Andrew Ostrom

This endorsement addresses the issue of costs following the dismissal of the plaintiff's motion on April 28, 2017.

The defendant sought costs ranging from partial indemnity to substantial indemnity, while the plaintiff proposed partial indemnity costs of approximately $2295.

The court, exercising its discretion under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01, determined that the case did not merit substantial indemnity costs.

Costs were fixed at $4,000, payable forthwith by the plaintiff to the defendant.

The plaintiff brought a motion for a further and better affidavit of documents from her former employer and related defendants in a wrongful dismissal and discrimination action.

The plaintiff sought seven categories of documents, arguing they were necessary to respond to a pending summary judgment motion.

The court dismissed the majority of the requests, finding that the defendants had either already produced the relevant documents, the documents did not exist, or the requested documents (such as other employees' severance packages) were privileged and irrelevant.

The court granted the request for documents relating to the rationale for not awarding the plaintiff a salary increase in early 2014.

The applicant brought two human rights applications alleging discrimination on the basis of family status after his request for an extension to complete a nursing program was denied.

In this interim decision, the Tribunal consolidated the two applications on consent.

The Tribunal denied the applicant's request for production of extension requests made by other students, finding that the documents were not arguably relevant to the issue of whether the applicant's family status-related needs were properly considered and accommodated.

The applicants sought an assessment of their former lawyer's accounts, the release of their file, and a stay of enforcement of an $80,000 mortgage given to the lawyer's spouse for legal fees.

The court found no special circumstances to justify assessing 14 accounts rendered prior to November 2012, except for a limited review of an alleged double-billing error.

The court ordered the lawyer to release the file, finding the solicitor's lien was lost because the lawyer had terminated the retainer.

Enforcement of the mortgage was stayed pending the outcome of the assessments.

Following dismissal of a motion seeking to vary a consent judgment and amend a statement of claim, the court determined costs payable to the successful defendants.

One defendant sought costs payable forthwith, while the plaintiff argued any award should be set off against an outstanding amount owed under a prior consent judgment.

The court held that the costs award and the debt under the consent judgment were liquidated mutual obligations, requiring legal set‑off.

Costs payable to that defendant were therefore credited against the amount owed under the consent judgment, while costs payable to the other defendant were ordered payable forthwith.

The court also assessed the reasonable quantum of costs under Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiff moved to vary a consent judgment arising from a three-party settlement and to lift a stay imposed on his separate action after the First Nation defendant defaulted on later settlement instalments.

The court held that a consent judgment may be rectified only on grounds going to the formation of the underlying agreement, not merely because of subsequent non-performance, and found no evidence of fraud, mistake, or other vitiating factor.

Relief was also unavailable under Rule 49.09 because the settlement had merged into the consent judgment, and the court declined to invoke inherent jurisdiction to rewrite a bargain negotiated with counsel.

The motion was dismissed, leaving the plaintiff to pursue enforcement remedies under the existing judgment.

The moving party sought a declaration that the responding party was in breach of contract and, alternatively, an injunction restraining direct contractual and payment arrangements with member bands.

The court found there was no valid 2015 contract or memorandum of agreement because the draft contract presented in December 2014 was withdrawn on April 29, 2015 following a threatening and disturbing email that marked a breakdown in the parties' relationship.

Applying the interlocutory injunction test, the court held there was no serious issue for trial arising from the alleged 2015 contract, the alleged harm was speculative and therefore not irreparable, and the balance of convenience favoured the responding party.

The motion was dismissed.