Varpio

The accused pleaded guilty to firearms and drug trafficking offences after shooting and killing an assailant who attempted to rob him during a drug deal.

The Crown sought a sentence of eight to nine years, while the accused sought five years.

The court found that the shooting constituted lawful self-defence under s. 34(1) of the Criminal Code and therefore could not be used as an aggravating factor in sentencing.

The court imposed a global sentence of six years in custody, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence for the firearms and drug offences while acknowledging the accused's youth and rehabilitative prospects.

The accused was charged with assault and sexual assault against his wife.

The complainant alleged multiple instances of physical abuse and non-consensual anal and vaginal sex.

The accused denied the physical assaults and testified that the sexual encounters were consensual or stopped immediately upon the complainant expressing pain or lack of consent.

The court found the complainant's evidence to be deeply flawed due to inconsistencies, minimization of her role in the toxic marriage, and delayed disclosure.

Conversely, the accused's evidence was credible and unshaken.

Applying the W.(D.) framework, the court was left with a reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused of all charges.

The plaintiff hotel sought an injunction to restrain the neighbouring defendant tire shop from servicing commercial vehicles, alleging the noise constituted a nuisance and breached municipal by-laws and the Environmental Protection Act (EPA).

The court found that the noise from servicing commercial vehicles likely caused an adverse effect, breaching s. 9(1) of the EPA and, consequently, the municipal zoning by-law.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the court granted an injunction restraining the defendant from servicing commercial vehicles between 8:00 p.m. and 9:00 a.m. to prevent irreparable harm to the hotel's reputation.

The Federal Crown brought an application to change the venue of the respondents' substantive application, which sought to attack a search warrant executed primarily in North Bay.

The Crown argued the matter should be heard in Ottawa, where the warrants were authorized.

The court found that while the issuance of a search warrant constitutes a pre-charge criminal proceeding, creating a presumption for the originating jurisdiction, the balance of convenience strongly favoured North Bay.

The respondents resided and operated businesses in North Bay, and the majority of the searched locations were there.

The Crown's application for a change of venue was dismissed.

The accused, a 67-year-old with a heart condition, brought a detention review under s. 525 of the Criminal Code, arguing his vulnerability to COVID-19 warranted release.

He was detained on charges of attempting to purchase a firearm while prohibited, following a previous conviction for serious domestic violence offences against his ex-wife.

The court acknowledged the accused's heightened risk from COVID-19 but found the jail had implemented rigorous mitigation protocols.

Balancing the Gladue factors and pandemic risks against the substantial likelihood that the accused would cause serious harm to his ex-wife if released, the court concluded his detention remained necessary on secondary grounds.

The application was dismissed.

The accused was arrested for assault with a weapon (a pellet gun) and declined to speak with counsel.

Upon release, he was additionally charged with discharging a firearm, an offence carrying a mandatory minimum sentence, but was not re-advised of his right to counsel regarding this new, more serious charge.

The accused brought a Charter application to exclude a subsequent statement made to police.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the new charge constituted a fundamental and discrete change in jeopardy, violating the accused's s. 10(a) and 10(b) Charter rights.

Applying the Grant test, the court excluded the statement under s. 24(2).

The accused brought an application to exclude his statement to police following his arrest for a home invasion robbery, alleging Charter breaches and involuntariness.

The court dismissed the Charter claims, finding the accused understood his jeopardy when he spoke with counsel despite being under the influence of drugs.

However, the court found that the interviewing officer offered an improper inducement by suggesting a confession to a drug-fueled crime would potentially change the Crown's course of action.

Consequently, the portion of the statement made after the inducement was excluded as involuntary.

The applicants, accused of a home invasion robbery, brought a Charter application to exclude evidence (including firearms and disguises) found in the trunk of a vehicle.

The police had stopped the vehicle hours after the robbery without reasonable grounds, detaining the occupants for an extended period without reading them their rights to counsel.

The court found serious breaches of sections 9 and 10(b) of the Charter.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that the seriousness of the breaches and their impact on the applicants' rights outweighed society's interest in adjudicating the case on its merits, resulting in the exclusion of the evidence.

The appellant appealed his impaired driving conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in dismissing his Charter application.

The central issue at trial was the arresting officer's credibility regarding whether he had an Approved Screening Device (ASD) in his cruiser, as he had failed to make notes about it.

After conviction, the officer's notes were disclosed, revealing he had taken inventory of his cruiser's backseat but omitted the ASD.

The appeal court applied the Dixon test and found that the undisclosed notes were highly material and raised a reasonable possibility that the verdict might have been different, as they directly impacted the officer's credibility.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to exclude breath room evidence, which had led to the accused's acquittal on a charge of refusing to provide a breath sample.

The trial judge found that the police breached the accused's s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel of choice by failing to make reasonable inquiries to contact her specific lawyer after leaving a message at an office number.

