criminal Code.

Count #7, a charge of inviting C.B. to touch a part of your body for a sexual purpose, contrary to s. 152 (a) of the Criminal Code.

Count #8, a charge of committing a sexual assault on C.B., contrary to s. 271(1) (a) of the Criminal Code.

Count #9, a charge of touching C.B. for a sexual purpose, contrary to s. 151 (a) of the Criminal Code.

Count #10, a charge of inviting C.B. to touch a part of your body for a sexual purpose, contrary to s. 152 (a) of the Criminal Code.

On November 15, I sentenced G.B. on these offences. These are my written reasons for that sentence.

II. KIENAPPLE

[2] With respect to the application of the principle in R. v. Kienapple, 1974 14 (SCC), [1975] 1 S.C.R. 729 (S.C.C.) both the Crown and Defence submit that I should stay the sexual assault charges, Counts 1, 5 and 8 as they have the same underlying factual and legal basis as the charges of sexual interference, counts 2, 6 and 9. I agree and will order that counts 1, 5 and 8 be stayed.

III. POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES

[3] The Crown submits that G.B. should be sentenced to three years on each of the charges involving C.B. to be served consecutively. Similarly, the Crown seeks concurrent sentences of three years with respect to the offences involving A.C. Taking the principle of totality into account, Mr. Wilson suggests that the global sentence be reduced to five years.

[4] In addition to any custodial term imposed, the Crown seeks the following ancillary orders:

(a) An order for the taking of bodily substances for the purpose of performing DNA analysis pursuant to section 487.051 of the Criminal Code;

(b) An order requiring that G.B. comply with the provisions Sexual Offender Information Registry Act for a period of 20 years pursuant to section 490.012 of the Criminal Code.

(c) An order pursuant to section 161 of the Criminal Code for a period of 10 years prohibiting G.B. from (a) attending various locations where persons under the age of 16 might reasonably be expected to be; or (b) seeking or obtaining employment, volunteer or otherwise, which might put him in a position of trust or authority towards persons under the age of 16.

(d) A Weapons Prohibition pursuant to section 109 of the Criminal Code for a period of 10 years.

[5] The defence seeks a global sentence of two years. With respect to the ancillary orders Mr. Vaughan does not take issue with any of the ones suggested by the Crown.

IV. THE OFFENCES

C.B.

[6] C.B. was born on [birth date redacted] and she is now 24 years old. I accepted the following parts of her testimony.

[7] G.B., her step-grandfather, started touching her when she was four years old and the touching continued until [date redacted] when her father was arrested and charged with sexual offences relating to her. At this point C.B. was taken into care by the C.A.S. and her father was eventually convicted and sent to jail.

[8] C.B. was sexually abused at both [Address 1] as well as at their subsequent address of [Address 2]. At [Address 1] G.B. touched C.B.’s vagina both over and under her clothing and would ask her to masturbate him to ejaculation. C.B. could not say how often this occurred. She estimated that she was touched a few times per month and said it was at least three times and could have been more than ten times. C.B. described one incident when her grandfather put on a pornographic movie during which time she masturbated him but he did not touch her.

[9] When C.B. was eight or nine years of age she moved to a house at [Address 2]. Her grandparents resided in an upstairs apartment and her grandfather would ask her to come up to the living room of the apartment. They would sit on the couch and he would touch her breasts and vagina both over and under her clothing. She described his touching as “rubbing, grabbing.” He would ask her to touch his penis and she would masturbate her grandfather to ejaculation, but there was never any penetration. These incidents happened a couple of times a month always in the bedroom or living room of the upper apartment.

[10] When C.B. was younger, G.B. would buy her candy and when she was older he would give her money or buy vodka for her. Specifically when she was 11 or 12 years of age, he would buy her a mickey of Smirnoff vodka. While C.B. believed that this was connected to the sexual activity, G.B. never said anything specifically linking the gifts to the sexual abuse. While the purchases of candy may have been innocent, I am satisfied that the purchases of alcohol for C.B. were an attempt to encourage her co-operation and ensure her silence.

