Susan Stothart

The Children's Lawyer brought a motion under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss proceedings against a child defendant as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The plaintiffs, residents of a cooperative housing complex, had sued 37 defendants including several children, alleging various torts arising from disruptive behavior such as playing basketball, volleyball, and other common childhood activities in common areas.

The court found the claims against the child defendants to be frivolous and vexatious, lacking legal merit and constituting a misuse of court resources.

The court dismissed the action against Kingston Pitawanakiwat and, on its own motion, also dismissed claims against Gavin Spencer, Brooks Spencer, Deevan Ens, and Jaden Harrison.

The applicant sought an order for production of financial disclosure from third parties (the respondent's father, family corporations, and a family trust) pursuant to the Family Law Rules and Rules of Civil Procedure.

The applicant and respondent are involved in family proceedings concerning child support, spousal support, and equalization of net family property.

The applicant sought to set aside a domestic contract and alleged the respondent's reported income had declined significantly post-separation despite evidence of substantially higher cash flow during the marriage.

The third parties opposed production, arguing the motion was premature and that the domestic contract must first be set aside.

The court found the motion was not premature, that the applicant had met her onus, and that disclosure was necessary to fairly determine the respondent's true income and net family property.

The court ordered production of financial statements and corporate tax returns from the companies and details of non-arm's length expenses from all third parties, subject to confidentiality terms.

Following a settlement of a mortgage action resulting in a consent judgment, the defendants sought a mortgage payout statement to discharge the mortgage and obtain new financing.

The plaintiff provided a payout statement that included additional legal fees and costs incurred prior to judgment, as well as a holdback amount.

The defendants objected to these additional amounts, arguing that all legal costs and fees incurred prior to judgment were addressed and adjudicated in the consent judgment.

The court found that the consent judgment included all legal costs incurred up to the date of settlement and that the plaintiff was not entitled to claim additional pre-judgment legal costs or a holdback amount as a precondition to discharge.

The court granted summary judgment in favour of the plaintiff, Bemco Financial Services Ltd., for a deficiency on a mortgage loan after a power of sale.

The court found there was no genuine issue requiring a trial regarding the sale price, accounting for rents, management fees, property taxes, or real estate commissions.

The court disallowed a three-month interest penalty as a prohibited penalty under the Interest Act, but otherwise accepted the plaintiff’s accounting and entitlement to the deficiency.

The court considered a motion by the defendant, Echelon Insurance, to compel the plaintiff, 2414840 Ontario Inc. (operating as Cottage Country Family Diner), to answer undertakings and refusals from discovery, including production of the Fitchetts’ personal financial records and the corporation’s entire accountant’s file.

The court held that while the financial health of the corporation and its beneficial owners was relevant to motive in a civil arson claim, the request for the entire accountant’s file was overly broad and amounted to a fishing expedition.

The court also found that the personal financial records of the Fitchetts, as non-parties, could not be compelled through discovery of the corporate plaintiff.

The motion was dismissed.

The appellant, Troy Crowder, appealed his conviction and sentence for acting upon a forged document, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel and error in the restitution order.

The court found that the plea was voluntary and informed, and that Crowder received effective representation.

The appeal against conviction was dismissed, but the appeal against sentence was allowed in part: the probation condition requiring restitution to Crowder’s former spouse was vacated, while the restitution order to Aviva Insurance remained.

The applicant sought an order requiring the respondent to disclose her Robinson Huron Treaty settlement particulars, 2025 employment income particulars, and other employment benefits for 2023–2025.

The respondent opposed disclosure of the settlement particulars, citing legal and cultural reasons, but provided other requested financial information.

The court found that the respondent had complied with her disclosure obligations regarding income and benefits, and that the settlement funds were not “income” under the Child Support Guidelines nor relevant to her ongoing means, as they had been spent on legal fees.

The motion for further disclosure was dismissed.

The appellant, J.D., appealed his convictions for two counts of sexual assault and the sentence imposed.

The appeal focused on whether the trial judge misapprehended the appellant’s evidence, erred in applying the R. v. W.(D.) framework, or committed palpable and overriding error in rejecting the appellant’s testimony.

The court found that the trial judge materially misapprehended aspects of the appellant’s evidence, particularly regarding who suggested returning to the trailer and the analogy of “narcolepsy” for the appellant’s fatigue.

These misapprehensions were central to the credibility assessment and warranted a new trial.

The sentence appeal was dismissed as moot.

The court sentenced Zongxiu Jiang to 18 months' incarceration for cultivating cannabis in a non-dwelling house, contrary to s. 12(6)(a) of the Cannabis Act.

The decision reviews the facts, the parties' positions, sentencing principles, and the range of sentences for large-scale cannabis operations.

The court found that, despite mitigating factors such as a guilty plea and family hardship, the gravity and scale of the commercial operation, and Jiang's role as principal, required a custodial sentence.

The court declined to impose a conditional sentence, emphasizing the paramount importance of deterrence and denunciation in such cases, and held that collateral immigration consequences could not justify a more lenient sentence.

The appellant, Ann Marie Ahola, appealed her conviction for impaired operation of a conveyance by drug.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered because the trial judge’s reasons did not adequately address the second stage of the R. v. W.(D.) analysis—specifically, whether the appellant’s evidence, though rejected, nevertheless left the court with a reasonable doubt on an essential element of the offence.

