Valois P. Ambrosino

The parties separated in 2011, and both brought motions regarding financial disclosure and the sale of the jointly owned matrimonial home.

The respondent sought an order to list and sell the home, while the applicant sought to purchase the respondent's half-interest.

The court ordered the immediate listing and sale of the matrimonial home, finding no evidence of malicious, vexatious, or oppressive conduct that would justify refusing the respondent's prima facie right to partition and sale.

The court also ordered both parties to provide extensive financial disclosure, including three years of personal and corporate bank statements, to assist in determining whether income should be imputed to the applicant for support purposes.

Appeal from an application judge's decision regarding the division of property following the breakdown of a common law relationship.

The appellant sought sole beneficial ownership of a jointly-titled residential property (Brookdale Avenue) or, alternatively, a credit for his repayment of a joint line of credit used to finance its purchase.

The Court of Appeal upheld the finding that the respondent held a 50 per cent legal and beneficial interest in the property, but allowed the appeal in part by granting the appellant a $500,000 credit on division of sale proceeds for his repayment of the respondent's share of the joint debt.

The appellant, a father, sued the respondent, the mother of his child, for fraudulent misrepresentation and damages arising from involuntary parenthood.

The appellant alleged that the respondent falsely represented she was taking birth control pills, inducing him to engage in unprotected sexual intercourse that resulted in the birth of a child.

The motion judge struck the claim without leave to amend, finding no recoverable damages for non-pathological emotional harm from unplanned parenthood and that the misrepresentation did not vitiate consent for purposes of a sexual battery claim.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, holding that damages for involuntary parenthood are not recoverable in tort and that the alleged deception did not go to the nature and quality of the sexual act.

The moving party sought leave to appeal an order requiring him to pay $100,000 in interim costs and disbursements, as well as a $12,000 costs order.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the proposed appeal did not raise issues of general importance but rather involved fact-specific determinations regarding the moving party's ability to pay and his financial interconnectedness with his wealthy father.

Costs of the motion were fixed at $5,000 and set off against a previous costs order.

The applicant, Victoria Chechui, sought costs following a trial where she was awarded an interest in a property but not a joint account.

The respondent, Ian Jamieson Nieman, argued for divided success and reduced costs.

The court found Victoria entitled to costs, noting Ian forced the matter to trial and made a late, unreasonable offer.

The court declined to undertake a detailed analysis of time spent on each issue, finding it impractical and noting Ian's conduct prolonged the trial.

The court rejected Victoria's claim for full indemnity costs based on her offer to settle, as the offer was for a fixed amount for half the property, while the order was for sale and equal division, making it impossible to compare.

However, Victoria's offer was deemed more reasonable than Ian's.

The court removed costs for settlement and trial management conferences where no costs were ordered, and for an articling student's time deemed unreasonable.

Considering the purposes of costs, offers to settle, reasonableness, proportionality, and the losing party's expectations, the court fixed Victoria's costs at $180,000 inclusive of HST and disbursements.

The respondent successfully moved for summary judgment granting an order for the immediate partition and sale of a jointly-owned property.

The appellant, who had been critically injured in a hammer attack allegedly perpetrated by the respondent, appealed the order.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in law by failing to address the evidentiary significance of the appellant's affidavit detailing her severe injuries and lack of alternative housing.

The court held that this silence precluded meaningful appellate review of whether the partition and sale would cause hardship amounting to oppression.

The matter was remitted for a new hearing.

This trial concerned the ownership of a jointly held house (Brookdale) and a joint investment account following the separation of the applicant, Victoria Chechui, and the respondent, Ian Jamieson Nieman.

Victoria claimed 50% ownership in both, while Ian argued Victoria held her interests in trust for him, or alternatively, made an unjust enrichment claim.

Ian also sought damages for breach of trust, fiduciary duty, or contract.

The court found for Victoria regarding the Brookdale property, determining it was a joint gift and jointly owned.

However, the court found for Ian regarding the joint investment account, concluding that Victoria held her interest in trust for Ian, as his intention was only to grant a right of survivorship, not an immediate gift of half the funds.

All of Ian's damage claims were dismissed due to lack of proof and absence of a fiduciary relationship or contract.

The moving party sought leave to appeal an interim order that reduced the responding party's child and spousal support obligations based on a material change in circumstances following his loss of employment.

The moving party argued the motions judge erred in finding a material change and failing to impute income.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and the motion for a stay, finding no conflicting decisions, no good reason to doubt the correctness of the interim order, and noting that the issue of imputing income was not raised before the motions judge.

The moving party sought leave to appeal an order requiring her to pay $150,000 to the responding party for interim disbursements under Rule 24(12) of the Family Law Rules.

The moving party argued there were conflicting decisions regarding the requirement of exceptional circumstances and that there was good reason to doubt the correctness of the order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding no conflicting decisions as the rule involves discretionary balancing to level the playing field, and no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motions judge's factual findings and exercise of discretion.

The applicant sought occupation rent after leaving the jointly owned matrimonial home due to severe conflict and alleged domestic violence, while the respondent remained in the property with a new partner and changed the locks.

The court considered the common law principles governing occupation rent where no order for exclusive possession exists, including the timing of the claim, duration of occupancy, inability of the non-resident spouse to realize equity, and equitable set-offs.

