Ellies

The moving party brought a motion for the production of documents and information relating to two of the responding party's accounts: an investment account and a bank account.

The court found that the responding party had sufficiently answered the request regarding the investment account.

Regarding the bank account, the court ordered the responding party to provide an affidavit clarifying whether the account into which deposits were made was closed, or whether the account from which corresponding withdrawals were made was closed.

The motion was largely dismissed, and the responding party was awarded costs of $2,000.

The applicant, charged with second-degree murder in a 1998 cold case, applied to change the venue of his trial from Sudbury to Toronto, arguing that extensive pre-trial publicity and public support for the victim made it impossible to empanel an impartial jury in the Northeast Region.

The court reviewed the extent and content of the media coverage, social media commentary, and a public opinion survey.

The court found that the applicant failed to establish a fair and reasonable likelihood of widespread partiality or prejudice that could not be overcome by the safeguards of the jury system.

The application was dismissed, though the court noted the trial might still be moved within the region due to COVID-19 constraints, and imposed a publication ban on specific portions of the reasons.

The applicant sought to quash four municipal by-laws permitting the development of an arena and casino outside the downtown area, alleging statutory non-compliance, procedural unfairness, disqualifying bias, and bad faith.

The court found that the municipality complied with the Planning Act and gaming regulations, provided adequate public consultation, and that the council members did not exhibit disqualifying bias or act in bad faith.

The application was dismissed.

The applicants commenced an application to declare the respondent a vexatious litigant under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The respondent wrote to the court requesting that the application be summarily dismissed under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing the issue had already been decided in a previous contempt motion.

The court found that the previous request for a vexatious litigant declaration had been abandoned, not dismissed on its merits, and that a prior order requiring the respondent to seek leave to take steps in the proceeding was narrower than a s. 140 declaration.

The respondent's request for summary dismissal was therefore dismissed.

The applicant mother applied under the Interjurisdictional Support Orders Act, 2002 to vary a 2015 Alberta child support order.

The original order imputed the respondent father's income at $65,000, but the applicant later discovered his actual income was higher in subsequent years.

The respondent did not appear or file responding materials.

The court granted the application, varying ongoing support and fixing arrears for both ongoing support and extraordinary expenses retroactively to 2016 based on the respondent's actual income.

The defendant, Michel Royer, brought a motion to set aside default judgments totaling over $800,000 obtained against him by multiple plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs' claims arose from indignities to human remains committed by the co-defendant owner of a funeral home where Royer lived and volunteered.

Royer had retained a lawyer to defend the actions, but due to the negligence of his lawyer and the failure of the plaintiffs' lawyer to provide notice before noting him in default, judgments were entered against him.

The court applied the test for setting aside a default judgment, finding that Royer moved promptly upon learning of the judgments, had a plausible excuse for the delay, and possessed an arguable defence on the merits.

The motion was granted and the default judgments were set aside.

The payor brought a motion to change a 1999 spousal support order, seeking to terminate his $700 monthly payments upon his retirement at age 60.

The recipient opposed the motion, arguing she remained disabled and unable to work, and sought an increase in support based on the payor's post-separation income increases.

The court ruled that the recipient's psychiatric expert report was partially inadmissible for failing to comply with the Family Law Rules for litigation experts.

The court found the payor's retirement constituted a material change in circumstances and terminated the spousal support, noting he had paid support for 20 years—well beyond the duration suggested by the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines for a 12.5-year marriage.

The applicant father moved for summary judgment for sole custody of the parties' two children.

The respondent mother did not respond to the motion.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial, noting the mother had counselled one of the children to make false allegations of abuse against the father and had not exercised access in over a year.

The court granted the father sole custody and the mother supervised access, finding it in the children's best interests.

Costs were awarded to the father on a partial indemnity basis.

A jury panel member requested to be excused from jury duty because she had recently become employed as a probation officer.

The court considered whether a probation officer is a 'person engaged in the enforcement of law' under section 3(1) of the Juries Act.

The court reviewed the duties of a probation officer under the Ministry of Correctional Services Act and similar legislation in other provinces.

The court concluded that a probation officer is engaged in law enforcement and is therefore ineligible to serve on a jury in Ontario.

The panel member was excused.

The Crown appealed the dismissal of an impaired driving charge against the respondent.

The trial judge had dismissed the charge on the basis that the Crown failed to prove the identity of the offender because there was no in-court dock identification.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in law by concluding the identification evidence was insufficient.

The uncontroverted circumstantial evidence, including the arresting officer's lifelong knowledge of the respondent and the signing of a Promise to Appear, was sufficient to prove identity.

The matter was remitted for a new trial.