[11] G.B. told C.B. not to say anything to anyone about these events and she did not as she was scared. It was not until 2007 or 2008 when C.B. finally told her grandmother about the abuse, in an attempt to ensure G.B. was not doing anything similar to her sisters, P.C. or A.C..

A.C.

[12] A.C. was born on [birth date redacted] and at the time of the trial she was 16. I accepted the following aspects of her testimony.

[13] G.B., her step-grandfather, started abusing her after she turned seven and was living with her grandparents at [Address 3] and it continued until she was in Grade 7 or 8 and returned home from church and told G.B. that it had to stop. Initially the abuse occurred approximately twice a week although when she got older it occurred less frequently, perhaps once per week.

[14] Most of the sexual abuse occurred in G.B.’s bedroom on his bed. G.B. would undress her and touch and kiss her breasts and her vagina, however there was never any penetration. G.B. would tell her to touch his penis and she would masturbate him. His penis would not be erect most of the time and A.C. only remembered him ejaculating once or twice. G.B. would often put on pornographic movies.

[15] The sexual abuse also occurred elsewhere in the house. Sometimes in the 2nd floor hallway near the half wall by the stairs, A.C. would lean back against the wall, fully clothed and masturbate him while he would kiss her, kiss her breasts and put his hands in her pants. Sometimes in the living room A.C. would sit on his lap in the rocking chair covered by a blanket. G.B. would touch her but this would be concealed by the blanket. A.C. testified that these incidents lasted approximately 15 minutes.

[16] G.B. told A.C. not to tell anyone, saying that she did not want to end up like your older sisters an end up in a foster home. He would say “don’t be like C.B., don’t tell anyone.”

V. THE OFFENDER

[17] G.B. is now 75 years of age. He is married to B.B., the grandmother of the two victims, who still supports him. Unfortunately, it appears that this support turns on her misguided belief that G.B. did nothing wrong. This is tragic as this means G.B.’s conviction will also cost the two victims a relationship with their grandmother. It also means that the support of his wife will not contribute to his taking responsibility for his wrong-doing or otherwise contribute to his rehabilitation.

[18] G.B. was born in Guyana and came to Canada in [date redacted] when he was sponsored by his wife. He is now a Canadian citizen. They have no children of their own. G.B. and his wife now live in a senior’s home where they have their own apartment. Their income is consists of old age pensions and senior’s benefits. G.B. has little formal education having started work at the age of 12 in Guyana. In Canada he worked as [occupation redacted] until his retirement in 2002. He apparently still does some part time work as a [occupation redacted].

[19] G.B. has a variety of health-related problems. He takes some 15 pills a day for high blood pressure, diabetes, high cholesterol, kidney and colon issues and arthritis. I am also told he suffered a minor cardiac incident in early October just before he was to appear in court. However, I note that the defence has not argued that because of these he should not be incarcerated. There is also no suggestion that Corrections Canada will not be able to address G.B.’s health needs.

VI. RELEVANT PRINCIPLES OF SENTENCING

[20] The purpose and principles of sentencing are set out in s. 718 of the Criminal Code. Generally speaking, the fundamental purpose of sentencing is to foster respect for the law and to maintain a just, peaceful and safe society. The court attempts to achieve this purpose by imposing just penalties that have one or more of the following objectives:

(1) denouncing unlawful conduct [s. 718(a)];

(2) deterring this offender and others from committing offences [s. 718(b)];

(3) imprisoning offenders where necessary to separate them from law abiding members of society [s. 718(c)];

(4) assisting in rehabilitating offenders and in appropriate circumstances encouraging their treatment [s. 718(d)];

(5) providing reparation for harm done to victims of the community [s. 718(e)]; and

(6) promoting in offenders a sense of responsibility for and acknowledgement of the harm they have done to victims and to the community [s. 718(f)].

