Daniel Melamed

The Applicant Mother brought a motion seeking an order for the children to attend a specific private school for the 2024/2025 academic year, with tuition and expenses to be divided as a section 7 expense (Applicant 30%, Respondent 70%).

She also sought a psycho-educational assessment for the children.

The court granted the private school attendance, ordering equal sharing of tuition and expenses, but dismissed the request for a psycho-educational assessment without prejudice due to missing procedural details.

The decision emphasized the children's best interests, particularly stability and continuity in schooling, and found the private school expenses appropriate given the parties' combined financial resources, including proceeds from property sales.

This is a costs endorsement following a come-back motion concerning ex parte injunctions.

The applicant successfully continued a Family Law Act preservation order against her former spouse but failed to continue a Mareva order against his family members and corporate affiliates.

The court determined costs based on divided success, reasonableness of conduct, and settlement offers, ultimately awarding the applicant costs against the former spouse and the other respondents costs against the applicant, with deferred payment terms for the applicant.

The applicant brought a motion to continue an ex parte FLA Preservation Order against her former spouse and a Mareva Order against his family members and corporate affiliates.

The applicant alleged that the respondent spouse had dissipated tens of millions of dollars from the sale of a business to defeat her equalization claim.

The court found a serious issue to be tried and continued the FLA Preservation Order against the respondent spouse to prevent further depletion of his remaining assets.

However, the court dissolved the Mareva Order against the family members and affiliates, finding no demonstrated risk that they would remove or dissipate the assets from the jurisdiction.

The applicant wife brought a motion for interim spousal support, interim disbursements, and a non-depletion order following the breakdown of a 51-year traditional marriage.

The respondent husband, who controlled a lucrative family business, had ceased paying support and changed his compensation structure from salary to share redemption, significantly depleting his capital.

The husband brought a cross-motion for the partition and sale of the matrimonial home and cottage.

The court found the husband was deliberately attempting to evade his support and equalization obligations.

The court ordered the husband to pay $20,000 per month in interim spousal support, a retroactive lump sum of $187,500, and $200,000 in interim disbursements.

The court also issued a non-depletion order and adjourned the husband's motion for the sale of the properties to the trial judge.

The party seeking costs sought an award on a substantial indemnity basis following a successful motion.

The court found that the opposing party had acted unreasonably by proceeding with the motion despite being warned that they were in breach of a previous costs order.

Applying the Family Law Rules, the court awarded substantial indemnity costs in the amount of $8,398.

The appellant father appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Justice dismissing his motion to vary a separation agreement governing child support obligations and quantifying arrears for special expenses.

The father argued that a material change in circumstances existed due to a decline in his income and an increase in the mother’s means, and that the trial judge erred by failing to adjust his support obligations accordingly.

Applying the principles from Willick v. Willick and the deferential appellate standard described in Housen v. Nikolaisen and Hickey v. Hickey, the court held that the alleged financial deterioration was foreseeable and largely the result of the father’s own choices regarding employment and business ventures.

Because the circumstances relied upon were apparent at the time the agreement was executed and did not constitute a qualifying material change, the refusal to vary the agreement was upheld.

The respondent mother’s cross‑appeal seeking trial costs was also dismissed, as the costs determination fell within the trial judge’s discretion.