Adam Bernstein

The accused, C.N., was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference involving a seven-year-old complainant, V.V. The trial turned on the credibility of the child witnesses and the accused.

The court reviewed the evidence, including video surveillance, police interviews, and testimony, and applied the legal framework for assessing credibility and adverse inferences.

The judge found the accused's evidence not credible, accepted the core of the complainants' evidence, and convicted C.N. on both counts.

The court sentenced Renzo Gomez for dangerous driving causing death and dangerous driving causing bodily harm, following his guilty plea.

The facts established that Mr. Gomez drove at excessive speed, under the influence of alcohol, and with a history of prior driving offences, resulting in a fatal collision and serious injuries.

The court reviewed the impact on the victims and their families, the offender’s personal circumstances, and the applicable legal framework.

After considering aggravating and mitigating factors, the court imposed a custodial sentence of 6 years for causing death (with a 16-year driving prohibition) and 4 years for causing bodily harm (with a 14-year prohibition), to be served concurrently, along with a DNA order.

This criminal trial concerned charges of impaired driving causing death and bodily harm against Renzo Gomez, who had already pleaded guilty to dangerous driving.

The central issue was whether the accused's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol.

Despite a high-speed collision, the smell of alcohol on the accused's breath, and a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) range of 53-105 mg/100ml, the court found reasonable doubt.

This was primarily due to expert evidence highlighting inter-individual variability in the effects of alcohol and the consistent testimony of three witnesses (a police officer and two paramedics) who observed no signs of impairment in the accused.

The court emphasized that a high BAC alone, especially below 100 mg/100ml, does not automatically prove impairment beyond a reasonable doubt for criminal prosecution, and that such a threshold is a matter for Parliament.

The accused was acquitted of the impaired driving charges.

The accused brought an application for a stay of proceedings based on an alleged violation of his right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Charter, citing a total delay of 24 months and 22 days, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling for summary conviction matters.

The court found that the defence was "markedly indifferent" to securing an earlier trial date, as evidenced by their failure to clearly assert an 11(b) breach or take proactive steps to expedite the matter after trial dates were set.

Consequently, the court apportioned a significant portion of the delay (7 months and 3 days) to the defence, resulting in a net delay of 17 months and 19 days, which falls below the Jordan ceiling.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The offender, an African Canadian man, was convicted of aggravated assault after sucker-punching and stomping a defenceless victim outside a nightclub.

The court considered the impacts of systemic anti-Black racism and the lack of a formal Impact of Race and Culture Assessment (IRCA) due to financial constraints.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence given the severity of the unprovoked attack, the court sentenced the offender to two years in a penitentiary, less three months credit for time spent on strict bail conditions.

The applicant, Adrian Williams, sought bail after being charged with first-degree murder and attempted murder.

The application was heard during the COVID-19 pandemic, with expert medical evidence presented regarding the risks of the virus in correctional facilities.

The court considered the secondary and tertiary grounds for detention under the Criminal Code, including the applicant's criminal record, the gravity of the offences, the strong Crown case, and the public health implications of the pandemic.

Despite the public health concerns, the court found that the applicant failed to demonstrate that his detention was not necessary for public safety and to maintain confidence in the administration of justice, given his history of breaching court orders and the extreme violence of the alleged crimes.

Bail was denied.

The offender was found guilty by a jury of manslaughter for his participation in a group attack that resulted in the victim's death by blunt force trauma.

The sentencing judge determined the facts of the offence, finding that the offender used a branch as a weapon and participated in beating the defenceless victim.

After weighing aggravating factors, including the brutal nature of the attack, against mitigating factors such as the offender's supportive family and lack of premeditation, the court imposed a sentence of 6.5 years.

The offender received 399 days of credit for pre-sentence custody, lockdown conditions, and strict bail conditions, leaving a remaining sentence of 5 years and 149 days.

