Gareau

The applicant brought a motion for interim spousal support following a 27-year relationship.

The respondent argued the applicant had not established entitlement because she worked throughout the marriage.

The court disagreed, noting the applicant's earnings were substantially less, she sacrificed her advancement for the respondent's, and the respondent had previously paid voluntary support before unilaterally discontinuing it.

Using the parties' 2023 incomes, the court ordered the respondent to pay interim spousal support of $2,300 per month retroactive to September 1, 2023.

The plaintiffs brought a medical malpractice action against an emergency room physician following the death of their 27-year-old daughter from a cerebellar stroke.

The patient had presented to the emergency department with nausea, vomiting, and weakness, and was discharged with a diagnosis of intoxication.

The next day, she was found at home with severe trauma and a massive stroke, from which she died.

The court dismissed the action, finding that the physician met the standard of care, as the patient exhibited no focal neurological signs warranting a gait assessment or CT scan.

The court also found that causation was not proven, accepting expert evidence that the stroke likely occurred the following day due to trauma.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's action on a motion by the defendant, the court determined the issue of costs.

The defendant sought costs of $17,186.76.

The court found that the defendant was completely successful and entitled to costs on a partial indemnity scale, noting the plaintiff's conduct was misguided but not malicious.

Costs were fixed at $12,000 all-inclusive.

The accused was tried on 15 counts of domestic violence-related offences, including sexual assault, assault with a weapon, forcible confinement, and uttering threats against his former partner.

The court applied the W.(D.) framework to assess credibility, ultimately rejecting the accused's testimony and accepting the complainant's evidence as truthful and compelling.

The accused was found guilty on 13 counts.

The offender was sentenced for multiple counts of sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and sexual exploitation involving three minor children.

The offender, who was a parent to the children, abused his position of trust over a significant period of time.

Applying the principles from R. v. Friesen, the court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, balancing the profound harm caused to the victims against the offender's guilty pleas and tragic background.

A global sentence of 4 years imprisonment was imposed, along with mandatory ancillary orders and a 10-year section 161 prohibition order.

The accused was charged with multiple offences, including attempted murder, aggravated assault, and robbery, following a violent home invasion committed by two masked men.

While one assailant pled guilty, the identity of the second assailant was at issue.

The Crown's case against the accused was entirely circumstantial, relying on the testimony of unreliable witnesses and lacking any forensic evidence linking the accused to the crime scene.

The defence advanced a viable alternate suspect theory pointing to the victim's son, who had motive and opportunity.

Applying the Villaroman test for circumstantial evidence, the court found that the evidence did not lead to an inescapable inference of guilt and acquitted the accused on all counts.

During a criminal trial for a home invasion and assault, the Crown brought an application on a voir dire to admit the videotaped police statement of an unavailable witness under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The witness, who was initially arrested for the offences against his father, could not be located to testify.

The court found the necessity criterion was met but concluded the statement lacked threshold reliability.

Given the witness's animus toward the victim and his motive to fabricate while under arrest, the absence of an oath and contemporaneous cross-examination posed significant limitations on assessing the statement's truthfulness.

The application was dismissed.

The defendants brought a summary judgment motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' Family Law Act claim arising from their mother's fall and subsequent death.

The mother fell and fractured her hip on June 9, 2015, and died on September 29, 2015.

The action was commenced on September 29, 2017, exactly two years after her death but more than two years after the fall.

The plaintiffs conceded that the court was bound by Camarata v. Morgan, which held that death does not create a new cause of action or re-toll the limitation period.

The action was dismissed as statute-barred.

The defendant corporation brought a motion for leave to be represented by its director, a non-lawyer, under Rule 15.01(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure in an action for unpaid municipal taxes.

The plaintiff municipality brought a competing motion to strike the defendant's pleadings for non-compliance with the Rules.

Applying the Extend-a-Call factors, the court denied the defendant's motion, finding the director was not clearly authorized to represent all corporate interests, the corporation could afford counsel, and the director had delayed the litigation.

The court ordered the defendant to retain counsel by a specified date, failing which its pleadings would be struck.

The respondent father brought a motion seeking reimbursement from the applicant mother for section 7 extraordinary expenses related to sports, cell phones, and school supplies.

The parties' prior final order required advance written consent for such expenses.

The court found that the father had not obtained the mother's advance consent for the claimed expenses.

