Court File and Parties

Court File No.: FO-20-15551-0001 Date: August 5, 2025 Ontario Court of Justice

Between: Carmen Apolaya Applicant

— AND —

James Howell Respondent

Before: Justice W. Kapurura

Heard on: July 8, 2025

Reasons for Judgment released on: August 5, 2025

Counsel:

• Valois Ambrosino, counsel for the applicant
• Raymond E. Sharpe, counsel for the respondent

Part One – Introduction

[1] There are two motions before the court regarding procedural issues. The parties have one child, AJ (the child), who is 14 years old. The child resides primarily with the respondent (the father). The applicant (the mother) has parenting time with the child on three out of four weekends per month, and one Wednesday overnight per month. Parenting time during holidays is shared equally.

[2] The parties have been involved in family court litigation for about 12 of the child's 14 years of life. The mother commenced the initial proceeding when the child was about 6 weeks old.

[3] The father's motion seeks an order:

a. Striking the mother's motion to change issued on June 2, 2024. The motion to change seeks to vary the final parenting and child support orders made by this court on February 24, 2023.

b. Prohibiting the mother from issuing further motions to change without leave of the court.

c. Prohibiting the mother from issuing further motions to change without first paying $25,000.00 as security for costs.

[4] The father argues that the mother has failed to comply with two existing orders requiring her to seek leave of the court before bringing a motion to change. He takes the position that a court order striking the mother's motion to change would conclude this proceeding as he did not seek any substantive orders in his response to her motion to change.

[5] The mother has brought a cross-motion seeking the following orders:

a. A dismissal of the father's motion.

b. Leave to proceed with her motion to change currently before the court.

[6] The parties had their first case conference in this matter on April 28, 2025.[1] On that date, the court provided directions regarding these two motions. Each party filed the following materials:

a. A supporting affidavit and a reply affidavit regarding their motion.

b. An affidavit in response to the other party's motion.

[7] The court must determine the following issues:

a. Should the court retroactively grant the mother leave to proceed with her motion to change?

b. If so, should the court provide terms for the mother to reinstate her motion to change?

c. If not, should the court strike the mother's motion to change?

d. Should the court require the mother to pay security for costs before bringing a motion to change in the future?

Part Two – Litigation History and Court Orders

[8] The father is 38 years old. The mother is 40 years old.

[9] The parties were in a common law relationship from March 2009 until late 2010. When the parties met, the mother was residing in Peru, where she was born.

[10] The mother travelled to Canada on a visitor visa in 2009 and moved in with the father.

[11] The parties' relationship deteriorated shortly after the child was born in 2010.

[12] On October 30, 2010, the mother called the police against the father. When the police attended, she was arrested and charged with assault against him. The mother's arrest led to the parties' separation.

[13] The child remained in the father's care following the mother's arrest. The mother subsequently resolved the charges when she pleaded guilty.[2]

[14] The mother issued an application in the fall of 2010, seeking parenting orders. She also brought an ex parte motion for custody (as it was then called). Her ex parte motion was granted by Justice P.W. Dunn on November 2, 2010, but was never enforced as the child remained in the father's care. At the review date of November 22, 2010, Justice Dunn set aside the November 2, 2010, order and reinstated the status quo at the time. The child continued to reside with the father.

[15] The mother's Canadian visitor visa expired in December 2010. She remained in Canada after the expiration of the visa.

[16] The parties do not provide much detail on what transpired between 2010 and 2014. However, their family matter remained in court during that period.

[17] On December 11, 2014, Justice Dunn made a final order granting custody of the child to the father.

[18] On January 16, 2015, the court ordered the mother to pay the father's costs of $4,500.00.[3]

[19] On March 16, 2015, Justice Dunn made a final order granting parenting time to the mother every 2nd, 3rd, and 4th weekend of each month, from Friday after school until Sunday at 6:00 p.m. The child was to reside primarily in the father's home.

[20] On September 30, 2016, Justice Dunn made a final order prohibiting the mother from travelling outside of Ontario and Canada with the child. Justice Dunn's endorsement invited the parties to make costs submissions regarding the September 30, 2016, hearing.

[21] Justice Dunn's decision on costs was released on February 7, 2017. In the decision, he made the following orders and comments:

a. The father was entitled to costs because he was successful and because the mother had raised issues by way of re-litigation that had already been decided.

b. The mother shall pay the father his costs in the amount of $2,000.00 for the September 30, 2016, hearing. The mother was now liable to pay the father his total costs of $6,500.00, comprising the $4,500.00 ordered on January 16, 2015, and the $2,000.00 ordered on February 7, 2017.

c. The mother must pay at least $3,000.00 towards the costs amount before she is permitted to bring any further proceedings.

d. The mother must apply, on motion, for the court's permission before bringing any further proceedings.

