Andrew Rogerson

The moving party sought a stay of an order requiring him to produce documents and attend an examination in a foreign main bankruptcy proceeding, pending his father's application in Hong Kong to annul the underlying bankruptcy order.

The court determined the order was interlocutory and applied the RJR-Macdonald test.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no serious issue to be tried, no irreparable harm to the moving party, and that the balance of convenience favoured the trustees.

The moving parties sought to object to the responding parties including their factums from the court below in their motion record for leave to appeal.

The Divisional Court issued a supplementary endorsement clarifying that anything before the court below may form part of the record on a motion for leave to appeal, and there was nothing improper about including the factums.

The court declined to reconsider its decision on the motion for leave to appeal, noting that its decision did not turn on the responding parties' factums.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal two interlocutory orders.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding parties.

The court issued supplementary reasons regarding a motion for disclosure of non-parties to whom the plaintiffs had disseminated unredacted litigation documents identifying minor defendants.

Despite the plaintiffs' failure to provide submissions and their stated intent to seek leave to appeal, the court proceeded to decide the outstanding issue.

The court found that the plaintiffs had breached an interim publication ban and engaged in a strategy to release minor defendants' identities to the press.

To ameliorate the harm and ensure the efficacy of the publication ban, the court ordered the plaintiffs to disclose under oath the names and contact details of all recipients of the identifying documents.

The court heard urgent motions to seal the file and ban publication of minor parties' identities in a bullying lawsuit.

The plaintiffs, Mother Doe and Jane Doe, initially sought broad protection but then released unredacted pleadings to the press, identifying the minor defendants.

The court found the plaintiffs' conduct reprehensible, rejecting their late-filed affidavits and expunging other materials.

Applying the Dagenais/Mentuck test, the court granted a publication ban protecting minors' names, school attendance dates, and family details, but allowed publication of ages, grade levels, and general details of alleged bullying and harm, as these were deemed not to identify the minors to the general public.

Substantial indemnity costs were awarded against the plaintiffs due to their abusive litigation tactics and breaches of court orders.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her defamation action following a five-day trial.

The trial judge found that while the respondent's statements were defamatory and made in the context of an employment reference, they were protected by qualified privilege.

The trial judge also found that the appellant failed to prove malice, which would have defeated the privilege.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision on liability, finding no palpable and overriding error.

The court also addressed the appellant's challenge to costs, granting leave to appeal costs and reducing the award by $8,275.00 to exclude costs for voluntary mediation.

This is a costs endorsement arising from a motion for temporary access to a child during November and Christmas 2017.

The applicant father sought access to the child while a trial on custody and access was ongoing before another judge.

The respondent mother opposed the motion.

The court granted the applicant substantially all of the relief sought, permitting access during the requested periods with specified conditions.

The applicant subsequently sought full recovery of costs in the amount of $6,724.06.

The court reduced the costs award to $3,000.00 inclusive of all fees, disbursements, and HST, citing the failure of either party to serve an offer to settle and other relevant factors under the Family Law Rules.

The respondents brought a motion to stay a $50,000 costs order pending their motion for leave to appeal.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that the moving parties failed to meet the RJR-MacDonald test for a stay.

Specifically, they did not establish a serious issue to be tried regarding the correctness of the costs order, nor did they demonstrate irreparable harm or that the balance of convenience favoured them.

At a trial management conference for a will challenge and related gift challenge, the court directed that the two proceedings be tried together to avoid duplicating evidence regarding the deceased's capacity.

The court ordered that evidence in chief be given primarily by affidavit, with limited oral examination, and set a timetable for the exchange of materials and a pre-trial conference.

The appellant sought to appeal and sought leave to appeal an order of the Superior Court of Justice that had dismissed her motion for leave to appeal a costs order made in the Ontario Court of Justice regarding parental access.

The respondent requested that the Divisional Court dismiss the proceedings under Rule 2.1.01.

The court held that there is no right of appeal from an order denying leave to appeal.

The appeal and motion for leave to appeal were dismissed.

The plaintiff sought summary judgment for the amount owing on a second mortgage.