The Superior Court of Justice found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that the police failed to make reasonable efforts.

The court upheld the exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter and dismissed the appeal.

The applicants, charged with offences relating to a home invasion robbery, brought an application to adduce evidence that a third party committed the robbery.

The court found a strong nexus between the third party and the crime, noting police intelligence and surveillance linking the third party to a vehicle similar to the one used in the robbery.

The court held that the proposed evidence was relevant and probative, and its probative value substantially outweighed any prejudicial effect.

The application was allowed.

Following a three-and-a-half-week jury trial for a motor vehicle accident, the plaintiff was awarded $36,000 in damages.

As this amount was less than the vanishing deductible, the action was dismissed.

The defendant sought costs of $211,234.92, having beaten a pre-trial offer to settle.

The court reduced the costs award to $150,000, noting that the defendant's late production of documents and lengthy cross-examination unnecessarily extended the trial by one-and-a-half weeks.

The plaintiff was granted 12 months to pay the costs award.

The accused was charged with drug and weapons offences and brought an application under s. 11(b) of the Charter alleging unreasonable delay.

The total delay from charge to the anticipated end of trial was over 38 months.

After deducting defence delay, the net delay was approximately 36 months, which exceeded the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in Jordan.

The Crown conceded the case was not particularly complex, and the court found no exceptional circumstances to justify the delay.

The application was granted and the charges were stayed.

The applicants brought an application to set aside a 2011 will made by their brother/uncle, who suffers from Alzheimer's disease.

The application was converted into an action, and the issue on this motion was who should be appointed as the incapable person's litigation guardian.

The applicant nephew sought to be appointed, offering to abandon his claim in the action.

The respondent opposed the appointment, arguing the nephew had a conflict of interest because his father stood to benefit if the will was set aside.

The court agreed, finding that the nephew could instruct counsel in a way that unfairly prejudiced the respondent, and dismissed the request to appoint the nephew as litigation guardian.

The applicant sought a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code after being detained on charges of possession for the purpose of trafficking and breach of recognizance.

The applicant argued that his new ability to secure GPS electronic monitoring constituted a material change in circumstances.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding that electronic monitoring does not address the tertiary ground for detention and merely monitors rather than prevents non-compliance, thus failing to meet the test for a material change in circumstances under R. v. St. Cloud.

The applicant, Brian Hamm, sought an order preventing the respondent, Gordon R. Baker, a lawyer, from disclosing the contents of a legal file to an intervenor in an ongoing litigation.

Hamm claimed that he and Baker were in a solicitor-client relationship, or a 'near client' relationship, and that Baker owed him a duty of confidentiality.

The court applied the Jeffers indicia to determine if a reasonable person would conclude a solicitor-client relationship existed.

The court found that Baker acted solely as corporate counsel for Northern Superior Industries Ltd. and for another investor, and that Hamm understood Baker was not representing his personal interests.

The application was dismissed.

The parties brought competing motions to change a final order regarding custody and access of two children following the mother's relocation to Garden River.

The grandparents sought defined access, a police enforcement clause, access to official records, and an assessment of the children.

The mother and father consented to changing the father's access from supervised to unsupervised.

The court granted the grandparents defined monthly and holiday access with a police enforcement clause due to the high conflict between the parties, but dismissed their requests for official records and an assessment.

The father was granted unsupervised access on reasonable terms to be agreed upon with the mother.

Following a guilty verdict, the trial judge opened a letter purportedly from a juror.

An inquiry was held where the juror denied writing the letter.

The defence subsequently applied for a mistrial or a stay of proceedings based on a reasonable apprehension of bias, arguing that the juror's subsequent contact with the Crown tainted the process.

The trial judge dismissed the applications, finding that he was functus officio under the rule in R. v. Burke, which dictates that only an appellate court has jurisdiction to order a new trial for alleged juror bias requiring reconsideration of the verdict.

The judge also held that the Burke rule does not violate section 7 of the Charter and declined to continue the inquiry due to jury secrecy concerns.

During a trial for break and enter and assault, the court ruled on whether certain defences could be left with the jury.

The court permitted the third-party suspect defence for one accused, finding sufficient evidence connecting another individual to the crime.

However, the court refused to leave the defences of self-defence and duress for the co-accused, concluding there was no air of reality to the claim that he drew a knife from the victim's kitchen in response to a threat.

The applicant father brought a motion to terminate child support for his 20-year-old son, arguing the son was old enough to provide for himself and that they had no relationship.

The respondent mother opposed and sought an increase in support and payment of arrears.

The court found the son remained a child of the marriage as he was pursuing post-secondary education, and ordered the father to continue paying table support until at least April 2018.

The court also ordered the father to pay $3,580.32 in child support arrears, but dismissed the claim for section 7 expenses, finding the son could fund his own education through RESPs, OSAP, and part-time work.