[22] On October 6, 2020, the mother brought a motion to change parenting orders. She did not seek leave of the court as ordered by Justice Dunn on February 7, 2017. On October 12, 2021, Justice B. Weagant granted the mother leave to proceed with her motion to change.

[23] The Office of the Children's Lawyer (OCL) released a report on August 6, 2021, pursuant to section 112 of the Courts of Justice Act. In the report, the OCL made the following recommendations:

a. The father should continue to have decision-making responsibility for the child. The mother should be consulted and involved, when possible.

b. The child should spend three out of four weekends per month with the mother. The child should have Wednesday overnights with the mother during the weeks when the mother does not have parenting time.

c. The parents should continue to have equal parenting time during the summer and March break.

d. The parents should refrain from making disparaging or negative remarks to the child about the other parent.

[24] On February 24, 2023, the parties executed detailed final minutes of settlement on all parenting issues, except for travel, based on the OCL recommendations above. The minutes of settlement also resolved child support on a final basis. The minutes were entered into a final order by this court on February 24, 2023. The child support clauses of the order provide as follows:

a. Commencing February 1, 2023, the mother shall pay the father support for the child in the amount of $547.23 per month based on her annual income of $59,125.37.

b. The mother's child support arrears are $31,753.44. She shall pay the father arrears at the reduced and fixed amount of $15,876.72 (50% of $31,753.44) as of December 31, 2022. Commencing February 1, 2023, she shall pay the father $200 per month towards arrears. The mother shall pay the total arrears of $15,876.72 within 36 months.

[25] The travel issue remained before the court.

[26] On February 26, 2024, the OCL provided a Voice of the Child report (VOC report) addressing the discrete issue of travel. The VOC report stated that the child was open to travelling with his mother to Peru. It also noted that the child wished to have more parenting time with the mother.

[27] On February 28, 2024, the father accepted an offer to settle the travel issue that had previously been served on him by the mother, dated July 19, 2023 (and had remained open). The mother's offer was that she may travel with the child to Peru, provided she deposits $20,000.00 with the court, and that she may otherwise travel with the child outside of Canada without a monetary deposit. The mother refused to honour her offer to settle after the father accepted it.

[28] On March 12, 2024, Justice M. Pawagi adjourned the travel issue to a one-day focused hearing.

[29] On June 2, 2024, the mother issued her motion to change, seeking to vary the final order of this court dated February 24, 2023, with respect to child support and parenting issues. Her motion to change was issued before the conclusion of the travel issue on her prior motion to change. This is the main proceeding before this court. The motion to change seeks the following specific orders:

a. An order suspending and/or downwardly varying the child support order dated February 24, 2023, due to her loss of employment, retroactive to July 6, 2023.

b. An order that the child shall reside with each parent based on a 50-50 (equal time-sharing) schedule.

[30] On June 5, 2024, the father brought a motion seeking a final order on the issue of travel based on the accepted offer to settle. On June 7, 2024, Justice Pawagi granted the father's request and finalized the travel issue. The order provides that the mother may travel with the child to Peru, provided she deposits $20,000.00 with the court, and that she may otherwise travel with the child outside of Canada without a monetary deposit.

[31] On August 2, 2024, Justice Pawagi ordered the mother to pay the father his costs of $5,000.00 regarding the June 5, 2024, motion.

[32] The mother's motion to change issued on June 2, 2024, remains before this court. The father seeks to have it struck per his motion materials.

Part Three – Legal Considerations

3.1 – The Test for Determining Leave Motions

[33] In Kim v. McIntosh, 2024 ONSC 7257, the court set out the following test for determining leave motions at paragraph 14:

Courts tasked with determining leave motions, hold a gate-keeping function. In the context of limitations placed on litigants pursuant to procedural powers under r. 2(5) of the FLR, leave motions should be viewed as screening mechanisms – alive to the important balance between the right to be heard and the prevention of misuse of the court process. Leave should be granted where it is in the overall interests of justice to do so. Determination of the interests of justice should include consideration of the context and merits of the motion, and an overall balancing of interests. More specifically, the court should consider:

1. The offensive or targeted litigation conduct that compelled the requirement for leave and the need to discourage that conduct;

