Valois P. Ambrosino

The respondent brought a motion to strike the applicant's motion to change and to prohibit further motions without leave of court and security for costs.

The applicant sought dismissal of the respondent's motion and leave to proceed with her motion to change.

The court found that the applicant had a history of non-compliance with court orders requiring leave before bringing motions to change, had engaged in abuse of process through relitigation of settled issues, and lacked credibility.

The court struck the applicant's motion to change, dismissed her request for leave, and dismissed the respondent's request for security for costs, finding that existing leave requirements were sufficient safeguards.

The applicant mother brought a motion for temporary child and spousal support.

The respondent father argued he met the 40% shared parenting threshold under section 9 of the Child Support Guidelines, warranting a reduction in support.

The court found the father failed to establish he met the threshold and ordered full guideline child support based on his income of $103,000.

Spousal support was denied due to insufficient funds.

The court also ordered the children to attend public school unless the mother's family continued to fund their private school tuition.

The applicant mother sought supervised parenting time for the respondent father, preservation of cottage sale proceeds, and temporary child and spousal support.

The respondent father cross-moved for unsupervised parenting time.

The court denied the applicant's request for supervised parenting, granting the respondent unsupervised parenting time with a specific schedule.

Issues regarding the cottage property were adjourned to a later date to allow the added respondent (the father's sister, legal owner of the cottage) to make submissions.

Temporary financial orders were made to maintain the status quo, requiring the respondent to pay certain household and vehicle expenses, and an uncharacterized amount of $6,000 per month to the applicant, pending full financial disclosure and a future case conference.

The respondent was also ordered to enroll in the Caring Dads program.

The appellant, Patrick Gregory Ellis, appealed support and related orders made after an uncontested trial, which was uncontested because his pleadings were struck due to wilful non-compliance and refusal to provide financial disclosure.

The respondent, Amy Dawn Lamothe, brought a motion to quash the appeal.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion on two bases: first, courts typically do not hear appeals from unopposed proceedings, and no exception was warranted; second, the appellant had chronically and wilfully breached numerous court orders, causing prejudice.

The appeal was quashed, and the appellant was barred from initiating further financial proceedings without paying outstanding amounts or obtaining leave.

Costs were awarded to the respondent on an elevated scale.

The applicant mother brought a motion to strike the respondent father's pleadings due to his failure to comply with court orders regarding financial disclosure and costs.

The court found the father in continued breach of disclosure orders regarding his business income and a previous costs order.

The court struck the father's pleadings relating to financial issues, including support and property division.

However, the court refused to strike his pleadings regarding parenting issues, noting that doing so would not be in the children's best interests.

The parties brought cross-motions seeking to impose specific terms for the sale of their matrimonial home, following several prior orders that had failed to result in a sale.

The applicant sought to restrict the respondent, who intended to bid on the property, from seeing other offers.

The respondent argued that real estate regulations required offers to be conveyed promptly.

The court held that the obligation to convey offers is subject to client direction and ordered a blind bid process where neither party would see the offers until a specified time, preventing the respondent from gaining an unfair right of first refusal.

The court imposed detailed terms regarding the listing agreement, showing times, and COVID-19 protocols to ensure the sale proceeded without further dispute.

This ruling addresses the costs of an urgent motion brought by the father to reinstate parenting time, which was resolved by consent.

The father sought full recovery of costs, arguing the mother's non-compliance necessitated the motion.

The mother sought her own costs or that each party bear their own, arguing the motion was unnecessary and she was more successful as counselling was agreed upon.

The court found the father was more successful in reinstating parenting time, which the mother had unilaterally suspended in breach of a prior order.

However, the father also behaved unreasonably by not informing the mother about a counselling session with the child.

Considering both parties' unreasonable conduct and offers to settle, and the disproportionate legal costs, the court ordered the mother to pay the father $3,500.00 in costs.

The respondent moved by a Rule 14B motion to continue previously heard substantive motions, either by virtual conference or in-person.

The applicant opposed a virtual hearing, citing potential prejudice.

The court noted that recent procedural changes eliminated the requirement for urgency or pressing matters for motions.

The substantive issues involved the enforceability of an alleged agreement and the effect of escrow provisions related to the sale of a commercial property.

Recognizing the complexities and the court's rescheduling challenges due to COVID-19, the court declined to immediately set a hearing mode or date.

Instead, it ordered a further case conference before another Justice to review the parties' positions on the substantive issues and the preferred mode of hearing (in-person vs. virtual), before rescheduling the motions.

A motion to change a final custody and access order resulted in settlement on November 10, 2018, with the only remaining issue being costs.

The respondent father sought costs of $34,349.89 on a full recovery basis or $26,116.57 on a partial recovery basis.

The applicant mother sought no costs or nil costs.

The court declined to award costs to either party, finding that the settlement was not a clear capitulation by either party, both parties behaved unreasonably in not serving offers to settle, and the mother's financial circumstances and impact on the child's welfare were relevant considerations.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's finding of contempt on three access provisions in a custody and access order.

The motion judge had found the appellant in contempt for: (1) failing to provide the children's summer activity schedule by May 1 from 2012 to 2015; (2) denying access during Easter weekend in 2015; and (3) denying access to the son on his birthday in October 2015.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside all three findings of contempt, finding that the record did not support the motion judge's findings and that the motion judge's reasons were insufficient.

This ruling on costs followed a motion regarding custody and access.

The applicant sought costs on both full and partial indemnity bases, while the respondent sought partial indemnity costs.