[21] Section 718.1 of the Criminal Code provides that the fundamental principle of sentencing is that a sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and to the degree of responsibility of the offender. Section 718.2 of the Criminal Code also requires the court to take into account other principles, including these:

(a) that a sentence may be increased or decreased depending upon the presence of any relevant aggravating or mitigating circumstances relating to the offence or to the offender including the fact that the offender abused a person under 18 years of age; or in committing the offence, abused a position of trust or authority in relation to the victim. [s. 718.2(a)];

(c) where consecutive sentences are imposed, the combined sentence should not be unduly long or harsh [s. 718.2(c)];

(d) that an offender should not be deprived of liberty if less restrictive sanctions may be appropriate in the circumstances [s. 718.2(d)]; and

(e) that all available sanctions other than imprisonment that are reasonable in the circumstances should be considered for all offenders.

[22] By including these last two principles within the Criminal Code, Parliament has directed courts in effect to consider imprisonment as a last resort. It is obvious from the submissions of counsel that this case is not one where a non-custodial disposition would be appropriate.

[23] In R. v. Nasogaluak, 2010 SCC 6, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 206 the Court held at para. 43:

The language in ss. 718 to 718.2 of the Code is sufficiently general to ensure that sentencing judges enjoy a broad discretion to craft a sentence that is tailored to the nature of the offence and the circumstances of the offender. The determination of a "fit" sentence is, subject to some specific statutory rules, an individualized process that requires the judge to weigh the objectives of sentencing in a manner that best reflects the circumstances of the case. [Citations omitted.] No one sentencing objective trumps the others and it falls to the sentencing judge to determine which objective or objectives merit the greatest weight, given the particulars of the case. The relative importance of any mitigating or aggravating factors will then push the sentence up or down the scale of appropriate sentences for similar offences. The judge's discretion to decide on the particular blend of sentencing goals and the relevant aggravating or mitigating factors ensures that each case is decided on its facts, subject to the overarching guidelines and principles in the Code and in the case law.

[Emphasis added.]

[24] The considerations that are most relevant in cases of child sexual abuse were succinctly described by Moldaver J.A. in R. v. Woodward, 2011 ONCA 610 at para 72:

(1) Our children are our most valued and our most vulnerable assets.

(2) We as a society owe it to our children to protect them from the harm caused by sexual predators.

(3) Throughout their formative years, children are very susceptible to being taken advantage of by adult sexual offenders and they make easy prey for such predators.

(4) Adult sexual predators recognize that children are particularly vulnerable and they exploit this weakness to achieve their selfish ends, heedless of the dire consequences that can and often do follow.

(5) Three such consequences are now well-recognized: (i) children often suffer immediate physical and psychological harm; (ii) children who have been sexually abused may never be able, as an adult, to form a loving, caring relationship with another adult; (iii) and children who have been sexually abused are prone to become abusers themselves when they reach adulthood.

[25] As for the objectives of sentencing that should govern the sentencing of offenders such as G.B., Moldaver J.A. said the following in R. v. Woodward, 2011 ONCA 610 at para 72:

Absent exceptional circumstances, in the case of adult predators, the objectives of sentencing commonly referred to as denunciation, general and specific deterrence and the need to separate offenders from society must take precedence over the other recognized objectives of sentencing. [Emphasis added.]

[26] The parties do not dispute that these are the principles that must govern the sentence I impose in this case. I will discuss each of these principles in turn.

(A) Denunciation

[27] Denunciation as a principle of sentencing was explained by Chief Justice Lamer in R. v. C.A.M., 1996 230 (SCC), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500 (S.C.C.) at para. 81:

