Allyson M. Fischer

The applicant, a graduate student, sought judicial review of a university disciplinary decision that resulted in a formal reprimand for harassment under the Code of Student Conduct.

He argued that he was denied procedural fairness because he was not permitted legal representation at the initial hearing before the Vice-Provost, that the decision was unreasonable, and that it violated his Charter right to freedom of expression.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the process was fair given the context and minor sanctions, the Statutory Powers Procedure Act did not apply, the decision was reasonable, and the Charter did not apply to the university's internal disciplinary process.

Following settlement of a security for costs motion by consent order requiring the corporate plaintiffs to post security into court, the court was asked to determine costs of the motion.

The plaintiffs argued the motion was unnecessary because they had offered undertakings from partners and allegedly accepted settlement proposals involving promissory notes.

The court held that a costs endorsement should not determine the merits of the underlying motion and applied the test of whether the moving parties’ position was clearly unreasonable.

It found the defendants reasonably proceeded with the motion, as the sufficiency of the undertakings and the existence of a concluded settlement were not self‑evident and the plaintiffs failed to provide timely details.

The moving parties, having obtained substantially the relief sought through the consent order, were awarded partial indemnity costs.

The appellants appealed an order striking their claims for intentional infliction of mental suffering, negligence, and derivative claims under the Family Law Act.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the claims were properly struck for failing to plead sufficient facts, but found it was not plain and obvious that the pleadings could not be amended.

The appeal was allowed in part to grant the appellants leave to deliver a fresh statement of claim.

The appellants appealed an order striking various paragraphs from their statement of claim, which primarily alleged wrongful dismissal and intentional infliction of mental suffering arising from the employer's handling of a workplace affair.

The Court of Appeal found that while the pleadings were confusing, the claim for intentional infliction of mental suffering was adequately pleaded.

The wrongful dismissal claim required redrawing to comply with the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Court also permitted the appellants to maintain their claims against a non-participating defendant and set aside the motion judge's award of substantial indemnity costs, substituting it with partial indemnity costs.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment that limited her long-term disability benefits and assessed her wrongful dismissal notice period at 12 months.

The respondent cross-appealed the calculation of short-term disability benefits.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding no evidence to support the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant failed to mitigate her disability by not seeking medical assistance.

The court increased the notice period to 18 months based on the Bardal factors.

The cross-appeal was dismissed, affirming that short-term benefits should be calculated on base pay and commissions.

The applicant sought judicial review of a 1997 Ontario Labour Relations Board decision dismissing his complaints against his union under sections 74 and 76 of the Labour Relations Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the four-and-a-half-year delay in bringing the application was undue and inadequately explained.

Furthermore, applying the patent unreasonableness standard of review, the court held that the Board's conclusion that the union had not acted arbitrarily, discriminatorily, or in bad faith was not patently unreasonable.

The applicant also failed to exhaust alternative remedies regarding the section 76 claim.