The applicant, charged with manslaughter, brought a pre-trial motion challenging the constitutional validity of section 4(b) of the Juries Act (Ontario).

The applicant argued that this provincial legislation, which disqualifies individuals convicted of an indictable offence from jury service, creates an operational conflict with section 638(1)(c) of the Criminal Code, which allows for challenges for cause only for those sentenced to imprisonment exceeding twelve months.

The applicant contended that the provincial law unduly narrows the jury pool and infringes on federal jurisdiction over criminal procedure.

The Crown argued that the provincial legislation is a valid exercise of power over the administration of justice and does not conflict with or frustrate the purpose of the federal law.

The court dismissed the application, finding no operational conflict or frustration of federal purpose, as the provincial and federal laws govern different aspects of jury selection and can coexist.

The applicant, charged with manslaughter, brought a Charter challenge against the jury panel, alleging violations of ss. 11(d) and 11(f) due to the Province of Ontario's jury source list compilation methods.

The applicant contended that the Municipal Property Assessment Corporation (MPAC) process systematically under-included non-property owners and, consequently, black individuals in Peel, creating an appearance of partiality.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the state made reasonable efforts to ensure a broad cross-section of society for jury selection.

The statistical evidence presented was deemed confusing and contradictory, and ultimately did not support the applicant's claims of under-representation of renters or black individuals.

The court emphasized that representativeness focuses on the process of casting a wide net, not on achieving proportional representation of specific groups.

This endorsement provides reasons for four trial rulings made during a jury trial for manslaughter, where the accused were ultimately found not guilty.

The rulings addressed: (1) whether jurors could ask witnesses questions (denied, emphasizing the adversarial nature of criminal trials); (2) the Crown's re-examination of a witness on prior consistent statements (allowed to clarify a one-sided picture created during cross-examination); (3) the Crown's request to introduce bad character evidence against one accused (denied, as the defence had not put character in issue); and (4) the Crown's request for a specific jury charge on aiding and abetting related to a push by one accused (declined as speculative and unduly complex given the Crown's primary theory of a group beating).

The accused was charged with two counts of sexual assault causing bodily harm under section 272(1)(c) of the Criminal Code.

The case centered on whether consent to sexual activity can be vitiated through fraud in the context of online deception.

The accused used an elaborate Craigslist scheme, posing as a spa owner and creating fictional personas to deceive two women into believing they were engaging in sexual activity with high-end business clients in exchange for substantial payment.

In reality, the accused was the "client" and had no intention of paying.

The Crown alleged that the accused exceeded the boundaries of any consent given and engaged in aggressive breast-sucking and forced fellatio.

The accused denied the allegations, claiming all sexual conduct was consensual.

The court found the accused guilty of sexual assault causing bodily harm in relation to one complainant and guilty of the included offence of sexual assault in relation to the other, based on evidence of non-consent and the complainants' withdrawal of consent during sexual activity.

The defendant was charged with a single count of assault against his former domestic partner.

The trial involved testimony from the complainant, her son, and the defendant, along with photographic evidence.

The central issue was credibility.

The court found the complainant's evidence compelling and credible regarding how she sustained injuries to her face, neck, arm, and knee.

The defendant's explanation of the injuries was rejected as implausible and inconsistent.

The court found the defendant guilty of assault, determining he applied force without consent and without lawful justification or self-defence.

During a criminal trial involving allegations of sexual touching, the Crown sought to introduce a redacted transcript from the accused's prior College of Psychologists disciplinary hearing.

The court ruled that admissions made by the accused's counsel at the disciplinary hearing were presumptively admissible as admissions against interest.

However, the court held that these statements should be treated as informal evidentiary admissions rather than formal admissions under s. 655 of the Criminal Code, ensuring the jury is not misled into believing the accused formally admitted the facts in the current criminal proceeding.

The Crown brought an application to introduce similar fact evidence across three counts of sexual assault involving three separate complainants against the accused, a therapist.

