William Harvey Abbott

Following a family law trial, the court resolved disputes over separation date, equalization, child support, section 7 expenses, imputation of income, and disposition of the matrimonial home.

The court found the separation date was June 15, 2018, accepted an imputed annual income of $44,500 for support purposes, and ordered retroactive base support and section 7 contributions.

In light of disclosure failures and non-compliance, the court accepted the moving party’s net family property calculations and ordered an equalization payment.

The court vested title to the matrimonial home in the moving party, granted sole carriage and exclusive possession pending sale, and declared a registered family mortgage null and void.

Pre-judgment interest was denied.

The Respondent Father brought a motion seeking disclosure of the complete file from the Office of the Children's Lawyer (OCL) to challenge its recommendations regarding decision-making responsibility and parenting time for the child.

The Applicant Mother opposed the motion, arguing privilege and privacy.

The court found that the Mother had waived any privilege or privacy interest by providing the records to the OCL and that the records were relevant and necessary for the Father to challenge the OCL's findings.

The Father's motion for disclosure was granted, and the Mother was ordered to pay costs.

This decision addresses whether a previous costs award of $34,800, ordered against the Applicant for breaches of parenting orders, could be characterized as support for enforcement purposes under the Family Responsibility and Support Arrears Enforcement Act, 1996.

The Respondent argued that the costs related to child support issues in an underlying, outstanding motion to change, and that the broad discretion under Rule 1(8) of the Family Law Rules permitted such characterization, asserting that Clark v. Clark was overruled by Bouchard v. Sgovio.

The court dismissed the Respondent's request, holding that for costs to be enforceable as support, support must have been claimed and adjudicated in the specific proceeding where the costs were awarded, not merely in a related, outstanding motion.

The court affirmed that Rule 1(8) does not allow for characterizing costs in a manner inconsistent with the substance of the proceeding in which they were awarded, and that Bouchard did not overrule Clark on this point.

The respondent brought a motion to vary a previous order concerning the amalgamation and ownership of corporations, specifically seeking to remove the applicant's interest in the amalgamated entity.

The applicant opposed this motion and brought a cross-motion for alternative relief.

The court dismissed the respondent's motion, finding that it was functus officio and that the respondent had not demonstrated a mistake in the original order under Rule 25(19) of the Family Law Rules.

The court only corrected a typographical error in the original order, requiring the parties to negotiate a cooperative agreement for the amalgamated corporation.

The applicant sought summary judgment to enforce a settlement agreement reached at mediation with her common-law partner.

The respondent denied a binding agreement, claiming lack of understanding, duress, and unconscionability.

The court found a binding agreement based on objective evidence, counsel's ostensible authority, and the parties' post-mediation conduct, dismissing the respondent's claims of duress and unconscionability.

The settlement, which included the sale of a farm and division of proceeds, was enforced.

The parties brought motions for summary judgment regarding child support.

The applicant sought to vary a consent final order to cap his child support income due to a significant income increase, arguing against "wealth transfer." The respondent sought to enforce the existing order and collect arrears.

The court found no material change in circumstances to justify varying the order, as the original order already contemplated income fluctuations and provided a mechanism for adjustment.

The applicant's motion to change was dismissed.

The court found the applicant's claimed expenses unreasonable due to lack of documentary proof, adding them back to his income for support calculation.

The respondent's motion to enforce was granted, and the applicant was ordered to pay $219,688.00 in child support arrears.

The respondent brought a motion seeking the sale of the matrimonial home under the Partition Act.

The applicant opposed, arguing the motion was premature and prejudicial due to outstanding financial disclosure and unresolved equalization issues under the Family Law Act.

The court, while acknowledging the prima facie right to partition, emphasized the nuanced approach required in family law cases.

It found that ordering a sale before full financial and valuation information was available would risk prejudice to the applicant's equalization claim and cause undue hardship.

The motion was dismissed without prejudice, allowing the respondent to re-bring it after a scheduled settlement conference and expert reports are available.

This is a costs endorsement following a come-back motion concerning ex parte injunctions.

The applicant successfully continued a Family Law Act preservation order against her former spouse but failed to continue a Mareva order against his family members and corporate affiliates.

The court determined costs based on divided success, reasonableness of conduct, and settlement offers, ultimately awarding the applicant costs against the former spouse and the other respondents costs against the applicant, with deferred payment terms for the applicant.

The applicant father brought a motion seeking an order for his 15-year-old daughter to attend reunification therapy and for equal parenting time, alleging parental alienation by the respondent mother.

The court dismissed the motion for reunification therapy, finding no expert evidence to support the allegations of alienation and noting the lack of a detailed therapy proposal.

Relying on a Voice of the Child report indicating the daughter's reluctance to spend time with the father due to his historical lack of involvement, the court ordered limited parenting time subject entirely to the daughter's wishes.

The respondent father sought an urgent order for the resumption of parenting time for the parties' 12-year-old child, Porter, after the applicant mother unilaterally withheld access citing COVID-19 concerns.

The court, applying principles from Ribeiro v. Wright, affirmed the presumption of maintaining existing parenting arrangements.

While the mother's initial COVID-19 concerns were addressed, her subsequent arguments based on the child's preferences, anxiety, and asthma were deemed non-urgent and lacking specific evidence.

The court ordered the immediate resumption of the father's parenting time with a minor schedule adjustment, but denied requests for make-up time and a police enforcement clause.

The respondent brought an urgent motion seeking an order for the applicant to post security for costs of $75,000, citing the applicant's impending house sale and alleged non-compliance with previous orders.