The decision reviews the evidence, the law on misapprehension of evidence, the standard for an unreasonable verdict, and the requirements for reasons in credibility cases.

The court considered an uncontested family law application by Joanne Polack for equalization of net family property and spousal support against Peter Denis Larabie.

The respondent’s answer was struck for failure to comply with disclosure orders, and the trial proceeded in his absence.

The court reviewed the parties’ long-term relationship, financial history, and the respondent’s repeated non-compliance with disclosure.

The court awarded the applicant lump sum spousal support, an equalization payment, and costs, with payment to be made from funds held in trust and, if necessary, from the respondent’s pension or LIRA.

The court also ordered further financial disclosure from the respondent and set out consequences for non-compliance.

The applicant, 2248169 Ontario Inc., sought orders for vacant possession and related relief regarding two properties occupied by the respondents.

The respondents claimed rights of occupancy under long-standing leases or assignments.

The court found that there were material factual disputes, including the existence and enforceability of the leases and whether the applicant had notice or was willfully blind to their existence.

The court held that these issues required viva voce evidence and could not be determined on the application record, and therefore ordered that the application be converted to an action.

The appellant, Christopher Hunt, appealed his conviction for assaulting his daughter and his suspended sentence.

The trial judge had found that the force used was not minor corrective force of a transitory or trifling nature, thus not falling under the s. 43 Criminal Code defence.

The appellant argued errors in the application of s. 43 and in the sentencing judge's finding that a discharge was inappropriate due to deterrence.

The court dismissed both appeals, upholding the trial judge's findings on corrective force and affirming that a discharge was not in the public interest given the aggravating factors and the need for denunciation and deterrence under s. 718.01 of the Criminal Code.

This is a costs endorsement following the dismissal of the plaintiff's motion to extend time for service of her statement of claim and for trial.

The defendant, as the successful party on the prior motion, sought partial indemnity costs.

The plaintiff argued against a costs award, citing modest means and alleged negligence by the defendant and her previous lawyer.

The court affirmed the general rule that costs follow the event and are typically awarded on a partial indemnity basis.

It found no special circumstances to deviate from this principle, noting the plaintiff's insufficient evidence of impecuniosity and that alleged negligence of prior counsel was not a relevant factor in this costs determination.

The court awarded the defendant $14,000 in partial indemnity costs.

The applicant, charged with first-degree murder, brought a motion to be allowed to sit at counsel table during his trial instead of in the prisoner's dock.

He argued that sitting in the dock undermines the presumption of innocence and fair trial rights, citing the Guy Paul Morin inquiry report and potential prejudice as an Indigenous person.

The Crown argued for the customary placement in the dock for visibility and jury observation, suggesting a jury instruction could mitigate prejudice.

The court, balancing fair trial rights, communication needs, and the absence of security concerns, granted the application, allowing the accused to sit at counsel table.

The applicant and respondent, former partners, both sought the sale of their jointly owned property.

While agreeing on the sale, they disputed the distribution of net proceeds, with the respondent claiming sole beneficial ownership or a constructive trust due to her significantly larger financial and labour contributions.

The court dismissed the respondent's claim for a resulting trust but found unjust enrichment by the applicant.

The court ordered that after the respondent is reimbursed for her downpayment and renovation costs, the remaining net proceeds be divided 17% to the applicant and 83% to the respondent, reflecting their respective financial contributions to the mortgage and carrying costs.

The respondent brought a motion seeking the partition and sale of the former matrimonial home prior to trial and the return of personal items.

The applicant opposed, arguing prejudice to her family law claims and disputing ownership of some items.

The court granted the order for partition and sale, with net proceeds to be held in trust, finding no unfair prejudice to the applicant's family law claims given the trust arrangement.

The court also ordered the return of most personal items, deferring the dispute over two specific pictures to trial.

The applicants sought judicial review, including mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, and s. 24(1) Charter relief, of a Justice of the Peace's decision.

The Justice of the Peace had dismissed their s. 11(b) Charter application for unreasonable delay and deferred an abuse of process application in a provincial offences proceeding concerning alleged damage to Massasauga snake habitat.

The Superior Court dismissed the applicants' request for extraordinary relief, finding that the Justice of the Peace did not exceed or decline jurisdiction.

The court held that the issues raised were not appropriate for interlocutory intervention by a superior court, emphasizing that such matters are generally best addressed on appeal after the trial has concluded.

The plaintiff sought orders extending the time for service of her statement of claim and to set the action for trial in a solicitor's negligence claim against the defendant law firm.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the delay of over six and a half years in serving the claim to be extreme and inadequately explained.

The court also found significant actual prejudice to the defendant due to the passage of time, including likely loss of evidence and faded witness memories, and that allowing the action to proceed would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The applicant sought to vary an interim parenting order to implement week-about summer parenting time and change the child's school to accommodate his new out-of-town employment.

The respondent opposed both requests, citing her work schedule, the child's stability, and financial constraints.

The court dismissed the applicant's motion, finding no compelling change in circumstances to warrant varying the summer parenting time and determining that changing the child's school was not in the child's best interests, as it primarily served the applicant's convenience rather than the child's well-being.