C. Bruce Willson

The offender was sentenced for multiple counts of sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and sexual exploitation involving three minor children.

The offender, who was a parent to the children, abused his position of trust over a significant period of time.

Applying the principles from R. v. Friesen, the court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, balancing the profound harm caused to the victims against the offender's guilty pleas and tragic background.

A global sentence of 4 years imprisonment was imposed, along with mandatory ancillary orders and a 10-year section 161 prohibition order.

The applicants, accused of a home invasion robbery, brought a Charter application to exclude evidence (including firearms and disguises) found in the trunk of a vehicle.

The police had stopped the vehicle hours after the robbery without reasonable grounds, detaining the occupants for an extended period without reading them their rights to counsel.

The court found serious breaches of sections 9 and 10(b) of the Charter.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that the seriousness of the breaches and their impact on the applicants' rights outweighed society's interest in adjudicating the case on its merits, resulting in the exclusion of the evidence.

The applicants, charged with offences relating to a home invasion robbery, brought an application to adduce evidence that a third party committed the robbery.

The court found a strong nexus between the third party and the crime, noting police intelligence and surveillance linking the third party to a vehicle similar to the one used in the robbery.

The court held that the proposed evidence was relevant and probative, and its probative value substantially outweighed any prejudicial effect.

The application was allowed.

The Crown brought an application under s. 714.1 of the Criminal Code to permit a witness to testify by closed-circuit video from British Columbia.

The application was brought on the eve of trial without prior notice, contrary to the pre-trial endorsement.

The court denied leave to bring the late application, citing trial fairness and the importance of adhering to pre-trial timelines.

In the alternative, the court held that even if leave were granted, the substantive application would be dismissed because the Crown failed to establish that video testimony was appropriate in the circumstances, relying solely on hearsay evidence and cost considerations.

The plaintiff brought a motion to set aside a Registrar's order dismissing his action for delay under Rule 48.14.

The action, which arose from a real estate transaction and a forfeited deposit, was dismissed after the plaintiff failed to set it down for trial by a deadline established at a status hearing.

The court applied the Reid factors and found that the plaintiff failed to provide a reasonable explanation for the delay, did not move expeditiously to set aside the order, and could not rebut the presumption of prejudice to the defendants.

The motion was dismissed.

The applicants sought certiorari to quash their committal to stand trial for first degree murder under s. 231(5)(e) of the Criminal Code.

They argued there was no evidence that the victim was killed while being forcibly confined or regarding the role each applicant played in the killing.

They also argued they were denied natural justice because the preliminary inquiry judge relied on post-offence conduct and specific medical evidence without giving them an opportunity to make submissions.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the applications, finding that the applicants were permitted to address the evidence and were not denied natural justice.

The court further held that even if there was a breach, the applicants suffered no prejudice because a committal was inevitable based on the pre-offence and post-offence circumstantial evidence, which was sufficient to permit a jury to infer a common intention and that each applicant played a substantial and integral role in the killing.