Alexander H. Fiszauf

The accused brought a directed verdict motion arguing that the presumption of accuracy under s. 320.31 of the Criminal Code could not apply because there was no express evidence from an analyst regarding the target value of the alcohol standard used in the calibration check.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the breath technician's evidence of her expected target value based on her training, combined with the analyst's certificate stating the standard was suitable for use, was sufficient evidence for a trier of fact to apply the presumption.

The accused was charged with driving with excess blood alcohol after losing control of her vehicle and striking a pole.

At trial, she brought a Charter application alleging her s. 10(b) right to counsel was violated at the roadside and at the police station.

The court found no breach at the roadside but concluded a breach occurred at the station when the officer failed to correct her mistaken belief that she could only contact local counsel.

Applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2), the court admitted the breath samples, finding the breach was in the low-moderate range of seriousness and society's interest in adjudicating drinking and driving offences favoured admission.

A finding of guilt was entered.

The accused was charged with driving with a blood alcohol content over the legal limit.

The Crown's evidence showed breath samples with a BAC of 100-110 mg/100ml.

The accused challenged the validity of the police investigation on Charter grounds, alleging violations of his rights against unreasonable search and seizure, arbitrary detention, and right to counsel.

While the court found the approved screening device demand was lawful based on reasonable suspicion, it found that the police violated the accused's right to counsel of choice by steering him toward duty counsel without providing him with the means to select a lawyer of his choosing.

The court excluded the breath sample evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that the seriousness of the state conduct and the impact on the accused's Charter rights outweighed society's interest in a trial on the merits.

The applicant sought to exclude evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter based on alleged violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(b).

The applicant was stopped for a traffic violation, subjected to an approved screening device test, arrested for driving over 80, and provided breath samples.

The court found that the officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct the breath demand based on a faint odour of alcohol from the vehicle, the applicant's admission of earlier drinking, and confirmation of the odour from the applicant's mouth.

The court further found that the officer complied with the informational component of section 10(b) by reading the pre-printed rights, and that the applicant did not exercise his right to counsel until requesting duty counsel at the police station, at which point the police properly implemented that request.

The Charter application was dismissed.

The Crown brought an application to admit statements made by the accused to a police officer following breath testing as voluntary.

The court conducted a voluntariness analysis under the confessions rule established in R. v. Oickle.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove the statements were voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt.

Key factors included the accused's youth and first arrest, questioning on a detain sheet prior to legal advice, a compelled breath demand with questioning during the procedure, and the absence of a secondary caution.

The court held that the circumstances created a reasonable doubt as to whether the accused understood his right to silence when questioned by the officer.

The accused was charged with impaired driving following a collision and brought a Charter motion seeking exclusion of statements and breath test results.

She argued police lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest, that her roadside statements were compelled under statutory accident‑reporting obligations, and that her rights under ss. 10(a) and 10(b) of the Charter were violated.

The court held the accused failed to prove her statements were compelled and found the investigating officer had reasonable and probable grounds based on observations of impairment, witness information, and the unexplained collision.

The court further found no breach of the right to counsel or the informational component of detention.

The Charter application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and with refusing to provide a breath sample.

The defendant sought to exclude evidence of his refusal based on alleged Charter violations regarding the right to be informed of the reason for detention and the right to counsel.

The court found the defendant's evidence to be internally inconsistent and contradicted by multiple Crown witnesses.

The court rejected the Charter application and found the defendant guilty of both offences beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The trial proceeded on a blended hearing addressing two main issues: whether breath testing was conducted as soon as practicable, and whether there was a Section 8 Charter breach related to video surveillance of the cell area and the presence of a police officer during the accused's use of the toilet.

The court found no breach of the "as soon as practicable" requirement and determined that even if a privacy breach occurred, the evidence should not be excluded under Section 24(2).

The accused was convicted and sentenced to a $1,000 fine, a $300 victim fine surcharge, and a one-year driving prohibition.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application for certiorari to review his committal for trial on first-degree murder.

He argued the preliminary inquiry judge impermissibly weighed evidence regarding specific intent, planning, and deliberation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding there was sufficient circumstantial evidence, including poisoning allegations and the appellant's own statements, to support the committal.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge failed to consider defence evidence and failed to provide adequate reasons for accepting the complainant's evidence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge failed to consider important evidence from the appellant's wife, did not give reasons for rejecting it, and overlooked problematic aspects of the complainant's evidence including a motive to fabricate.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered, though the Court noted the Crown may wish to consider whether proceeding is in the interests of justice given the appellant had already served his conditional sentence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for fraud and theft, arguing for the first time on appeal that the Crown prosecutor was in a conflict of interest for having previously represented him on an assault charge.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence but found no actual conflict of interest or prejudice, as the matters were independent and no relevant confidential information was used.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, upholding the custodial sentence due to the seriousness of the frauds committed against a charitable institution.

The appellant appealed his conviction for robbery, arguing that the verdict was unreasonable.

The appellant had admitted his involvement in the robbery to a witness with a criminal record, but the balance of the evidence confirmed the admission.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge was in the best position to assess credibility and the verdict was not unreasonable.

The appellant, an aboriginal offender, appealed his 9-year sentence for a brutal and planned sexual assault involving a home invasion and stabbing.

He argued the trial judge failed to give due consideration to s. 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting the trial judge properly applied Gladue principles and found that for such a violent and serious offence, the sentence for an aboriginal offender would be similar to that of a non-aboriginal offender.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

He argued that the jury was misled by the trial judge's charge on reasonable doubt and that the verdicts were inconsistent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no merit in the arguments and concluding that the jury likely divided the incident into episodes.

The court also refused leave to appeal the sentence, finding no error in principle.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault with a weapon and forcible confinement based primarily on eyewitness identification by the complainant.

The appellant appealed, arguing the verdict was unreasonable and that the trial judge misapprehended the alibi evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in her application of the W.(D.) framework by compartmentalizing the evidence and misapprehended several key pieces of defence evidence.

Concluding that the identification evidence displayed numerous indicia of unreliability and the alibi evidence was strong, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and entered an acquittal.