Associate Judge Andrew Graham

This motion concerned a dispute over litigation privilege regarding handwritten notes made by the plaintiffs' representative on an email from the defendant's counsel.

The plaintiffs claimed privilege, arguing the notes were made in contemplation of litigation.

The court found that the plaintiffs failed to meet the onus to establish that the notes were created for the dominant purpose of reasonably contemplated litigation, as there was no direct evidence from the note-taker regarding his state of mind.

Consequently, the claim of privilege failed, and the plaintiffs were ordered to produce the notes.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for a status hearing to extend the deadline for setting their action down for trial, which was facing administrative dismissal for delay under Rule 48.14(1).

The significant delay of 3.5 years was attributed to a series of associate lawyers at the plaintiffs' firm failing to advance the file.

The defendants opposed the extension, arguing the explanation for delay was inadequate, but conceded they suffered no actual prejudice.

The court, applying the two-part test from Faris v. Eftimovski and considering its overriding discretion, found that despite the uncompelling explanation for counsel's delay, the action should proceed given the plaintiffs were not at fault and the defendants suffered no non-compensable prejudice.

The motion was granted, extending the deadline, and the plaintiffs were ordered to pay the defendants' costs.

The plaintiff commenced an action which was subsequently discontinued following an email exchange between counsel.

The defendant then brought a motion under Rule 23.05(1) for costs of the discontinued action, arguing the discontinuance was unilateral.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the email correspondence constituted a binding settlement agreement that included the discontinuance of the action but did not include any term for the payment of costs.

The plaintiff was awarded partial indemnity costs for successfully opposing the motion.

The plaintiff brought a motion to compel answers to questions refused at the defendant's examination for discovery in a constructive dismissal action.

The court applied the Supreme Court's decision in Potter to hold that the plaintiff could not compel answers regarding information that was not within her knowledge at the time she alleged constructive dismissal.

The court also determined that litigation privilege arose no earlier than the date the defendant understood the plaintiff considered herself constructively dismissed.

The court issued mixed rulings on the specific refused questions, ordering some to be answered and upholding the refusal of others.

The plaintiff moved to amend its statement of claim to increase damages and add allegations regarding the defendant's misuse of a lifetime loyalty program certificate, as well as a claim for unjust enrichment.

The defendant opposed, arguing the amendments introduced a new cause of action after the limitation period expired and failed to properly plead unjust enrichment.

The court allowed most of the amendments, finding they fell within the factual matrix of the existing breach of contract claim.

However, the court refused the amendment adding a claim for unjust enrichment because the plaintiff failed to plead an absence of juristic reason, and struck a reference to a breach of a separate 2011 agreement.

The plaintiffs obtained a default judgment against the defendants for an unpaid loan and registered a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) on the matrimonial home of two of the defendants.

The defendant Satchwell moved to discharge the CPL, arguing the loan was not secured by the property.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiffs had established a reasonable claim to an interest in the property because the uncontradicted evidence and deemed admissions showed the loaned funds were used to purchase the home.

The self-represented plaintiff brought a motion to compel the three defendants to deliver further and better affidavits of documents and to provide access to their computer hard drives to search for relevant documents.

The underlying action involves allegations of fraudulent misrepresentation regarding structural damage to the plaintiff's vehicle following a collision.

The court dismissed the motion against two defendants, finding no evidence that documents were withheld or intentionally deleted.

The motion against the insurer was partially granted, requiring it to produce an event log and an itemized list of documents claimed as privileged, but the request to inspect its hard drive was denied.

The defendant brought a motion to recover costs thrown away after the plaintiffs refused to sign consent forms at a scheduled defence medical examination, resulting in the examination's cancellation.

The plaintiffs had not been provided the consent forms in advance and were unable to reach their counsel for advice at the time of the appointment.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiffs acted reasonably in refusing to sign unfamiliar documents in an adversarial context without the opportunity to consult their lawyer.

The defendant was ordered to pay the plaintiffs' costs of the motion.

The defendant moved to dismiss the plaintiff's personal injury action after the plaintiff failed to comply with a court order requiring him to appoint a new lawyer or file a notice of intention to act in person.

The self-represented plaintiff brought a cross-motion to remove the defendant's counsel, arguing a conflict of interest because the counsel was an in-house lawyer for Aviva, the insurer for both parties.

The court dismissed the cross-motion, finding no lawyer-client relationship existed between the plaintiff and Aviva's in-house counsel.

The court adjourned the defendant's motion to dismiss, granting the plaintiff an extension to comply with the order to appoint counsel or act in person.

The plaintiff, a former franchisee, brought a motion to amend its statement of claim to add new heads of damages following the termination of a commercial lease.

The defendant landlords opposed the amendments, arguing they were statute-barred, and brought a cross-motion for security for costs.

The court allowed the amendments for equipment and business losses, finding they arose from the factual matrix of the original pleading, but dismissed the proposed claims for breach of contract and fiduciary duty.

The court also granted the defendants' motion for security for costs, finding the corporate plaintiff had insufficient assets, its principal was not impecunious, and the plaintiff failed to demonstrate a good chance of success.