The evidence established that the applicant’s departure was effectively compelled and that the respondent had exclusive use of the property while delaying sale or buyout.

The court found it equitable to award occupation rent based on half of the fair market rental value.

Credits were to be applied for the respondent’s payments toward property taxes and the joint line of credit.

The applicant child was successful on a motion for interim relief against the respondent father, obtaining a declaration of parentage, child support, and interim disbursements.

The parties could not agree on costs.

The applicant sought full recovery costs based on an offer to settle and the respondent's unreasonable behaviour.

The court rejected the respondent's argument that the issues were novel or of public interest.

Finding the respondent's behaviour unreasonable and that the applicant beat her offer to settle, the court awarded costs of $32,523.72.

Following a successful appeal that set aside an order requiring the appellant to have a litigation guardian, the court determined the costs of the appeal.

The appellant sought substantial indemnity costs of over $30,000, arguing that full recovery is the norm in family law proceedings.

The respondent argued for no costs due to the novelty of the issue, or alternatively $7,000.

The Divisional Court held that the normal rule of partial indemnity costs applies to appellate proceedings in this court, rejecting the family law full-recovery norm for appeals.

Costs were fixed at $15,000 on a partial indemnity basis.

The minor appellant brought an application seeking child support from her biological father.

The motion judge held that the appellant was required to have a litigation guardian under Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, finding the Family Law Rules did not adequately cover the situation.

On appeal, the Divisional Court held that the Family Law Rules do adequately cover the situation, specifically exempting a child in a child support case from the definition of a 'special party'.

The appeal was allowed, and the order requiring a litigation guardian was set aside.

The parties made costs submissions following a successful motion by the respondent father to set aside an appeal decision based on a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The appellant daughter sought costs thrown away for the initial appeal hearing, while the respondent father sought costs as the successful party on the motion to set aside.

The Divisional Court declined to award costs to either party, noting that the motion to set aside was based on the appearance of judicial impartiality and was unconnected to the merits of the underlying dispute or the parties' conduct.

The court left the determination of costs for the preparation of the appeal materials to the new panel that will re-hear the appeal.

In a family law proceeding arising from a child’s motion, the court refused a late adjournment request brought by the respondent and his partner.

The court held that the absence of historical counsel’s file, alleged deficiencies in the child’s financial disclosure, and incomplete questioning did not justify delaying urgently needed interim child support, particularly where the respondent himself was in breach of disclosure obligations.

The court also dismissed a non-party partner’s motion to add herself and her children as parties, finding they were not proper parties and that any relevant evidence could have been advanced by affidavit.

The motion proceeded without adjournment.

A child brought a motion to vary an earlier interim family law order to obtain interim child support, interim disbursements, DNA testing or alternatively a declaration of parentage, and to vacate a non-contact provision.

The court found a material change in circumstances based on the absence of a pending trial, deterioration in the child’s financial circumstances, the respondent’s continuing disclosure failures, and the respondent’s renewed reliance on paternity uncertainty.

Applying the statutory child support scheme, the court held that the parents’ prior agreement could not bargain away the child’s right to support, imputed income of $200,000 to the alleged father, and ordered interim Guideline support retroactive to April 1, 2014.

After the respondent stated he would refuse DNA testing if ordered, the court drew an adverse inference from that refusal and the surrounding evidence, and made a declaration of parentage.

The court also ordered $50,000 in interim disbursements, vacated the prior non-contact order upon filing of an undertaking, and adjourned the motion to strike the Answer while giving a final deadline for disclosure.

The moving party brought a motion to set aside an appeal decision after discovering that one of the panel judges had briefly represented him in a related matter 16 years prior, before her appointment to the bench.

Neither the judge nor the moving party recalled the relationship at the time of the appeal hearing.

Applying the objective standard for reasonable apprehension of bias, the court found that prudence dictated setting aside the decision and constituting a new panel to re-hear the appeal.

Following the disposition of two family law motions where the applicant was substantially successful, the court considered written costs submissions.

The respondent argued for no costs due to divided success and the applicant's alleged unwillingness to mediate.

The court rejected these arguments, finding the applicant was the successful party and the respondent's conduct in bringing his motion was unreasonable.

The applicant was awarded partial indemnity costs of $18,000.

Following competing family law motions addressing temporary child support, parenting schedule, and claims for special or extraordinary expenses, the court was asked to determine costs.

The applicant sought substantial indemnity costs of $15,000, while the respondent argued for no costs or a modest award.

The court found success on the motions was divided: the applicant succeeded in maintaining the residential schedule and obtaining temporary child support based on imputed income, but failed on claims for intentional underemployment and s. 7 expenses, and obtained only partial retroactive support.

Considering the Family Law Rules, including Rules 24 and 18, and the parties’ settlement offers, the court concluded the applicant achieved only modestly greater success.

Costs were therefore fixed in a modest amount.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her motion to change child and spousal support and the denial of her request for an adjournment.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's exercise of discretion to deny the adjournment, noting the request was not supported by the record.

The Court also upheld the dismissal of the motion to change, finding the motion judge's determination of the respondent's income was supported by the evidence.

The appeal was dismissed, but no costs were awarded as the respondent had breached the underlying child support order.