Andrew Ostrom

The plaintiff purchased a property at a Sheriff's auction and paid the deposit.

The following day, the Sheriff cancelled the sale because the purchase price was below the internal policy threshold of 60% of the debtor's equity.

The plaintiff sued for damages for breach of contract, relying on a notice in the Ontario Gazette that stated the sale was subject to cancellation 'up to the time of sale'.

The court dismissed the action, finding that the actual Notice of Sheriff's Sale of Land, which allowed cancellation 'up to the time of the satisfaction of the sale terms', governed the auction.

The court also held that the Sheriff, as an officer of the court, acted in good faith and was immune from liability under section 142 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The plaintiff, Luigi Ruffolo, sued The Toronto-Dominion Bank for negligence, breach of contract, and negligent infliction of emotional distress, alleging an improvident sale of his property under power of sale in 2002.

The Bank brought a motion for summary judgment, arguing the action was statute-barred by the Limitations Act.

The court found that the plaintiff discovered his claim on April 27, 2009, when he received the Bank's sale file, and therefore the two-year limitation period expired on April 27, 2011, well before the action was commenced on August 18, 2017.

The motion for summary judgment was granted, and the action was dismissed as limitation-barred.

The Plaintiff sought summary judgment to enforce an Agreement of Purchase and Sale for a residential property, claiming breach and seeking specific performance.

The Defendant sought summary judgment to dismiss the action, arguing no agreement was reached.

The court found that the parties never had a meeting of the minds (consensus ad idem) regarding an essential term, the "renovation clause," which was ambiguous and had different interpretations by each party.

Consequently, no valid contract was formed.

The Plaintiff's motion was dismissed, the action was dismissed, and the deposit was ordered to be returned to the Plaintiff.

The court also hypothetically addressed specific performance, finding the property unique.

The plaintiff, Aldgate Construction (1988) Limited, brought a summary judgment motion against the defendants, Noreast Foods Ltd. and its guarantor Zi Zhong Wu, for unpaid rent and breach of repair covenants under a commercial lease.

Aldgate sought damages of $105,356.88 and dismissal of Noreast's $1,151,421.99 counterclaim for alleged unlawful termination.

The court granted summary judgment in part for Aldgate in the main action, awarding $79,196.52, finding no genuine issues requiring a trial regarding the breaches of lease and damages.

However, the court dismissed Aldgate's motion to summarily dismiss the counterclaim, finding that genuine issues requiring a trial existed regarding the lawfulness of Aldgate's re-entry and any consequential damages suffered by Noreast.

The court also specified undisputed material facts for the counterclaim to streamline the subsequent trial.

The applicant brought a motion challenging a retainer agreement with the respondent law firm, which was dismissed.

The court ordered parties seeking costs to file written submissions within a specified timeframe.

Neither party filed submissions, leading to an order that there would be no costs awarded for the motion.

The defendant bankrupt brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff bank's action.

The bank sought a declaration under s. 178(1)(e) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act that its prior default judgment against the defendant survived bankruptcy due to fraudulent misrepresentation.

The defendant argued the bank was barred from leading extraneous evidence of fraud not pleaded in the original action, relying on Rodriguez.

The court distinguished Rodriguez, finding the rule against extraneous evidence does not apply where the creditor had no knowledge of the fraud prior to obtaining judgment.

The court dismissed the motion, finding genuine issues for trial regarding the defendant's knowledge of the false representations and the bank's reliance on them.

The plaintiffs brought an action in defamation against the defendant, a former union member, for publishing numerous derogatory posts and videos online.

The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment, and the defendant brought a cross-motion to dismiss the action under the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court held that an anti-SLAPP motion can be heard concurrently with a summary judgment motion.

The court dismissed the anti-SLAPP motion, finding that while the expression related to a matter of public interest, the harm suffered by the plaintiffs outweighed the public interest in protecting the expression.

The court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, finding the posts defamatory and malicious, and awarded a permanent injunction and costs.

The plaintiff, a long-term employee without formal accounting qualifications, was terminated from her position as Controller following a corporate merger.

She brought an action for wrongful dismissal, discrimination, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress against her former employer, its national affiliate, and its external auditor.

On a motion for summary judgment brought by the defendants, the court dismissed the claims against the national affiliate and the auditor, as well as the claims for discrimination and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

The court awarded the plaintiff 18 months' reasonable notice for wrongful dismissal, along with unpaid vacation pay and a promised legal fee allowance.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiffs' solicitor negligence action for delay, the defendant Whyte was awarded costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The plaintiffs appealed the initial assessment officer's certificate, and the parties consented to have the court assess the costs de novo.

Applying the factors under Rule 58.06(1), the court reduced the time claimed for discoveries and trial preparation, ultimately assessing the costs at $23,438.50 and ordering the defendant to return the excess amount previously paid by the plaintiffs.

This endorsement addresses the issue of costs following the dismissal of the plaintiff's motion on April 28, 2017.

The defendant sought costs ranging from partial indemnity to substantial indemnity, while the plaintiff proposed partial indemnity costs of approximately $2295.

The court, exercising its discretion under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01, determined that the case did not merit substantial indemnity costs.

Costs were fixed at $4,000, payable forthwith by the plaintiff to the defendant.

The plaintiff brought a motion for a further and better affidavit of documents from her former employer and related defendants in a wrongful dismissal and discrimination action.

The plaintiff sought seven categories of documents, arguing they were necessary to respond to a pending summary judgment motion.

The court dismissed the majority of the requests, finding that the defendants had either already produced the relevant documents, the documents did not exist, or the requested documents (such as other employees' severance packages) were privileged and irrelevant.

The court granted the request for documents relating to the rationale for not awarding the plaintiff a salary increase in early 2014.

The applicants sought an assessment of their former lawyer's accounts, the release of their file, and a stay of enforcement of an $80,000 mortgage given to the lawyer's spouse for legal fees.

The court found no special circumstances to justify assessing 14 accounts rendered prior to November 2012, except for a limited review of an alleged double-billing error.

The court ordered the lawyer to release the file, finding the solicitor's lien was lost because the lawyer had terminated the retainer.

Enforcement of the mortgage was stayed pending the outcome of the assessments.

Following dismissal of a motion seeking to vary a consent judgment and amend a statement of claim, the court determined costs payable to the successful defendants.

One defendant sought costs payable forthwith, while the plaintiff argued any award should be set off against an outstanding amount owed under a prior consent judgment.

The court held that the costs award and the debt under the consent judgment were liquidated mutual obligations, requiring legal set‑off.

Costs payable to that defendant were therefore credited against the amount owed under the consent judgment, while costs payable to the other defendant were ordered payable forthwith.

The court also assessed the reasonable quantum of costs under Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.