2. A preliminary or threshold assessment of the merits of the relief sought by the moving party; and

3. A balancing of the individual interests of the litigants and the interests of public.

3.2 – Non-Compliance with Court Orders

[34] Subrules 1(8) and 1(8.1) of the Family Law Rules, provide as follows:

Failure to obey order

(8) If a person fails to obey an order in a case or a related case, the court may deal with the failure by making any order that it considers necessary for a just determination of the matter, including,

(a) an order for costs;

(a.1) an order to pay an amount to a party or into court as a penalty or fine;

(b) an order dismissing a claim;

(c) an order striking out any application, answer, notice of motion, motion to change, response to motion to change, financial statement, affidavit, or any other document filed by a party;

(d) an order that all or part of a document that was required to be provided but was not, may not be used in the case;

(e) if the failure to obey was by a party, an order that the party is not entitled to any further order from the court unless the court orders otherwise;

(f) an order postponing the trial or any other step in the case; and

(g) a contempt order, if sought under rule 31. O. Reg. 322/13, s. 1; O. Reg. 261/24, s. 1.

Failure to follow rules

(8.1) If a person fails to follow these rules, the court may deal with the failure by making any order described in subrule (8), other than a contempt order under clause (8)(g).

3.3 – Abuse of Process

[35] In Levely v. Levely, 2013 CarswellOnt 1953 (Ont. S.C.J.), the court stated that:

Family court proceedings should not become a destructive tool which one party wields and manipulates in order to create further financial and emotional hardship for the other party.

[36] In Catholic Children's Aid Society of Toronto v. E.S., [2016] O.J. No. 2558 (OCJ), the court stated that:

78 The common law doctrine of abuse of process engages the inherent power of the court to "prevent misuse of its procedure, in a way that would... bring the administration of justice into disrepute". Toronto (City) v. Canadian Union of Public Employees (C.U.P.E.), Local 79 v. City of Toronto, et al., (2003) 3. S.C.R. 77 para. 37.

81 The Supreme Court of Canada has made observations as to why relitigation of an issue is to be avoided as a matter of public policy:

• There can be no assumption that relitigation will yield a more accurate result than the original proceeding;

• Relitigation is a waste of judicial resources.

• An inconsistent result in the subsequent proceeding "in and of itself will undermine the credibility of the entire judicial process, thereby diminishing its authority, its credibility and its aim of finality".

3.4 – Enforcement of Court Orders

[37] In Ferguson v. Charlton, 2008 ONCJ 1, Justice R. Spence set out a three-step process for the court to follow on a motion brought under subrule 1(8). This three-step process applies when deciding whether the evidence allows for a finding of non-compliance of an order by one party, and whether the court should exercise its discretion to impose consequences if any breach is found. The three steps in the process set out in Ferguson are:

[64] ... First, the court must ask whether there a triggering event that would allow it to consider the wording of either subrule 1(8) or subrule 14(23). That triggering event would be non-compliance with a court order "in the case or a related case" [subrule 1(8)] or an order "made on motion" [subrule 14(23)].

Second, if the triggering event exists, the court should then ask whether it is appropriate to exercise its discretion in favour of the non-complying party by not sanctioning that party under subrule 1(8), or by ordering that subrule 14(23) does not apply. My review of the foregoing case law suggests that this discretion will only be granted in exceptional circumstances. In my view, the court's decision whether or not to exercise its discretion in favour of a non-complying party, ought to take into account all relevant history in the course of the litigation and, more specifically, the conduct of the non-complying party.

Third, in the event that the court determines that it will not exercise its discretion in favour of the non-complying party, it is then left with a very broad discretion as to the appropriate remedy pursuant to the provisions of either subrule 1(8) or subrule 14(23).

Part Four – Analysis

[38] The evidence in this case confirms the following undisputed facts:

i. Justice Dunn's order dated February 7, 2017, requiring the mother to seek leave of the court before bringing any further proceedings, remains in effect. In his endorsement, Justice Dunn stated that the mother had attempted to relitigate issues that had already been resolved.

ii. The mother did not seek leave of the court before bringing her current motion to change.

iii. There is high conflict between the parties.

iv. There is poor communication between the parties. In text messages filed by both parties, the mother uses the following language when texting the father:

Don't you fuck know the schedule?

..do your fucking job as a parent..

v. The child continues to do well in the father's primary care. There are no concerns about the care being provided to the child in his home.

