Charlotté Calon

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal the decision of Chalmers J. dated July 12, 2024.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding parties fixed in the amount of $5,000 all inclusive.

The Ontario College of Teachers brought a motion seeking leave to withdraw allegations of professional misconduct against the member.

The parties agreed to the withdrawal after the member signed an Undertaking, Agreement and Acknowledgment, in which he irrevocably resigned his membership, surrendered his Certificate of Qualification and Registration, and undertook never to teach again in Ontario.

The Discipline Committee granted the motion, finding that the withdrawal was reasonable, appropriate, and protected the public interest.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal where the appellants' appeal was allowed.

The Court of Appeal addressed the disposition of costs for a motion previously heard in the Superior Court.

The appellants sought $20,098.48 for the motion costs.

Applying s. 137.1(8) of the Courts of Justice Act, the court fixed the motion costs at the requested amount and ordered them payable to the appellants by the respondents, conditional on the appellants' success in the ongoing main action.

The court noted the respondents' original motion had a low prospect of success.

The appellants, a cat rescue operation and its director, appealed the dismissal of their defamation action under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The motion judge had dismissed the action against all defendants, including non-moving parties, and awarded costs.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred by misapplying the s. 137.1 criteria, specifically by using a higher standard for assessing the substantial merit of the claim, mischaracterizing the "sting" of the defamation, relying on inadmissible hearsay, and improperly assessing the harm suffered by the appellants.

The Court also held that the motion judge erred in dismissing the action against defendants who had not brought a motion to dismiss.

The appeal was allowed, the dismissal order set aside, and the matter remitted for further proceedings.

The defendant landlord moved under Rule 49.09 to enforce a settlement agreement against the plaintiff tenant.

The settlement required the plaintiff to pay the reasonable costs of removing its commercial signage from the building.

After the plaintiff delayed the removal, the defendant hired its own contractor for $7,175.50, an amount nearly identical to the plaintiff's own quote.

The court found the defendant's request for reimbursement reasonable and ordered the plaintiff to pay the amount, plus substantial indemnity costs, noting the litigation was unnecessary.

The moving party brought motions for leave to appeal three orders of the lower court.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motions for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the respondents in the amount of $5,000 per court file.

The applicant brought a motion for the production of third-party medical, financial, and legal records in a will challenge, alleging his late mother lacked testamentary capacity and was unduly influenced by the respondent.

While the applicant's own evidence was largely speculative, the court found that the respondent's cross-examination and a video of the will signing ceremony provided an ample objective basis to meet the evidentiary threshold.

The video showed the mother being coached off-screen, and the respondent's evidence regarding the mother's finances was internally inconsistent and defied common sense.

The motion for production was granted.

The defendants brought an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' defamation action arising from posts made in a Facebook group about animal rescue practices.

The court found that the posts related to matters of public interest, specifically animal welfare.

The plaintiffs failed to show that the defendants lacked valid defences of justification and fair comment, and failed to provide evidence of harm sufficient to outweigh the public interest in protecting the expression.

The action was dismissed.

The Privacy Commissioner brought a reference to the Federal Court regarding the application of PIPEDA to Google's search engine.

A complainant alleged Google contravened PIPEDA by displaying links to sensitive news articles when his name was searched.

The Court answered two reference questions.

First, the Court held that Google collects, uses, and discloses personal information in the course of commercial activities when indexing and displaying search results, as every component of its business model is commercial.

Second, the Court held Google's search engine service is not excluded from PIPEDA under the journalistic exemption, as its primary purpose is not journalistic, and certainly not exclusively journalistic.

The Court concluded PIPEDA applies to Google's search engine operations.

The child, who was the subject of a high-conflict custody and child protection dispute, ran away and sought assistance from a legal clinic.

The father obtained an urgent motion order restraining the legal clinic and its lawyer from representing or contacting the child.

The legal clinic and the child appealed.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred by conflating a child's right to standing in a proceeding with their fundamental right to seek independent legal advice.

The court held that children are entitled to seek legal advice without permission from their parents or the court.

The moving parties sought to object to the responding parties including their factums from the court below in their motion record for leave to appeal.

The Divisional Court issued a supplementary endorsement clarifying that anything before the court below may form part of the record on a motion for leave to appeal, and there was nothing improper about including the factums.

The court declined to reconsider its decision on the motion for leave to appeal, noting that its decision did not turn on the responding parties' factums.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal two interlocutory orders.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding parties.