The applicant was wholly successful on a motion to strike the respondent's Notice of Objection under the Repair and Storage Liens Act and sought substantial indemnity costs.

The respondent argued costs should be reserved to the trial judge.

The court found no reason to defer costs, as the respondent had obstructed the statutory process.

However, the court awarded partial indemnity costs of $20,212.04, finding the respondent's conduct did not meet the threshold for substantial indemnity.

The defendants brought a motion for an order requiring the plaintiffs to serve a further and better affidavit of documents, specifically seeking financial documents relevant to the plaintiffs' damages claims.

The plaintiffs argued that the defendants were precluded from seeking these documents because they had agreed to a Discovery Plan that excluded them.

The court found that the defendants had explicitly reserved their right to pursue the financial information when agreeing to the Discovery Plan.

The court ordered the plaintiffs to produce their financial statements and tax returns, as they were relevant to the claims for business losses, but declined to order production of other speculative documents at this stage.

The applicant brought a motion to strike the respondent's Notice of Objection under the Repair and Storage Liens Act (RSLA) and for the return of a customized truck.

The respondent argued the RSLA did not apply because its work constituted manufacturing a new vehicle, not repairing an existing one, and claimed an additional $150,000 for estimated export costs.

The court found the work constituted a 'repair' under the RSLA and that the respondent had attorned to the RSLA process.

The court struck the Notice of Objection as an abuse of process because the additional costs claimed were not for repair or storage, and ordered the return of the vehicle.

The applicants brought a motion for leave to issue a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) regarding a jointly purchased investment property.

The applicants argued that the motion had already been settled via email correspondence between counsel.

The court found that the email exchange constituted a binding settlement agreement to consent to the CPL order while reserving costs.

Alternatively, the court held that a CPL was justified on the merits, as there was a triable issue regarding the parties' respective interests in the property.

The motion was granted.

The plaintiff brought a motion under Rule 5.04(2) to amend the title of proceedings to correct an alleged misnomer, seeking to substitute 'Downtown Auto Collision Centre Inc.' for the named plaintiff 'Dealer’s Choice Preferred Collision Centre Inc.'.

The action alleged breach of a 2013 agreement.

The court found that the defendants had specifically rejected the inclusion of Downtown Auto as a party to the agreement during negotiations.

Applying the 'litigating finger' test, the court concluded the defendants would have had no reason to think the intended plaintiff was Downtown Auto.

The motion was dismissed with costs awarded to the defendants.

The plaintiff, suing the school board for historical abuse by a teacher, brought a motion to compel production of his grade 3 class register and the last known contact information of his classmates.

The school board opposed, arguing that the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (MFIPPA) prohibited disclosure, that the plaintiff had not exhausted his administrative remedies, and that the request was disproportionate and violated the classmates' privacy.

The court granted the motion, holding that civil discovery rights are distinct from MFIPPA access rights, the classmates were potential witnesses, and the privacy concerns did not outweigh the need for disclosure.

The court limited the scope of the school board's search for contact information to ensure proportionality.

The applicants brought a motion to compel the respondent's counsel to attend an examination under Rule 39.03 and to remove the counsel and his firm as lawyers of record.

The applicants sought to examine the counsel regarding a legal opinion he provided on the validity of proxies submitted during a condominium board election.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the legal opinion lacked the 'high materiality and necessity' required to compel opposing counsel to testify.

Consequently, as counsel would not be a witness, there was no conflict of interest warranting removal from the record.

The defendants, who are psychotherapists sued for professional negligence in a family law dispute, moved for the production of the plaintiff's matrimonial lawyer's file.

The plaintiff opposed, claiming solicitor-client privilege.

The court held that by pleading the defendants' misconduct caused him to incur approximately $900,000 in legal fees, the plaintiff put his state of mind and his lawyer's advice in issue.

The court found an implied waiver of privilege and ordered the production of the file, subject to specific claims of litigation privilege for documents prepared for the current action.

The plaintiff moved to strike a Rule 39.03 summons to witness issued by the defendant Western Life Assurance Company, seeking to examine the plaintiff's legal assistant, who is also his sister.

The defendant sought to examine the legal assistant regarding the plaintiff's knowledge of his disability claim obligations and the limitation period.

The court found that communications with the legal assistant were protected by solicitor-client privilege and that the defendant failed to demonstrate the "high materiality and necessity" required to compel her testimony, nor was there a clear waiver of privilege.

The motion to strike the summons was granted.

The defendants moved for security for costs against the plaintiff, Forvest Financial Services Corporation, an assignee of a claim from a Swiss corporation.

The motion was brought under Rule 56.01(1)(d), alleging Forvest had insufficient assets in Ontario to pay costs.

The court applied the two-stage test from Hallum and Yaiguaje, considering all evidence, including the plaintiff's own financial disclosures.

The Master found that Forvest's assets, primarily "advances to related parties" were sheltered from execution and insufficient.

While the plaintiff demonstrated a good case on the merits regarding misappropriation of funds, a critical credibility issue concerning a limitation period argument prevented a finding of "good chance of success." No unreasonable delay was found on the defendants' part.

The court ordered Forvest to post security for costs, reducing the quantum to exclude mediation costs due to the defendants' bad faith participation and costs related to their counterclaim.