Retribution, as well, should be conceptually distinguished from its legitimate sibling, denunciation. Retribution requires that a judicial sentence properly reflect the moral blameworthiness of that particular offender. The objective of denunciation mandates that a sentence should also communicate society's condemnation of that particular offender's conduct. In short, a sentence with a denunciatory element represents a symbolic, collective statement that the offender's conduct should be punished for encroaching on our society's basic code of values as enshrined within our substantive criminal law. As Lord Justice Lawton stated in R. v. Sargeant (1974), 60 Cr. App. R. 74, at p. 77: "society, through the courts, must show its abhorrence of particular types of crime, and the only way in which the courts can show this is by the sentences they pass". The relevance of both retribution and denunciation as goals of sentencing underscores that our criminal justice system is not simply a vast system of negative penalties designed to prevent objectively harmful conduct by increasing the cost the offender must bear in committing an enumerated offence. Our criminal law is also a system of values. A sentence which expresses denunciation is simply the means by which these values are communicated. In short, in addition to attaching negative consequences to undesirable behaviour, judicial sentences should also be imposed in a manner which positively instills the basic set of communal values shared by all Canadians as expressed by the Criminal Code.

[Emphasis added.]

[28] In this case, an appropriate sentence must denounce the sexual abuse of children especially when it involves repeated sexual acts, lasts for an extended period of time and involves a significant breach of trust.

(B) Deterrence

[29] Justice Charron explained deterrence as a sentencing principle in R. v. B.W.P., 2006 SCC 27, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 941 (S.C.C.) at para. 2:

Deterrence, as a principle of sentencing, refers to the imposition of a sanction for the purpose of discouraging the offender and others from engaging in criminal conduct. When deterrence is aimed at the offender before the court, it is called "specific deterrence", when directed at others, "general deterrence". ... General deterrence is intended to work in this way: potential criminals will not engage in criminal activity because of the example provided by the punishment imposed on the offender. When general deterrence is factored in the determination of the sentence, the offender is punished more severely, not because he or she deserves it, but because the court decides to send a message to others who may be inclined to engage in similar criminal activity.

[30] Given the G.B.’s age and his health difficulties, I accept that his risk of re-offending has been somewhat reduced. However, I note that he persisted in this abuse even after he was diagnosed with erectile dysfunction. Thus, despite his somewhat attenuated risk, I consider specific deterrence to be relevant to the sentence I must impose.

[31] As for general deterrence, I recognize that the theory behind general deterrence has been questioned in some contexts.[2] Critics of general deterrence question its validity on the basis that: (1) many crimes are relatively spontaneous and the offender does not stop beforehand to consider the possibility of being punished; (2) offenders are not aware of sentences imposed for particular crimes so the quantum of a sentence will not have a deterrent effect; and (3) even if an offender was aware of the range of sentences imposed for a particular crime, they would discount that range by the risk of discovery, apprehension and actual prosecution.

[32] Despite these criticisms, general deterrence remains one of the objectives of sentencing that Parliament has prescribed in s. 718 of the Criminal Code. In fact, in my view, general deterrence must be one of the principal sentencing objectives in cases like this. Moreover, the above criticisms have little or no applicability to cases of this nature: (1) Sexual abuse of children is rarely, if ever, a spontaneous crime. (2) When child sexual abuse takes place over a period of time, the abuser is often aware of the risk of apprehension and punishment. That is why, as in this case, abusers will often take steps to ensure their victims remain silent. This behaviour suggests that the abuser engages in a form of cost-benefit analysis. Thus, the imposition of significant sentences for the sexual abuse of children by increasing the cost of punishment can alter that calculus and deter the sexual abuse; and (3) In R. v. D.D. (2002), 2002 44915 (ON CA), 58 O.R. (3d) 788 (Ont. C.A.) a critically important case dealing with the sentencing of those who sexually prey upon children, Moldaver J.A. expressly endorsed the use of general deterrence saying at para 45, “the message to such offenders must be clear -- prey upon innocent children and you will pay a heavy price!”

[33] For all of these reasons I am of the view that general deterrence is particularly effective when dealing with those who sexually abuse children over time in situations involving a breach of trust. Not only is general deterrence effective in this area but it is a critical sentencing objective given the impact of such crimes.