Following the dismissal of the defendant's motion to discharge a certificate of pending litigation, the plaintiffs sought substantial indemnity costs based on unaccepted offers to settle.

The court found that Rule 49.10(2) did not entitle the plaintiffs to substantial indemnity costs because they were the responding parties on the motion, and the motion was dismissed.

However, exercising its discretion under Rule 49.13, the court awarded the plaintiffs partial indemnity costs, increased to $3,500 to recognize their efforts to resolve the matter.

In a high-conflict family law proceeding, the applicant brought a motion at the court's direction to determine whether the self-represented respondent was a 'special party' under Rule 2 of the Family Law Rules.

The court reviewed the respondent's demeanor, communications, and former counsel's opinion, finding him incapable of understanding the issues or appreciating the consequences of his decisions.

The court declared the respondent a special party and appointed the Public Guardian and Trustee as his legal representative.

The offender pleaded guilty to two counts of attempted murder, aggravated assault, and attempt to obstruct justice after breaking into a home and repeatedly stabbing three victims who had implicated his brother in a previous crime.

The Crown sought 6 to 8 years imprisonment, while the defence sought 3 to 5 years, citing the offender's Aboriginal background and Gladue principles.

The court emphasized the devastating impact on the victims and the need for public protection, sentencing the offender to 8 years imprisonment less enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody.

The accused was charged with multiple historical sexual offences against twin sisters who frequented his convenience store when they were youths.

The court found the evidence insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that sexual contact occurred before the complainants turned 14, or that one of the complainants was sexually assaulted.

However, the court found that the accused was in a position of trust towards one of the complainants when they began a sexual relationship after she turned 14.

As a result, her consent was legally irrelevant, and the accused was found guilty of sexual exploitation.

The plaintiff, a self-represented minister of the Church of the Universe, sued the Attorney General of Canada for damages and an injunction after being acquitted of possessing cannabis, which he claimed was a religious sacrament.

The plaintiff moved for default judgment, and the defendant moved to strike the statement of claim for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's motion as premature.

The court granted the defendant's motion to strike the claims for Charter damages, conspiracy, malicious prosecution, and negligence, but granted the plaintiff leave to amend his claim for a constitutional exemption under s. 2(a) of the Charter.

The accused was charged with drug trafficking after a police officer found cocaine in his rental vehicle following a traffic stop.

The accused brought a Charter application to exclude the evidence, alleging breaches of his rights under sections 8 and 9.

The court found that the initial traffic stop was a pretext for a criminal investigation and not a valid stop under the Highway Traffic Act, resulting in an arbitrary detention.

The court also found that the officer's demands for the rental agreement and questions about the accused's travel itinerary constituted unreasonable searches and seizures.

Furthermore, the officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the accused.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that the multiple serious Charter breaches warranted the exclusion of the drugs under section 24(2).

The parties lived in a common-law relationship.

After separation, the plaintiff commenced a Small Claims Court action for unjust enrichment, which was administratively dismissed after the defendant argued the court lacked jurisdiction.

The plaintiff then commenced a Superior Court action for unjust enrichment and constructive trust.

The defendant moved to dismiss the action, arguing it was frivolous, barred by res judicata due to the Small Claims Court dismissal, or that there was no genuine issue for trial.

The court dismissed the motion, holding that an administrative dismissal is not a decision on the merits and does not trigger res judicata.

The court also found a genuine issue for trial regarding the plaintiff's contributions to the property.

During a first-degree murder trial, the accused brought an application to adduce evidence of a third-party suspect, a Crown witness who had a sexual relationship with the deceased and a motive to harm him.

The court found sufficient circumstantial evidence connecting the witness to the crime scene and the deceased to establish an air of reality to the defence.

The application was granted, permitting the defence to pursue the witness as a third-party suspect.

The accused, charged with first degree murder, brought an application to edit portions of his video-recorded police interview.

The defence argued that certain statements made by the interviewing officer expressing certainty of guilt and urging the accused to speak should be redacted as they would act as a 'voice for the Crown' and undermine the accused's right to silence.

The court agreed to redact segments where the officer suggested the accused had an option to explain himself or where the officer expressed disbelief at the accused's denials, finding these could undermine the right to silence or suggest undisclosed evidence.

Other segments providing context to the accused's admissions were retained.

The defence in a first-degree murder trial brought a pre-trial application requesting that the jury be permitted to take a view of the crime scene.

The Crown consented to the view, but an issue arose regarding whether the accused could waive his right to attend under s. 652(3) of the Criminal Code.

Declining to follow conflicting Ontario jurisprudence, the court held that s. 652(3) must be read in conjunction with s. 650(2)(b), permitting the accused to waive his attendance.

The application was granted with specific logistical conditions to protect the integrity of the trial.