[39] The evidence shows that the mother has a history of bringing motions to change without first seeking leave, in breach of Justice Dunn's order. On October 6, 2020, she brought a motion to change parenting orders. She did not seek leave of the court before issuing her motion to change. Even though she subsequently obtained court approval to proceed with her motion to change on October 12, 2021, the fact remains that she did not first seek leave before issuing her motion to change.

[40] In the current proceeding, the mother did not seek leave of the court. She is now seeking retroactive approval to proceed with her motion to change. Putting the cart before the horse has become a habitual approach for her that needs correction. What is concerning is that she was legally represented when she filed both motions to change. It is also concerning that in paragraph 35 of her affidavit dated June 6, 2025, she accuses the father of trying to block her ability to address the parenting and support issues by "claiming that (she) is required to seek leave prior to bringing (her) motion."

[41] The court finds that the mother's current motion to change is problematic for the following reasons:

a. She did not seek leave of the court.

b. Her most recent motion to change was concluded on June 7, 2024, when Justice Pawagi made a final order on the remaining issue of travel. All other parenting issues had been concluded on February 24, 2023, by way of a consent order. The mother issued her motion to change on June 2, 2024, before the conclusion of her most recent motion to change.

c. On August 2, 2024, Justice Pawagi ordered the mother to pay the father his costs of $5,000.00 regarding the June 5, 2024, motion. In her costs endorsement, Justice Pawagi stated as follows:

I am not precluding the mother from taking any further steps until she pays the within cost award, but I am requiring her to obtain leave of the court before commencing a further motion to change in order to prevent her from again running up the legal costs for the father unnecessarily.

It is understandable that the comments were made after the mother had commenced her current motion to change. However, the comments are a clear reflection of this court's frustration about the unending litigation and the mother's conduct.

d. On June 7, 2024, Justice Pawagi finalized the issue of travel. In paragraph 12 of her decision, Justice Pawagi made the following comment:

If the (father's) motion is granted and an order is made as per the terms of the mother's offer, the mother's counsel advised the court that the mother will commence a motion to change said order. The mother has already commenced a motion to change the consent final order dated February 24, 2023.

The mother threatened to bring a motion to change if Justice Pawagi made an order she did not agree with. This is another indication of a disturbing trend in terms of the mother's litigation conduct.

[42] Considerable judicial resources have been devoted to this family at the expense of other families.

[43] A review of this file shows that previous attempts by the court to control the mother's litigation conduct have not worked successfully. The court previously employed the following methods:

a. On January 16, 2015, the mother was ordered to pay the father's costs of $4,500.00.

b. On February 7, 2017, Justice Dunn ordered the mother to pay the father his costs of $2,000.00.

c. In his February 7, 2017, order, Justice Dunn ordered that the mother should pay at least $3,000.00 out of the $6,500 total ordered per the January 16, 2015, and February 7, 2017 orders before bringing any further proceedings.

d. In his February 7, 2017, endorsement, Justice Dunn stated that the mother had raised issues by way of re-litigation that had already been decided.

e. On August 2, 2024, Justice Pawagi ordered the mother to pay the father his costs of $5,000.00 regarding the June 5, 2024, motion.

f. On February 7, 2017, Justice Dunn ordered the mother to seek leave before commencing any new proceedings.

g. On August 2, 2024, Justice Pawagi made an order requiring the mother to seek leave of the court before bringing any motion to change "in order to prevent her from again running up the legal costs for the father unnecessarily."

[44] The court finds that there are also potential challenges with the merits of the mother's current claims as contained in her motion to change, without deciding on the issues, for the following reasons:

a. Her request to seek variation of the parenting issues is solely based on a comment that was included in the VOC report dated February 26, 2024, in which the child stated that he wanted more time with the mother. This is a fact that was known to both parties at the time the current final order was made on February 24, 2023. The previous OCL report that formed the basis of the consent order included similar statements by the child.

b. On the issue of child support, the mother claims that she lost her employment in 2023 and is now in receipt of Ontario Works social benefits. However:

i. There is evidence to suggest that she makes frequent international trips to Peru. Her sources of funds are not disclosed.

ii. In December 2024, she made a payment of $20,000.00 into court as security pursuant to Justice Pawagi's order of June 7, 2024, to allow her to travel to Peru.

iii. She claims that she lost her employment in 2023. The father provided a Form 20 dated January 25, 2025, in which he requested her record of employment (ROE). She provided the document in June 2025, when she served him with her motion materials.

c. She states that she is unable to comply with current support payments due to her inability to pay. Yet, she was able to pay $20,000.00 in December 2024 as security to allow her to travel to Peru. She was able to purchase return tickets for herself and the child.

