Alan S. Cofman

The plaintiffs, ATS Automation Tooling Systems Inc. and IWK (Thailand) Ltd., brought a motion to temporarily stay their action against Chubb Insurance Company of Canada.

The action concerned insurance coverage for damaged medical packaging equipment shipped from Thailand to India.

The plaintiffs sought the stay pending the final resolution of related arbitral proceedings in India, arguing that the issues were intertwined and a stay would prevent prejudice and promote efficiency.

Chubb opposed the stay, asserting it had no standing in the Indian arbitration, that the plaintiffs had suffered no insurable loss under the policy (which only covered ocean carriage to Chennai, not inland transit), and that the action was a placeholder.

The court refused the stay, finding that the interpretation of the Chubb policy was irrelevant to the Indian arbitration, that there was no certainty of the arbitration proceeding, and that delaying Chubb's opportunity to seek summary judgment would cause prejudice.

The court emphasized the principles of proportionality, timeliness, and affordability in civil litigation, as articulated in Hryniak v. Mauldin.

The applicants, members of a church congregation, brought a motion to strike portions of affidavits filed by the respondent directors and other congregation members in an underlying application.

The application seeks to determine corporate membership, election of directors, and leave for a derivative action against current directors of Kingdom of Heaven Embassy Ministries Inc. The court considered Rules 25.11 and 39.01(5) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court granted the motion in part, striking numerous paragraphs from the respondents' affidavits that were deemed irrelevant, scandalous, or vexatious, particularly those impugning the character or conduct of the former pastor, Mr. Somers.

Leave was granted for the respondents to file amended affidavits.

The applicant trucking company sought declarations of insurance coverage after its cargo of electronic goods was stolen.

The respondent insurer denied the claim on two grounds: that the goods were not in the applicant's custody and that the applicant misrepresented the type of cargo.

The court rejected both grounds, finding that the goods were covered under the policy and that no material misrepresentation occurred.

However, the court declined to order a specific indemnity amount due to the claim value not being crystallized, instead issuing declarations in the applicant's favour.

Costs were awarded to the applicant on a modest scale.

The Acuity defendants moved for summary judgment in a fire loss claim, arguing no causal connection could be proven between the fire and their light fixtures.

The plaintiff alleged a design defect in the open luminaires led to a metal halide bulb rupture, igniting a tarp.

The court found a genuine issue requiring a trial on causation, noting conflicting expert evidence and deficiencies in the initial fire investigation due to premature site clearance.

The motion for summary judgment was not granted, but the court directed further oral evidence to be adduced on the causation issue to potentially streamline the lengthy and expensive litigation.

The Acuity defendants moved for summary judgment and sought to exclude the plaintiff's expert evidence from Vincent Rochon regarding the origin and cause of a warehouse fire.

The defendants argued Rochon was not qualified to opine on electrical code/CSA standards, lacked independence and impartiality due to his prior involvement with the insurer's sister company (REI) and the initial site investigation, showed bias, and presented an unreliable "novel science" theory (ricocheting quartz fragments).

The court found Rochon qualified, willing, and able to fulfill his duty as an expert, and that his ricochet theory was not "novel science" but an application of existing scientific principles.

The motion to exclude Rochon's evidence was dismissed, with the court noting that concerns about the investigation's shortcomings or the plausibility of Rochon's theory could inform the weight of the evidence at the summary judgment motion or trial.

Following earlier litigation involving the issuance of Notices of Prohibition by the Ministry, the successful party sought costs for multiple court attendances.

The court held that although costs were not specifically addressed at earlier hearings, they were necessary steps in the litigation and the successful party was entitled to recover costs.

The judge expressed concern that the ministry refused to hold its Notices of Prohibition in abeyance to allow an orderly hearing and indicated that substantial indemnity costs might otherwise have been appropriate.

However, due to deficiencies in the bill of costs and excessive hours claimed for research, the court reduced the hours and awarded partial indemnity costs.

Final costs were fixed at $45,076.33 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The applicant supermarket owner sought judicial review of an automatic prohibition issued under the Smoke-Free Ontario Act after employees were convicted of selling tobacco to minors.

The prohibition barred the store from selling tobacco products for nine months based solely on employee convictions, even though the employer had never been charged and had no opportunity to assert the statutory due diligence defence available to owners.

The court found that the Ministry’s notice process, information system, and decision-making framework failed to provide adequate notice or a meaningful opportunity for the employer to present a defence.

Because the administrative system did not record or consider whether the employer had exercised due diligence, the issuance of the prohibition violated procedural fairness and frustrated the statutory scheme.

The notice of prohibition was quashed.

The appellant and respondent were co-sureties for a corporate debt.

The appellant's principal unilaterally took control of the business, excluded the respondent, and caused the appellant to pay off the corporate debt without any demand from the bank or notice to the respondent.

The appellant then sought equitable contribution from the respondent.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding the payment was voluntary and not reasonably necessary for the survival of the business.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that because the appellant failed to establish that default was imminent, its voluntary payment discharged the debt and released the co-surety.

The plaintiffs moved for consolidation of two franchise-related actions and for a trial together with a third action involving prior franchisees of the same restaurant.

The claims arose from alleged deficiencies in disclosure under the Arthur Wishart (Franchise Disclosure), 2000 Act in connection with the purchase and resale of the same Lick’s restaurant franchise.

The court held that the two actions involving the same plaintiffs and transaction should be consolidated because they shared common questions of fact and law and arose from the same purchase.

Applying Rule 6.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and factors governing trial together orders, the court also directed that the consolidated action be tried together with the earlier action involving prior franchisees due to overlapping evidence, witnesses, valuation issues, and risk of inconsistent findings.

The court further ordered common documentary and oral discovery, common mediation, and assigned the actions to case management.

The cross-appellants (the sellers) appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for negligent misrepresentation regarding the value of business inventory sold to the respondents (the buyers).

The trial judge had awarded damages to the buyers but reduced the award by 20 percent due to contributory negligence.

On appeal, the sellers argued the buyers did not reasonably rely on the misrepresentation and suffered no detriment, while the buyers argued the finding of contributory negligence was inconsistent with reasonable reliance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's findings of reasonable reliance, detriment, and contributory negligence were supported by the evidence and could co-exist.