(C) The Need to Separate Offenders from Society

[34] This principle is straightforward. Some offenders present such a risk of re-offending that the only way to ensure that they do not re-offend is to incarcerate them. Thus s. 718 (c) of the Criminal Code speaks of the objective of “separat(ing) offenders from society, where necessary.” [Emphasis added] In the case of those who prey upon children, incarceration is justified where it is necessary to ensure that the offender will have no access to other children whom they might prey upon.

[35] While Woodward makes it clear that this is one of the primary objectives in sentencing sexual abusers of children, its importance in any particular case will turn on the facts of the case and, in particular, on the risk of re-offending represented by the particular offender.

[36] In this case Mr. Wilson, for the Crown, does not rely on this sentencing objective given that: (a) G.B. is not living with children; (b) the last offence occurred approximately ten years ago; and (c) his age and health lowers the risk of his re-offending. While I am not satisfied that G.B. presents no risk of re-offending, I accept Mr. Wilson’s submissions in this regard.

VI. DISCUSSION & ANALYSIS

[37] As the above quotation from Nasogaluak demonstrates the determination of a proper sentence is a very case-specific sentence. However, in R. v. D.D., Moldaver J.A. for a unanimous court gave some very clear directions about the appropriate range of sentences for child sexual abuse. At para 44 he stated:

To summarize, I am of the view that as a general rule, when adult offenders, in a position of trust, sexually abuse innocent young children on a regular and persistent basis over substantial periods of time, they can expect to receive mid to upper single digit penitentiary terms. When the abuse involves full intercourse, anal or vaginal, and it is accompanied by other acts of physical violence, threats of physical violence, or other forms of extortion, upper single digit to low double digit penitentiary terms will generally be appropriate. Finally, in cases where these elements are accompanied by a pattern of severe psychological, emotional and physical brutalization, still higher penalties will be warranted.

[Emphasis added]

Importantly, at para 33 Justice Moldaver qualified his comments about the appropriate range of sentence:

…I wish to emphasize that the ranges I have identified are not meant to be fixed and inflexible. On the contrary sentencing is not an exact science and trial judges must retain the flexibility needed to do justice in individual cases. The suggested ranges are merely guidelines designed to assist trial judges in their difficult task of fashioning fit and just sentences in similar cases.

[38] While the facts of D.D. were significantly worse than those in this case,[3] it marked a significant change in approach to sentencing in this area and the foregoing principles have been reiterated numerous times by every level of court in Ontario. I accept Mr. Wilson’s submission that G.B. falls within the category highlighted in the above quote from D.D.

Mitigating Factors

[39] The following mitigating factors are present in this case:

(a) G.B. does not have a Criminal Record; and

(b) Since coming to Canada, G.B. has been steadily employed and he continues to work on a part-time basis;

[40] There are two other factors which may work to reduce the appropriate sentence in this case:

(a) G.B. is now 75 years of age; and

(b) G.B. has several health problems.

I mention these separately as I do not consider these to be mitigating factors in any true sense. That is, they do not speak to G.B.’s good character or to his prospects for rehabilitation. Nonetheless, these are factors that can suggest that the appropriate sentence might be less than it would be otherwise.

Aggravating Factors

[41] The following aggravating factors are present in this case:

(a) G.B. as the step-grandfather of these two girls was in a position of trust. Indeed, with respect to A.C., G.B. was in a position of loco parentis. G.B. took advantage of this relationship with the victims, utilizing his position of trust and authority in order to perpetrate the acts of sexual abuse

(b) Both C.B. and A.C. were extremely young (ages 4 and 7 respectively) at the time that G.B. commenced his abuse of them;

(c) With both victims, the acts of sexual abuse were not isolated in nature but were performed with regularity over a number of years;

(d) The acts perpetrated by G.B. upon the victims went beyond touching above the clothing and included direct genital contact. On various occasions, G.B. directed both victims to masturbate him to the point of ejaculation. G.B. exposed both victims to pornographic movies. In the case of A.C., he did so while masturbating in her presence;

(e) All of the acts performed by G.B. were performed in the homes of the victims, a place where children should be able to feel safe;