The court dismissed the urgency motion, finding that a motion for security for costs was not urgent given the suspension of trials and that the purpose of security for costs is to secure future legal costs, not to provide "execution before judgment" for other alleged debts.

The court clarified that the inability to post security for costs primarily disadvantages the party ordered to provide it, not the moving party at this preliminary stage.

The Father brought an application under the Hague Convention for the return of the parties' four-year-old daughter to Arizona, her habitual residence, after the Mother unilaterally removed her to Ontario.

The Mother sought a declaration that Ontario had jurisdiction and argued that the Hague application was commenced more than one year after the wrongful removal, and that the child was settled in Ontario.

The court found that the child's habitual residence was Arizona, the removal was wrongful, and the Father did not consent or acquiesce.

The court determined that the Hague proceedings were commenced within one year of the removal.

Even if not, the court found the child was not sufficiently settled in Ontario to dismiss the application, emphasizing the Convention's objectives of deterrence and rapid return, especially for a young child whose environment is primarily family-centric.

The court ordered the child's return to Arizona.

The applicant sought interim child and spousal support, and the respondent brought a cross-motion for parenting orders.

The court previously granted the applicant exclusive possession of the matrimonial home and a temporary shared parenting schedule.

This endorsement addresses the remaining support issues, the respondent's income for support purposes, and the selection of a s. 30 assessor.

The court determined the respondent's income for support purposes based on his investment portfolio's net equity and historical rate of return.

Interim set-off child support and mid-range spousal support were ordered, with the applicant taking over matrimonial home expenses.

The court also ordered Dr. Morris to conduct the s. 30 assessment due to Dr. Polak's unavailability.

Procedural orders for document production, questioning, and a settlement conference were made on consent.

The applicant sought summary judgment for $500,000 from the deceased husband's estate, representing a life insurance policy he was contractually obligated to maintain for her benefit under a separation agreement but failed to obtain.

The respondent estate argued the clause was merely security for spousal support and subject to the Succession Law Reform Act clawback.

The court found the life insurance clause to be a "stand-alone" obligation, not solely security for support, and granted summary judgment for the applicant for the $500,000.

The issue of retroactive cost of living adjustments was reserved for further submissions.

The applicant sought substantial indemnity costs of $3,000.00 following a motion for temporary child and spousal support, while the respondent argued for no costs.

The court found that success on the underlying motion was divided, as the applicant did not obtain all the support claimed, and income was imputed to her as sought by the respondent.

The applicant also failed to make an offer to settle and acted unreasonably regarding her alleged inability to work and questionable expenses.

Applying the principles of costs in family law, the court determined that the presumption of costs for a successful party did not apply due to divided success and the applicant's unreasonable behaviour.

Consequently, the court ordered no costs to either party.

This is a costs endorsement following a successful appeal of a spousal support decision.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's order that reduced and then terminated spousal support payments.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and modified the support order.

The court then addressed costs for the trial below, determining that the appellant was the more successful party and entitled to costs despite the respondent's arguments regarding divided success and the appellant's disclosure failures.

The court awarded costs of $24,000 inclusive of HST and disbursements, enforceable by the Family Responsibility Office as support.

The applicant, Ms. Hebo, sought supplementary costs of $25,000 following a family law trial and an initial costs decision, and requested that costs awarded for support issues be made a charge on the former matrimonial home.

The respondent, Mr. Putros, opposed supplementary costs.

The court found that Ms. Hebo's offer to settle did not meet the strict requirements of Family Law Rule 18(14) for full indemnity but could be considered under Rule 18(16) and Rule 24.

The court determined that $8,000 was a reasonable and proportionate amount for supplementary costs, allocating $3,000 to support issues (enforceable by the Family Responsibility Office) and $5,000 to equalization (charged on the former matrimonial home).

The request for a charge on the matrimonial home for support costs was denied, as the Family Law Act does not provide for such relief for support orders, and the underlying reason was to secure a litigation funder who was not a party.

This endorsement addresses the issue of costs following a motion where the applicant was awarded temporary spousal support.

The applicant sought $4,470.85 in costs, while the respondent sought $8,391.

The court found the applicant to be the more successful party in the underlying motion, as she obtained spousal support despite seeking a higher amount, and the respondent's counter-proposals were not adopted.

The court rejected the applicant's arguments of bad faith against the respondent.

Considering the reasonableness and proportionality of the parties' conduct and offers to settle, the court noted that both parties' offers were far from the ultimate award.

The applicant's costs were reduced to reflect the discrepancy between her initial request and the final outcome.

The respondent was ordered to pay the applicant $3,500 in costs, all-inclusive.

The applicant sought substantial indemnity costs after a 10-day family law trial, claiming $203,059.19.

The respondent conceded $50,841.61.

The court awarded the applicant $103,000 in costs, finding the respondent's behavior unreasonable and in bad faith, particularly regarding non-payment of spousal support and presenting incredible evidence.

The costs were allocated between support issues ($40,000) and equalization ($63,000), with the latter secured as a charge on the matrimonial home.

The Applicant sought a temporary order for the children of the marriage to be placed in his care for 90 days, with no contact with the Respondent except as directed by a therapist, alleging parental alienation.

The Respondent opposed the motion.

The court considered whether the "material change in circumstances" test applied to a variation of a temporary, without prejudice order, ultimately accepting for the motion's purpose that the Applicant only needed to demonstrate the order was in the children's best interests.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the Applicant had not provided sufficient clear evidence, particularly noting issues with the admissibility and weight of the counsellor's reports as expert evidence without proper voir dire and cross-examination.