Andrew Rogerson

Following the breakdown of a common law relationship, the parties disputed entitlement to the proceeds of sale of a custom-built home constructed through a shell corporation on jointly used funds and extensive labour.

The court held that the presumption of resulting trust over the parties’ joint RBC and BMO accounts was rebutted, accepted that the applicant had contributed substantial cash and labour, and found that the respondent’s evidence was frequently not credible.

Applying unjust enrichment and joint family venture principles from Kerr, the court concluded that the applicant’s on-site management, labour, and career sacrifice sufficiently offset the respondent’s greater direct monetary contribution.

The respondent’s claims for line of credit interest, occupation rent, and compensation for lost personal property were dismissed.

The trust funds representing the sale proceeds were ordered to be distributed equally.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal the decision of Chalmers J. dated July 12, 2024.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding parties fixed in the amount of $5,000 all inclusive.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed Andrew Miracle’s appeal from a summary judgment awarding his former lawyer $2,858,500 in contingency fees and upholding a solicitor’s lien.

The dispute arose from a business conflict between Miracle and his son over “Smokin’ Joe’s,” resolved by arbitration.

The court found that Miracle’s acquisition of the business constituted a “recovery” under the contingency fee agreement, even though he did not receive a cash award.

The court also upheld the enforceability of the contingency fee agreement and the granting of a common law solicitor’s lien, finding no error in the motion judge’s exercise of discretion.

This decision addresses motions for leave to appeal a costs order issued by the Superior Court of Justice.

Robert Mark Roe, the appellant in the underlying appeal concerning a will challenge, sought leave to appeal the costs award.

Randall Scott Roe, a respondent, brought a cross-motion for leave to appeal the same costs order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed Randall Scott Roe's cross-motion for leave to appeal, finding no error in the application judge's discretionary costs award, which involved a holistic review of the litigation and parties' conduct.

Robert Mark Roe's motion for leave to appeal the costs order was dismissed as abandoned.

No costs were awarded on the motions for leave to appeal.

Robert Mark Roe appealed a lower court decision that upheld his mother's 2005 Will, which disinherited him.

He argued that his mother, Beverly Grace Roe, lacked testamentary capacity due to insane delusions and was unduly influenced by his brother, Rick.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the application judge's findings, concluding that Beverly's beliefs, though at times irrational, had a factual basis, and that she was not unduly influenced.

The court also confirmed that a testator only needs a general understanding of their assets for testamentary capacity.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondent Randall Scott Roe.

This is a costs decision following an unsuccessful three-week trial where Robert Mark Roe challenged his mother's will and inter vivos gifts.

The court dismissed both actions (Will Action and Gift Action).

The decision addresses the costs sought by Randall Scott Roe (an estate trustee and successful respondent) and Raymond Christopher Roe (another estate trustee).

The court fixed costs, ordering Mark Roe to pay Randall Scott Roe $330,000 in all-inclusive costs, the estate to cover $260,338.03 of Randall's litigation costs, and Randall to be personally responsible for the balance.

Raymond Christopher Roe was reimbursed $170,000 from the estate for his conciliatory approach.

The appellant pharmacist appealed the decisions of the Discipline Committee of the Ontario College of Pharmacists finding professional misconduct, imposing a penalty, and awarding costs of $190,000.

The misconduct involved billing for medications not prescribed or received, and falsifying records.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no legal error or palpable and overriding error of fact in the Committee's decisions regarding misconduct, penalty, or costs.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Financial Services Tribunal revoking her mortgage agent licence.

The Tribunal found she had engaged in a repeated pattern of dishonesty, including failing to disclose a previous real estate registration revocation and a criminal conviction for obstructing justice, and misleading investigators.

On appeal, the appellant argued the Tribunal should have applied a higher standard of proof and erred in its penalty.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, confirming that the civil standard of proof applies regardless of the seriousness of the allegations, and found no palpable or overriding error in the Tribunal's decision to revoke the licence.

The appellant appealed the removal of her notice of objection to a will's validity and a substantial indemnity costs award from the lower court.

The Court of Appeal found the appellant lacked standing to appeal the will's validity after withdrawing her objection and failing to provide supporting evidence.

However, the court found a palpable and overriding error in the application judge's costs award, as not all delays were solely attributable to the appellant.