The court dismissed the applicant's claim for costs for the period from September 11 to October 5, 2018, and entirely dismissed the respondent's claim for costs.

The applicant was awarded partial indemnity costs for the period from October 25 to December 15, 2018, totaling $14,048.28, finding the respondent's conduct unreasonable during that later period.

The applicant mother sought the return of her child to her primary care after the child was placed with the respondent father following the mother's temporary psychiatric episodes.

The father opposed, seeking to maintain primary care.

The court, applying the best interests of the child principle under the Children’s Law Reform Act, found that the mother's episodes were temporary and appropriately addressed.

The court emphasized returning to the pre-existing status quo where the mother was the primary caregiver, as the urgent situation had passed and the mother could safely resume care.

The father's attempt to change custody was deemed opportunistic.

The court ordered the child's return to the mother's primary care with a clarified parenting schedule and ordered both parties to cooperate with Family Connexions.

The Applicant brought an urgent, ex parte motion for broad interim relief, which led to multiple hearings and a significant number of affidavits.

The motion was eventually settled at a case conference.

The court was asked to determine costs for the motion.

The Applicant was found to be more successful in achieving substantive terms to stabilize the family's situation, but her conduct in initiating the motion without notice and prior to a case conference, despite a lack of true urgency, was deemed unreasonable and led to unnecessary costs.

The court awarded the Applicant partial costs, reduced by half to sanction her procedural conduct, payable upon adjudication or settlement of economic issues at trial.

The respondent, Stephen Levine, brought a motion seeking an advance on equalization to be used as a credit towards his purchase of the applicant's cottage and office condominium properties.

The applicant, Annette Levine, opposed this, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction for partial summary judgment on equalization due to significant disputes regarding asset valuations, outstanding disclosure, and uncommenced business valuations.

The court, citing Zagdanski and Haroun, declined to order an advance on equalization due to the contested facts and incomplete financial information.

However, it adopted an alternative proposal, ordering Stephen Levine to pay 50% of the cottage's net sale price (less a $50,000 valuator retainer) to reduce a line of credit on the matrimonial home, and to pay the full $400,000 sale price of the office condominium directly to Annette Levine (less commissions), ensuring she received a corresponding benefit for his acquisition of the properties.

The applicant mother brought a motion to change a child support order dated April 6, 2009, seeking retroactive contribution from the respondent father towards section 7 expenses (special or extraordinary expenses) incurred between 2012 and 2016, particularly for the daughter's post-secondary education costs totalling approximately $26,906.66.

The respondent failed to respond to the motion and was noted in default.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that although a change in circumstances existed, a retroactive increase in child support was not warranted based on the D.B.S. factors.

The court concluded that the father had paid an appropriate amount of child support and that the daughter would not benefit from a retroactive award.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal decision.

The appellant achieved only partial success on appeal.

The court reduced the respondent's costs award from $180,000 to $135,000 (a 25% reduction), finding that while the respondent remained entitled to costs of the application, some reduction was appropriate given the appellant's partial success and the disputed issues on appeal.

The court also declined to award costs to the appellant for his motion for a stay of the application judge's decision, finding the claimed costs excessive and the motion inappropriate as it sought multiple forms of relief beyond the stay order.

Appeal from an application judge's decision regarding the division of property following the breakdown of a common law relationship.

The appellant sought sole beneficial ownership of a jointly-titled residential property (Brookdale Avenue) or, alternatively, a credit for his repayment of a joint line of credit used to finance its purchase.

The Court of Appeal upheld the finding that the respondent held a 50 per cent legal and beneficial interest in the property, but allowed the appeal in part by granting the appellant a $500,000 credit on division of sale proceeds for his repayment of the respondent's share of the joint debt.

The appellant, a father, sued the respondent, the mother of his child, for fraudulent misrepresentation and damages arising from involuntary parenthood.

The appellant alleged that the respondent falsely represented she was taking birth control pills, inducing him to engage in unprotected sexual intercourse that resulted in the birth of a child.

The motion judge struck the claim without leave to amend, finding no recoverable damages for non-pathological emotional harm from unplanned parenthood and that the misrepresentation did not vitiate consent for purposes of a sexual battery claim.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, holding that damages for involuntary parenthood are not recoverable in tort and that the alleged deception did not go to the nature and quality of the sexual act.

The moving party sought leave to appeal an order requiring him to pay $100,000 in interim costs and disbursements, as well as a $12,000 costs order.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the proposed appeal did not raise issues of general importance but rather involved fact-specific determinations regarding the moving party's ability to pay and his financial interconnectedness with his wealthy father.

Costs of the motion were fixed at $5,000 and set off against a previous costs order.

The applicant, Victoria Chechui, sought costs following a trial where she was awarded an interest in a property but not a joint account.

The respondent, Ian Jamieson Nieman, argued for divided success and reduced costs.

The court found Victoria entitled to costs, noting Ian forced the matter to trial and made a late, unreasonable offer.

The court declined to undertake a detailed analysis of time spent on each issue, finding it impractical and noting Ian's conduct prolonged the trial.

The court rejected Victoria's claim for full indemnity costs based on her offer to settle, as the offer was for a fixed amount for half the property, while the order was for sale and equal division, making it impossible to compare.

However, Victoria's offer was deemed more reasonable than Ian's.

The court removed costs for settlement and trial management conferences where no costs were ordered, and for an articling student's time deemed unreasonable.

Considering the purposes of costs, offers to settle, reasonableness, proportionality, and the losing party's expectations, the court fixed Victoria's costs at $180,000 inclusive of HST and disbursements.