d. She has not provided several items of financial disclosure. She admits in her affidavit materials that, despite being requested, she has not provided the father with her bank statements for the period January 1, 2023, to January 31, 2024. In Roberts v. Roberts 2015 ONCA 450, the Ontario Court of Appeal stated that:

[11] The most basic obligation in family law is the duty to disclose financial information. This requirement is immediate and ongoing. [12] Failure to abide by this fundamental principle impedes the progress of the action, causes delay and generally acts to the disadvantage of the opposite party. It also impacts the administration of justice. Unnecessary judicial time is spent and the final adjudication is stalled. [13] Financial disclosure is automatic. It should not require court orders – let alone three – to obtain production.

e. Her sworn financial statement provides misleading information. She only declared accounts with CIBC and RBC. She did not list Tangerine. However, on December 16, 2024, she made a costs payment to the father by way of a cheque written on her Tangerine bank account. The Tangerine account is not listed in her financial statement.

[45] The court agrees with the father's argument that the current motion to change is an attempt by the mother to relitigate issues that were previously finalized, with the hope of obtaining a different result. The mother takes no regard for the costs involved in litigation. The father claims that since 2010, he has spent more than $100,000.00 in legal fees.

[46] The mother's engagement with the court process also appears to be lacking in sincerity. In 2010, she was charged with assault against the father. The father's evidence is that she was convicted of the charges. In her affidavit dated June 6, 2025, she describes the charges as false and "were ultimately dropped." In her affidavit dated June 20, 2025, she states that she pleaded guilty to the charges. Her evidence is internally inconsistent.

[47] The child has been in the father's primary care since he was about six weeks old. A school report card filed by the father shows that the child is doing well in school.

[48] From the foregoing, the court makes the following findings of fact:

a. The mother's current motion to change is an abuse of process that will unnecessarily add further financial and emotional hardship to the father and bring further instability to the child.

b. It is not in the child's best interests for the child to be exposed to further litigation without judicial approval. The child requires a break from this unending litigation.

c. Further litigation will further inflame the conflict between the parties.

d. Despite several court orders and several years of litigation, the parenting relationship between the parties remains poor.

e. There are no exceptional circumstances that would justify an exercise of the court's discretion in favour of the mother.

[49] Granting leave to the mother in this case would create a dangerous precedent for this court. Deterrence is critical. The court will dismiss her request for leave to proceed with her motion to change.

[50] The court finds that an order striking the mother's pleadings is proportionate to the wrongdoing. The child in this case deserves stability. He has been exposed to his parents' litigation for almost his entire life. He is now 14 years old. In Izyuk v. Bilousov, 2015 ONSC 3684, Justice A. Pazaratz concluded that high-conflict parenting disputes are often the most time-consuming, financially draining, and emotionally damaging cases judges deal with in family court. In Gordon v. Starr, Justice J. Quinn condemned "the all-too-common casual approach to compliance with court orders."

[51] The court will grant the father's request to strike the mother's pleadings. This order will conclude this proceeding.

[52] The court will make a further order requiring the court administration not to issue any motion to change brought by the mother without leave of the court. It is not necessary for the court to make another order requiring the mother to seek leave of the court before bringing a motion to change, as there are already two existing orders requiring her to do so.

[53] For the same reasons above, the court would also have dismissed the mother's claims if the father had sought a dismissal of the claims.

Part Five – Security for Costs

5.1 – Legal Considerations

[54] Subrules 24(20) to 24(25) of the Family Law Rules set out the court's jurisdiction to order security for costs:

Order for security for costs

24(20) A judge may, on motion, make an order for security for costs that is just, based on one or more of the following factors:

1. A party habitually resides outside Ontario.

2. A party has an order against the other party for costs that remains unpaid, in the same case or another case.

3. A party is a corporation and there is good reason to believe it does not have enough assets in Ontario to pay costs.

4. There is good reason to believe that the case is a waste of time, a nuisance or an abuse of the court process, and that the party does not have enough assets in Ontario to pay costs.

5. A statute entitles the party to security for costs. O. Reg. 10/25, s. 4.

Amount and form of security

(21) The judge shall determine the amount of the security, its form and the method of giving it. O. Reg. 10/25, s. 4.

Effect of order for security

(22) Until the security has been given, a party against whom there is an order for security for costs may not take any step in the case, except to appeal from the order, unless the judge orders otherwise. O. Reg. 10/25, s. 4.

