William Friedman

The Crown sought forfeiture of two properties under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act following the discovery of sophisticated marijuana grow operations.

The first property, a former Molson Brewery plant in Barrie, contained two large indoor grow operations operated by individuals convicted of production and trafficking offences.

The second property was a residential dwelling in Phelpston owned by a company controlled by the respondent's brother.

The Crown alleged that the property owners and their corporations were complicit in or colluded with the drug offences.

The respondents argued they were innocent third parties unaware of the illegal activities occurring on their properties.

The appellant appealed an order varying a restraining order that permitted the sale of a property and directed the distribution of proceeds to a mortgagee.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal, finding that neither the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act nor section 490 of the Criminal Code provides a right of appeal from an order varying a restraining order in these circumstances.

The applicant mortgagee brought a motion to vary a restraint order under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act to permit the sale of the subject property under power of sale.

The Crown consented to the sale, but the respondent owner opposed it, arguing the property had increased in value and disputing the mortgagee's claimed costs.

The court granted the motion to permit the sale, directing that the net proceeds be paid to the Crown.

The court declined to approve the mortgagee's claimed costs of over $388,000, directing that those funds be held by the Crown pending an assessment under Rule 58 and the final determination of the forfeiture proceedings.

The applicants, Fercan Developments Inc. and GRVN Group Inc., challenged the constitutional validity of sections 16 and 19 of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, which permit courts to order forfeiture of offence-related property.

The applicants raised three constitutional questions: whether the forfeiture provisions were ultra vires Parliament as relating to property and civil rights; whether they violated section 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867 by conferring jurisdiction on provincial courts; and whether they violated the Canadian Bill of Rights.

The court upheld the constitutional validity of all challenged provisions, finding that forfeiture is a valid exercise of Parliament's criminal law power, that the Ontario Court of Justice may constitutionally exercise forfeiture jurisdiction, and that procedural safeguards meet Bill of Rights requirements.

The applicant corporation brought an application concerning a restraint order affecting property.

It was uncontested that neither the corporation nor its sole shareholder, officer, and director had been charged with any criminal offence related to the restraint order or the property.

The respondent did not dispute these facts and there was no cross‑examination on the supporting affidavit.

The court issued a supplementary endorsement confirming that these uncontested facts informed the earlier decision dismissing the application.

The applicant sought to vary an ex parte restraint order under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act to allow the sale of a property that had been used as a commercial marijuana grow operation.

The applicant wanted to use the sale proceeds to pay out a first mortgage held by a credit union before remitting the balance to the Attorney General.

The Attorney General opposed the payout, arguing that the mortgagee's innocence had not been established and should be determined at a forfeiture hearing.

The court dismissed the application, finding that it would be premature to allow the payout before a full hearing under s. 20 of the CDSA.

The appellant lawyer appealed a decision of the Law Society Appeal Panel affirming his disbarment for professional misconduct.

The Hearing Panel found he knowingly participated in a dishonest scheme to obtain mortgage funds by being reckless and willfully blind to fraudulent real estate transactions.

The Divisional Court held that the standard of review was reasonableness and found no error in the panels' conclusions regarding misconduct or the penalty of disbarment.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and unlawful confinement, as well as his 30-month sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred in her credibility findings and failed to consider a conditional sentence on compassionate grounds due to his poor health.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the W.D. principles and conducted a fair assessment of the evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the appellant's medical needs could be adequately managed in custody.

The appellant, a property owner, appealed a summary judgment order requiring it to pay the respondent contractor $1,199,122.50 for the unpaid balance of a construction contract.

The motions judge had found that a prior settlement agreement constituted an unequivocal admission of liability, precluding the appellant from raising a defence of equitable set-off for construction deficiencies.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the settlement agreement expressly permitted the appellant to file a statement of defence without prejudice in the event of default.

As the elements of equitable set-off were present, there was a genuine issue for trial, and the summary judgment was set aside.

The appellant landlord appealed a decision finding that it did not have the right under a commercial lease to relocate the respondent tenant outside the existing shopping centre development.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the lease envisaged changes short of full demolition and creation of an entirely new development, and therefore the relocation right did not extend to compulsory relocation outside the existing complex.

The defendants sought leave to appeal an interlocutory injunction that prevented them from forcibly entering the plaintiff's unit and selling her shares prior to trial.

The dispute arose after the plaintiff installed a washer and dryer without the board's approval.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's application of the RJR-MacDonald test for injunctive relief.

The court also held that the matter was not of general public importance, but rather specific to the litigants.