The defendants argued the initial funds were gifts, not loans, and that the mortgage was obtained through fraudulent misrepresentation, duress, and was unconscionable, asserting they did not understand what they were signing despite receiving independent legal advice.

The court found the funds were loans, interest was implied by conduct, there was no misrepresentation, the defendants understood the documents and received adequate independent legal advice, and the mortgage was not unconscionable.

Summary judgment was granted to the plaintiff.

The plaintiff sued her former manager for defamation after he provided a negative employment reference to a prospective employer, resulting in a revoked job offer.

The court found that while the manager's statements were defamatory, they were made on an occasion of qualified privilege.

The plaintiff failed to prove that the manager was motivated by malice.

The court also dismissed the plaintiff's alternative tort claims as they were based on the same facts as the defamation claim.

The action was dismissed in its entirety.

The plaintiff, Tracey Kanak, sued her former manager, Darryl Riggin, for defamation based on statements made during a job reference.

The plaintiff alleged malice, while the defendant pleaded qualified privilege and denied malice.

The court found the statements defamatory but concluded they were made on an occasion of qualified privilege.

The plaintiff failed to prove malice, as the defendant's testimony was credible and his statements were honest and not reckless.

The court also dismissed the plaintiff's alternative claims (breach of contract, intentional interference, infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy) as they were deemed "dressed up" pleadings of defamation, resting on the same impugned publications.

The action was dismissed in its entirety.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment.

During the hearing, the defendants raised unpleaded legal issues in their factum, which was served late.

The plaintiff sought to file a supplementary book of authorities to address these new issues, providing it to the defendants at the commencement of the motion.

The court accepted the plaintiff's supplementary book of authorities and heard submissions from both parties.

To ensure fairness, the defendants were granted leave to file written submissions on the cases in the supplementary book within ten days, with the plaintiff allowed a further ten days for reply submissions, both limited to five pages.

The plaintiffs obtained an ex parte interim injunction preventing the defendant lenders from calling in a loan or enforcing a general security agreement.

On the return of the motion, the court set aside the injunction, finding the plaintiffs deliberately failed to disclose a material 'additional security' clause that gave the lenders majority equity and control of the corporation.

The court also granted the defendants' cross-motion to dismiss the action brought in the corporation's name, as the individual plaintiff lacked the corporate authority to commence litigation on its behalf without a board resolution.

The defendants brought a motion seeking leave to bring a summary judgment motion and to amend their statement of defence to add a limitations defence.

The court granted leave to amend the statement of defence, conditional on the defendants paying $1500 to the plaintiff for associated costs.

However, the court denied leave to bring a summary judgment motion, emphasizing the plaintiff's right to a jury trial and the principles of proportionality and access to justice, particularly given the plaintiff's unique circumstances and the imminent trial date.

The court found that allowing a summary judgment motion would be unjust and unfair, potentially jeopardizing the scheduled jury trial.

The appellant appealed the Registrar's proposal to refuse her registration as a real estate salesperson under the Real Estate and Business Brokers Act, 2002.

The refusal was based on her past conduct in British Columbia, where her mortgage broker registration was suspended for life and her real estate registration was suspended for three years due to her failure to supervise her assistant.

The Tribunal found that the appellant had demonstrated rehabilitation, taken responsibility for her past actions, and practiced without issue in Ontario for 18 months.

The Tribunal also found that a 17-year-old bankruptcy was insufficient to prove financial irresponsibility.

The Tribunal ordered the Registrar to register the appellant.

The respondent husband moved to stay a divorce proceeding and set aside an ex parte Mareva injunction on the basis that the Ontario court lacked jurisdiction under s. 3(1) of the Divorce Act.

The court found that the applicant spouse had not been ordinarily resident in Ontario for the required one‑year period preceding the application and had instead been living with the family in China.

The court also concluded there was no real and substantial connection to Ontario sufficient to ground corollary relief under the Family Law Act.

In related proceedings concerning the parties’ children, the court declined to order their return to China despite concerns regarding their removal, emphasizing the need for a full evidentiary record before determining custody issues.