Failure to give security

(23) If the party does not give the security as ordered and, as a result, the judge makes an order dismissing the party's case or striking out the party's answer or any other document filed by the party, subrule (22) no longer applies. O. Reg. 10/25, s. 4.

Security may be changed

(24) The amount of the security, its form and the method of giving it may be changed by order at any time. O. Reg. 10/25, s. 4.

Payment to carry on case

(25) The court may make an order that a party pay an amount of money to another party to cover part or all of the expenses of carrying on the case, including a lawyer's fees. O. Reg. 10/25, s. 4.

[55] The purpose of an order for security for costs is to protect a party from nuisance or irresponsible litigation, conducted without regard to the merits of the case or the costs likely to be incurred. See Izyuk v. Bilousov, 2015 ONSC 3684, Blackwood v. Nichols, 2022 ONCJ 313, para. 36.

[56] The following are the principles that courts must apply in determining whether to order security for costs. Izyuk, supra, para. 40.

a) The initial onus is on the party seeking security for costs to show that the other party falls within one of the enumerated grounds.

b) If the onus is met, the court has discretion to grant or refuse an order for security.

c) If the court orders security, it has wide discretion as to the quantum and means of payment of the order – Clark v. Clark, 2014 ONCA 175.

d) The order must be "just" and be based on one or more of the factors listed in subrule 24(20) Hodgins v. Buddhu, 2013 ONCJ 137.

5.2 - Analysis

[57] The father seeks an order requiring the mother to pay $25,000.00 as security for costs before bringing any motion to change in the future.

[58] The onus is on the father to show that the mother falls within one of the enumerated grounds under subrule 24(20).

[59] The mother resides in Ontario. There is no evidence that she has not complied with any previous orders for costs against her.

[60] In considering the enumerated grounds under subrule 24(20), the most relevant factor in this case is clause 4, which provides that:

There is good reason to believe that the case is a waste of time, a nuisance or an abuse of the court process, and that the party does not have enough assets in Ontario to pay costs. [emphasis added]

[61] It appears that clause 4 above contemplates the request being brought in the context of an existing case before the court.

[62] The mother's request for leave to proceed with her motion to change will be dismissed, as discussed above. The court has struck her motion to change, thereby concluding this proceeding. This means that she does not fall within the wording of clause 4, as there will be no case before this court.

[63] Further, there is already an existing order requiring the mother to seek leave of the court before bringing a motion to change. Requiring her to pay $25,000.00 as security for costs before bringing a motion to change in the future would add an unnecessary barrier to her ability to seek relief before the court. The existing orders requiring her to seek leave are sufficient to ensure judicial oversight.[4] In Premi v. Khodei r, 2008 ONCA 313 at paragraph 2, the Court of Appeal stressed that depriving a litigant of the ordinary right to go to court is a serious restriction of a basic right.

[64] It is still open to the father to request security for costs if the mother:

a. Seeks leave of the court to bring a motion to change in the future, or

b. Is granted leave to bring a motion to change in the future.

[65] For the reasons above, the court will dismiss the father's request regarding security for costs.

Part Six – Conclusion

[66] An order shall go on the following terms:

a. The mother's request to proceed with her motion to change is dismissed.

b. The mother's motion to change dated May 22, 2024, and issued on June 2, 2024, is struck.

c. The father's request for the mother to pay $25,000.00 as security for costs before bringing a motion to change, is dismissed.

d. The court administration shall not issue any motion to change brought by the mother without leave of the court.

e. The next court date of October 16, 2025, is vacated.

[67] The father enjoyed considerable success. If he seeks costs, he shall serve and file his written costs submissions by August 19, 2025. The mother will then have until September 2, 2025, to serve and file her written response. The submissions shall be no more than five pages, excluding any bill of costs or offer to settle. The submissions may be delivered to the trial coordinator's office at the courthouse or emailed to the trial coordinator.

[68] The court thanks counsel for their excellent presentation of this case.

Released: August 5, 2025

Signed: Justice Wiri Kapurura

Footnotes

[1] It was not clear why it took the parties about a year to attend their first case conference.

[2] The parties did not provide the date of resolution and the sentence.

[3] The parties did not provide the relevant order/endorsement and the reasons for the order. The costs order is referenced in Justice Dunn's endorsement dated February 7, 2017.

[4] Justice Pawagi's order dated August 2, 2024, requiring the mother to seek leave before bringing a motion to change will also be applicable if she seeks to bring a motion to change in the future.