David Kirk

The accused was charged with sexual assault following an encounter with the complainant in his truck.

The complainant passed away after testifying at the preliminary hearing, and her prior statements and testimony were admitted at trial.

The accused testified that the encounter was a consensual sex trade transaction and admitted to initially lying to police.

The court applied the W.(D.) framework to assess credibility and found that while the accused's evidence was largely rejected, material inconsistencies in the complainant's hearsay evidence, without the benefit of viva voce testimony, left the court with a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted.

The self-represented appellant, an OPCA litigant, was convicted of failing to appear in court.

During his trial, the judge excluded him from the courtroom twice due to his obstructionist and pseudo-legal behaviour, invoking s. 650(2)(a) of the Criminal Code.

After the Crown closed its case, the trial judge immediately proceeded to find the appellant guilty without offering him the opportunity to make full answer and defence under s. 650(3).

On appeal, the Superior Court found that while the exclusion was justified, the failure to offer the appellant the opportunity to present a defence constituted a miscarriage of justice.

The conviction was quashed and a new trial ordered.

The offender was sentenced for multiple counts of sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and sexual exploitation involving three minor children.

The offender, who was a parent to the children, abused his position of trust over a significant period of time.

Applying the principles from R. v. Friesen, the court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, balancing the profound harm caused to the victims against the offender's guilty pleas and tragic background.

A global sentence of 4 years imprisonment was imposed, along with mandatory ancillary orders and a 10-year section 161 prohibition order.

The accused pleaded guilty to firearms and drug trafficking offences after shooting and killing an assailant who attempted to rob him during a drug deal.

The Crown sought a sentence of eight to nine years, while the accused sought five years.

The court found that the shooting constituted lawful self-defence under s. 34(1) of the Criminal Code and therefore could not be used as an aggravating factor in sentencing.

The court imposed a global sentence of six years in custody, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence for the firearms and drug offences while acknowledging the accused's youth and rehabilitative prospects.

The applicant, charged with first-degree murder, applied for judicial interim release.

The Crown opposed release on the primary, secondary, and tertiary grounds.

The court found no basis for detention on the primary or secondary grounds, noting the applicant's lack of criminal record and proposed house arrest plan.

However, applying the factors from R. v. St-Cloud, the court concluded detention was necessary on the tertiary ground to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice, given the overwhelming strength of the Crown's case, the gravity of the offence, and the execution-style use of a firearm.

The applicant sought a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code after being detained on charges of possession for the purpose of trafficking and breach of recognizance.

The applicant argued that his new ability to secure GPS electronic monitoring constituted a material change in circumstances.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding that electronic monitoring does not address the tertiary ground for detention and merely monitors rather than prevents non-compliance, thus failing to meet the test for a material change in circumstances under R. v. St. Cloud.

The accused, a professional engineer, was charged with criminal negligence causing death and bodily harm following the partial collapse of the Algo Centre Mall roof parking deck, which killed two people and injured another.

The Crown alleged the accused failed to properly inspect the mall and identify severe corrosion of the steel structure caused by decades of water infiltration.

The court found the accused's engineering work was shoddy and inadequate, but concluded the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that his conduct constituted a marked and substantial departure from the standard of a reasonable engineer, given expert evidence that other professionals had also missed the severity of the corrosion.

The accused was acquitted.