The accused opposed the application, alleging an air of reality to collusion among the complainants, and brought a motion to sever the counts.

The court found the similar fact evidence highly probative of the actus reus and concluded the Crown had negated the risk of collusion on a balance of probabilities.

The Crown's application was granted, and consequently, the accused's motion for severance was dismissed.

Mr. Vincent Lo, a former psychologist, faced three counts of sexual assault.

The Crown sought to admit an agreed statement of facts (ASF) from a prior College of Psychologists disciplinary hearing as admissions against interest in the criminal trial.

The ASF detailed physical contact with a patient, A.M., including shoulder massage, bare chest touching, and leg massage towards the groin.

The accused argued that he did not formally admit the statements and that his counsel acted beyond authority.

The court ruled that the accused, through counsel, formally admitted the facts of touching but not the inferences of sexual abuse.

The court found the admissions highly probative and admissible, with potential prejudice mitigable by excluding certain details and providing a limiting instruction to the jury.

The accused, B.W., was charged with sexual interference under section 151 of the Criminal Code involving the complainant, S.L., who was under 16 years of age.

The alleged incidents occurred in a church basement between 2000 and 2007.

The Crown relied on S.L.'s testimony and a written 'confession' letter from B.W. The court found significant reliability issues with S.L.'s evidence due to inconsistencies in her account of the incidents and disclosures, and credibility concerns with T.S., S.L.'s mother, particularly regarding her handling of the school disclosure and the circumstances surrounding the 'confession' letter.

The court concluded that the 'confession' letter was heavily influenced by T.S. and potentially linked to a financial demand.

Ultimately, the court was not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that B.W. committed the offence or that S.L. was sexually touched by anyone.

B.W. was acquitted.

The defence applied to preclude the Crown from bringing a hearsay application to admit the prior videotaped statement and preliminary inquiry testimony of a missing victim in an attempted murder trial.

The defence argued that the Crown failed to comply with notice requirements under the Superior Court Criminal Proceedings Rules and that police efforts to locate the witness were insufficient.

The court found that while police efforts were inadequate and Crown disclosure of the witness's unavailability was late, there was no improper motive by the Crown.

The court dismissed the defence's application, concluding that it was in the interests of justice to permit non-compliance with the notice rules, as the defence was not prejudiced by the timing of the application itself, and the issues raised were relevant to the merits of the hearsay application.

The accused was charged with possession of prohibited firearms and marijuana for the purpose of trafficking after police discovered the items in a condominium unit following a flood.

The Crown alleged the accused constructively possessed the items because he rented the unit as a stash house.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove actual or constructive possession beyond a reasonable doubt, as the accused's only connection to the unit was a single fingerprint on a glass dish in a locked bedroom he could not access, and several other individuals had keys or access to the unit.

All charges were dismissed.

During a trial for attempted murder, the Crown brought an application to admit evidence of the accused's prior discreditable conduct, specifically his alleged membership in a street gang called the 'Clean Up Crew'.

The Crown argued this evidence was necessary to establish motive and animus, as the shooting was allegedly ordered by a gang leader.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while the evidence was highly probative of motive, its prejudicial effect—the risk that the jury would convict based on gang membership alone—outweighed its probative value.

The Crown was permitted to lead evidence of the relationship between the parties without referencing gang affiliations.

The accused was charged with six offences relating to three armed robberies committed at bus stops in Brampton and Mississauga within a one-hour period.

The robber used an imitation handgun to steal cellphones and bus tickets, fleeing in a van.

The Crown relied on eyewitness identification, similar fact evidence, DNA found on a baseball cap in the getaway van, and the accused's subsequent sale of the stolen cellphones.

The court admitted the similar fact evidence, finding the robberies strikingly similar.

The court rejected the accused's testimony as unworthy of belief and found that the cumulative evidence proved his identity as the robber beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was convicted of all charges.