(f) The physical and psychological impact that G.B.’s actions have quite obviously had upon the victims. As Moldaver J.A. noted in D.D. the “horrific consequences” of child abuse are well known. This is borne out by the victim impact statement of C.B. She speaks eloquently of the psychological impact the abuse has had on her. She has difficulties with relationships with men. She began using alcohol at an early age and was addicted to drugs and alcohol by the time she finished high school. She is tortured by guilt for not reporting her grandfather’s abuse earlier and she blames herself for the fact that her sister was then abused by him. While I do not have a victim impact from A.C., it is obvious to me that she feels deeply conflicted about reporting her grandfather’s abuse. She is also very hurt by the fact that her grandmother disbelieves her. The sad consequences of this were powerfully demonstrated on the last day in court when A.C. sat alone on the opposite side of the courtroom from her grandmother. This is a terrible way to treat a young girl who, while testifying, made it clear that she did not want G.B. to go to jail. A.C. testified that all she wanted was an apology from him for the abuse.

(g) The sexual abuse of A.C. commenced after C.B.’s father had been convicted of sexually abusing C.B. and her sister F.B. So at the time G.B. decided to abuse A.C., G.B. was well aware of the legal consequences of such actions and the devastation that sexual abuse by a family member can cause to a victim and their family. Indeed, G.B. used this as a means to pressure A.C. to remain silent about what he was doing to her telling her not to be like C.B. I regard this as a particularly aggravating circumstance.

The Appropriate Sentence

[42] In my view, given the sentencing guidance provided by the Ontario Court of Appeal in cases such as D.D., Woodward and R. v. D.M. 2012 ONCA 520, I think the sentence I impose must denounce sexual offences perpetrated upon children in the strongest of terms, especially offences committed by persons in positions of trust, involving multiple sexual contacts over a period of years. The sentence I impose must also be significant enough to deter like-minded offenders from engaging in such acts. For all of the foregoing reasons, the appropriate range of sentence for these offences is four to eight years. Moreover, given that they involved discrete victims over separate periods of time, they would ordinarily attract consecutive sentences, subject only to the principle of totality.

[43] The Crown’s submission is that the appropriate sentence on the charges related to C.B. is three years all to be served concurrently and the appropriate sentence on the charges related to A.C. is three years all to be served concurrently. Taking totality into account the Crown suggests I impose a global sentence of 5 years.

[44] Given all of the foregoing aggravating and mitigating factors, the two year sentence suggested by Mr. Vaughan is manifestly inadequate. For the same reasons, I do not think that a sentence of three years is sufficient to accomplish the goals of denunciation or deterrence with respect to the offences against either victim in this case. Rather, for all of the foregoing reasons, I think the appropriate sentence for the offences related to C.B. is six years all to be served concurrently and the appropriate sentence on the charges related to A.C. is six years all to be served concurrently. I would not make these sentences consecutive as this would offend the principle of totality.

[45] However, I must also consider G.B.’s advanced age and his health problems. In doing so, I recognize that the public would understandably be frustrated if they believed that G.B. might obtain a reduction in sentence because, through the silencing of his victims, he was able to delay his conviction. However, this is not why I will reduce his sentence. While I reject Mr. Vaughan’s submission that any sentence over two years is a “life sentence”, I will reduce G.B.’s sentence because of two undeniable realities. The first is that serving a penitentiary sentence, which is always an arduous experience, will be much more difficult for a man of his age with his various health problems. The second is that a year for a 75 year old man means far more a year does for a younger man.

SENTENCE

[46] G.B., on consent, I make the following orders:

DNA Order

[47] Sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching are among the primary designated offences in s. 487.04, the section of the Criminal Code dealing with forensic DNA analysis and the securing of DNA samples. Section 487.051(1) provides that the court shall, in the case of a primary designated offence, make a DNA databank.