Furthermore, the court determined that cell phones and school supplies did not qualify as section 7 expenses in these circumstances.

The motion was dismissed without costs.

The applicant, charged with first-degree murder, applied for judicial interim release.

The Crown opposed release on the primary, secondary, and tertiary grounds.

The court found no basis for detention on the primary or secondary grounds, noting the applicant's lack of criminal record and proposed house arrest plan.

However, applying the factors from R. v. St-Cloud, the court concluded detention was necessary on the tertiary ground to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice, given the overwhelming strength of the Crown's case, the gravity of the offence, and the execution-style use of a firearm.

The accused applied for release from custody under a section 525 bail detention review.

He had been detained on secondary grounds and proposed a release plan without a surety, relying on community services and his own good intentions.

The court found the plan insufficient to address the secondary ground concerns given the accused's lengthy criminal record and history of breaching court orders.

The application for release was dismissed.

The accused applied to sever counts in an indictment involving two different complainants, both of whom are his biological daughters.

The charges relate to allegations of sexual offences against minors.

Applying the factors from R. v. Last, the court found sufficient factual and legal nexus between the counts and determined that a judge sitting alone would not be subject to moral or reasoning prejudice.

The application for severance was dismissed, as the public interest in a single trial outweighed any risk of prejudice to the accused.

The applicant mother brought a motion seeking to relocate the parties' two children from Sault Ste.

Marie to London, Ontario, where she had moved with her new spouse.

The parties had previously shared parenting equally.

Applying the best interests of the child test from Gordon v. Goertz, the court found that the children were most closely connected to Sault Ste.

Marie, where they had lived most of their lives, attended school, and had established social and family connections.

The court dismissed the motion, ordering that the children's primary residence remain with the respondent father in Sault Ste.

Marie, with joint custody continuing.

No costs were awarded.

The applicant brought a motion to change seeking section 7 expenses, ongoing child support, and an increase in spousal support following a change in their son's hockey team status.

The respondent brought a cross-motion to clarify the commencement date of child support from a previous order.

The court ordered the respondent to pay a proportionate share of section 7 expenses incurred while the son played for a different team, and varied the previous order to include child support for the month of April.

The claims for ongoing child support during the hockey season and increased spousal support were dismissed.

The respondent's motion for clarification was also dismissed as the previous order was unambiguous.

The accused, charged under a 13-count indictment, brought an application for the disclosure of unredacted police notes and source documents.

The Crown resisted the application, claiming the redacted information was protected by confidential informant privilege.

Following an in camera Basi hearing, the court found that the individual who provided the information had an expectation of confidentiality and was a confidential informant, not a police agent.

The court scheduled a further in camera hearing to review the unredacted material to determine if any portions could be disclosed to the defence.

The accused was charged with multiple offences, including robbery and break and enter, following a home invasion where the victims were sprayed with bear mace.

The Crown's case relied entirely on circumstantial evidence, specifically the accused's DNA found on a bear spray canister located outside the residence.

The court found that the forensic evidence could not establish how or when the DNA was deposited on the canister, nor could it definitively link the exterior canister to the substance used inside the home.

Concluding that the circumstantial evidence did not lead to the sole reasonable inference of guilt, the court acquitted the accused on all counts.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to strike the statement of defence and for judgment, which they subsequently abandoned.

The defendants sought costs of $14,515.08 on a partial indemnity basis for the abandoned motion.

The court fixed the defendants' costs at $7,500 inclusive of HST and disbursements, noting that while the motion was not argued, the defendants' counsel had prepared materials and travelled for the hearing.

The court ordered that the costs not be payable until the conclusion of the action, as they may be deducted from any amounts found owing to the plaintiffs.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual interference and breach of probation.

The appeal was based on two grounds: that the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding the complainant's clothing, and that the trial judge made an unsupported inference about the appellant's behaviour regarding washing bedding.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the trial judge made palpable and overriding errors on both grounds, which were central to the credibility assessments of the complainant and the appellant.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant father appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing his motion to strike affidavit evidence filed by the Children's Aid Society on a summary judgment motion.

The father argued that under recent appellate jurisprudence, the court was required to automatically vet and excise non-trial-worthy evidence before responding parties filed their materials.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the responsibility remains on the parties to file trial-worthy evidence and to raise specific objections via a motion to strike, rather than imposing an automatic initial vetting process on the court.