The substantial indemnity costs were set aside and reduced to a partial indemnity amount.

The applicant challenged his mother's Will, which disinherited him, arguing she lacked testamentary capacity, suffered from insane delusions, and was unduly influenced by his brother.

The court found that while the Will was executed under suspicious circumstances, the respondents successfully proved the testator had testamentary capacity and was not operating under insane delusions.

The court held that the testator's reasons for disinheriting the applicant, though perhaps unreasonable or based on misunderstandings, were grounded in actual events and did not amount to insane delusions.

The applicant also failed to prove undue influence.

The application and related action were dismissed.

The moving defendants brought a motion on consent of all parties to transfer the action from St. Thomas to Toronto.

The action arose from a syndicated mortgage investment for a property in St. Thomas.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that none of the parties were located in Toronto and the only connection to Toronto was the location of counsel's offices.

The court held that the convenience of counsel is not a sufficient basis to transfer an action under Rule 13.1.02.

In a will challenge application, the parties brought cross-motions regarding the appointment of an Estate Trustee During Litigation (ETDL).

The applicants sought to appoint a professional trust company, while the respondent executor named in the impugned will sought to be appointed himself.

The court found that an ETDL was necessary and appointed the respondent executor, noting he had no beneficial interest in the estate, was neutral, and had already been managing the estate's assets.

The court dismissed the applicants' motion to appoint a limited partnership as ETDL, as it was not legally authorized to act in that capacity.

The court also granted directions for an accounting, production of medical records, and interim custody of certain chattels.

The appellant husband appealed an order granting the respondent wife's motion for partition and sale of their jointly owned matrimonial home and dismissing his motion for summary judgment.

The husband argued the parties had reached a binding agreement for him to buy out the wife's interest.

The Divisional Court upheld the motion judge's finding that there was no meeting of the minds, as the husband's acceptance did not include the wife's requirement for a spousal support release.

The Court also found no error in the order for partition and sale under the Partition Act, noting no malicious or oppressive conduct by the wife.

The appeal was dismissed.

An application for leave to appeal a contempt finding was dismissed.

The contempt finding arose from the applicant's failure to attend an examination in aid of a foreign bankruptcy proceeding.

The Court of Appeal found that the proposed appeal did not raise issues of general importance to bankruptcy/insolvency practice or the administration of justice, lacked prima facie merit, and would unduly hinder the progress of the bankruptcy proceedings.

The issues raised included a refused recusal motion and the requirement of personal service for contempt proceedings.

This is a motion to quash an appeal brought by Andrew Henry Ting against two orders made in the bankruptcy proceedings of his father, James Henry Ting.

The orders included an enforcement of a Hong Kong letter of request for production and examination, and a subsequent contempt finding and penalty for non-compliance.

The appellant argued he had a right of appeal under s. 193(a) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA) on the basis that the point at issue involved "future rights" specifically procedural fairness regarding a recusal request.

The Court of Appeal held that the orders were subject to BIA appeal routes and that issues of procedural fairness engage present, not future, rights.

Consequently, the appeal was quashed.

At a case conference, the court ordered the respondent to select three real estate brokers from a list proposed by independent counsel to obtain opinions of value for three properties subject to the application.

Following the valuations, the parties are to schedule a further case conference to determine next steps.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement following an appeal.

Costs of the appeal were awarded to the respondent on a partial indemnity scale in the amount of $2,500, inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The moving parties sought to object to the responding parties including their factums from the court below in their motion record for leave to appeal.

The Divisional Court issued a supplementary endorsement clarifying that anything before the court below may form part of the record on a motion for leave to appeal, and there was nothing improper about including the factums.

The court declined to reconsider its decision on the motion for leave to appeal, noting that its decision did not turn on the responding parties' factums.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal two interlocutory orders.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding parties.

The court issued supplementary reasons regarding a motion for disclosure of non-parties to whom the plaintiffs had disseminated unredacted litigation documents identifying minor defendants.

Despite the plaintiffs' failure to provide submissions and their stated intent to seek leave to appeal, the court proceeded to decide the outstanding issue.

The court found that the plaintiffs had breached an interim publication ban and engaged in a strategy to release minor defendants' identities to the press.

To ameliorate the harm and ensure the efficacy of the publication ban, the court ordered the plaintiffs to disclose under oath the names and contact details of all recipients of the identifying documents.