[48] In this case I will make an order pursuant to s. 487.051 of the Criminal Code requiring you to provide such samples of his bodily substances as are reasonably necessary for the purpose of forensic DNA analysis.

Sex Offender Registration

[49] Also on consent, there will be an order under s. 490.012(1) of the Criminal Code in Form 52 requiring you to comply with the Sex Offender Information Registration Act, S.C. 2004, c. 10, for the period of twenty years. I make this order because you have been convicted of sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching which are designated offences under s. 490.011(a)(xvi), and there is no basis to believe that this would have a disproportionate impact on you or your privacy or liberty interests. I take comfort in reaching this latter conclusion from the fact that from the fact that Mr. Vaughan for G.B. have consented to this order. The 20 year term is dictated by s. 490.013(2) (b) of the Criminal Code.

Order of Prohibition

[50] I will also make an order pursuant to section 161 of the Criminal Code for a period of 10 years prohibiting you from (a) attending various locations where persons under the age of 16 might reasonably be expected to be; or (b) seeking or obtaining employment, volunteer or otherwise, which might put him in a position of trust or authority towards persons under the age of 16. I will make an exception with respect to your attending church in the company of your wife.

Weapons Prohibition

[51] On consent, pursuant to section 109, you are prohibited from possessing any firearm, cross-bow, restricted weapon, ammunition, explosive substance, prohibited weapon, or prohibited device for a period of ten years.

[52] Stand up G.B., for the foregoing reasons, I sentence you as follows:

Count #2, a charge of touching A.C. for a sexual purpose, contrary to s. 151 (a) of the Criminal Code, I sentence you to a period of imprisonment of five years.

Count #3, a charge of inviting A.C. to touch a part of your body for a sexual purpose, contrary to s. 152 (a) of the Criminal Code, I sentence you to a period of imprisonment of five years to be served concurrently with the sentence for Count #2.

Count #6, a charge of touching C.B. for a sexual purpose, contrary to s. 151 (a) of the Criminal Code, I sentence you to a period of imprisonment of five years to be served concurrently with the sentence for Count #2

Count #7, a charge of inviting C.B. to touch a part of your body for a sexual purpose, contrary to s. 152 (a) of the Criminal Code, I sentence you to a period of imprisonment of five years to be served concurrently with the sentence for Count #2

Count #9, a charge of touching C.B. for a sexual purpose, contrary to s. 151 (a) of the Criminal Code, I sentence you to a period of imprisonment of five years to be served concurrently with the sentence for Count #2

Count #10, a charge of inviting C.B. to touch a part of your body for a sexual purpose, contrary to s. 152 (a) of the Criminal Code, I sentence you to a period of imprisonment of five years to be served concurrently with the sentence for Count #2

Ducharme J.

Released: November 20, 2012

COURT FILE NO.: 10/50000732/0000

DATE: 20121120

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

– and –

G.B.

Defendant

REASONS FOR SENTENCE

Ducharme J.

Released: November 20, 2012

[^1]: The trial judge made an order s. 486.4(1) directing that any information that could identify the complainants in this case shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in anyway. This version of the reasons for sentence has been redacted accordingly.

[^2]: R. v. Wismayer (1997), 1997 3294 (ON CA), 115 C.C.C. (3d) 18 (Ont. C.A.) per Rosenberg J.A. at pp. 36 - 39; R. v. Edwards (1996), 1996 1522 (ON CA), 28 O.R. (3d) 54 (C.A.) per Finlayson J.A. at p. 66; R. v. Sweeney (1992), 1992 4030 (BC CA), 71 C.C.C. (3d) 82 (B.C.C.A.) per Wood J.A. at pp. 98 - 100

[^3]: In D.D., the accused was convicted of numerous sexual offences against four boys each under eight years of age. The sexual acts included masturbation, group sex, oral sex and attempted and actual anal intercourse. The accused assaulted the boys and threatened to keep them silent. He had a minor, unrelated criminal record. Moldaver J.A. said that the global sentence of 9 years, 1 month was at the lower end of the appropriate range.