Shaw R.S.J.

The plaintiff construction company sued a First Nation and the federal Crown for over $3.3 million for work performed on reserve lands, seeking a sale of the lands under the Construction Lien Act.

The Crown moved to strike the claim, arguing the Act does not apply to the federal Crown or reserve lands.

The plaintiff conceded this point but sought leave to amend its claim to plead unjust enrichment and quantum meruit.

The court struck the Construction Lien Act claims but granted the plaintiff leave to amend, finding the original facts pleaded supported the alternative restitutionary claims without running afoul of the Limitations Act.

The claimant law firm sought costs for two motions regarding the enforcement of Certificates of Proof of Claim for unpaid solicitor accounts.

The debtor opposed and sought costs, arguing he was entirely successful on one motion and partially successful on the other.

The court found that success was divided, as the debtor succeeded on one motion but failed in his request to have the accounts assessed, while the claimant was substantially successful on the second motion.

The court exercised its discretion under s. 131(1) of the Courts of Justice Act and ordered that neither party be awarded costs.

The plaintiff was successful on a motion for leave to conduct a second examination for discovery of the corporate defendant and sought substantial indemnity costs due to alleged unreasonable delay by the defendant.

The court rejected the request for substantial indemnity costs, finding the defendant's conduct did not reach the level of aggressive or contumelious behaviour required.

Costs were fixed on a partial indemnity basis at $1,000 for fees plus disbursements, reflecting a fair and reasonable amount for an uncomplicated procedural motion.

The applicant father, residing in Ontario, applied under the Alberta Interjurisdictional Support Orders Act to vary a child support order made under the Divorce Act in Alberta.

The respondent mother, residing in Alberta, disputed jurisdiction.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the Interjurisdictional Support Orders Act does not permit variation of a Divorce Act order, and that the proper procedure is to apply for a provisional variation order under section 18 of the Divorce Act.

The applicant, an estate trustee and beneficiary of a 25% interest in a home, applied for an order vesting his interest or compelling the respondent estate trustees to sell the home.

The home was subject to a life interest granted to another beneficiary under a related estate.

The respondent estate trustees relied on their discretionary power under the wills to postpone the sale of the property.

The court dismissed the application, applying the Court of Appeal's decision in Di Michele, holding that the estate trustees' power to postpone the sale ousted the three-year vesting rule under section 9 of the Estates Administration Act, and their decision to allow the life interest to continue was a valid exercise of discretion.

The accused brought an application to quash a General Warrant authorizing covert entry onto a third party’s property and sought exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, alleging a breach of s. 8.

The primary issue was whether the accused had standing to assert a reasonable expectation of privacy in property owned by his brother.

Applying the totality of the circumstances analysis from R. v. Edwards, the court held the accused lacked sufficient possession, control, or authority over the property to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy.

As a result, he had no standing to challenge the warrant.

The court further held that, even if standing had existed, leave to cross‑examine the affiant would not have been granted because the challenge raised was facial rather than sub‑facial.

In a wrongful dismissal and Human Rights Code action, the plaintiff sought leave under Rule 31.03(2)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to examine a second corporate representative of the defendant.

The initially examined representative had not reviewed a large disability insurer file produced in the litigation and lacked knowledge of communications with the insurer.

The court held that requiring numerous undertakings from an unprepared witness would cause undue expense and inefficiency.

Because another corporate officer had direct knowledge of the relevant communications, leave to conduct a limited second discovery was appropriate.

The examination was restricted to questions arising from the insurer’s long-term disability file and capped at 1.5 hours.

The applicant sought to quash a general warrant authorizing covert police entry into a commercial storage room and to exclude evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, alleging a breach of s. 8.

The court first addressed whether the applicant had standing to challenge the search by demonstrating a reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises.

Although the lease for the room was in the name of a business partner, the applicant had keys, used the space for joint business storage, and exercised practical access and control.

Applying the totality of the circumstances analysis from Supreme Court jurisprudence, the court held that the applicant had a sufficient expectation of privacy.

The applicant therefore had standing to challenge the warrant and proceed to the second stage of the application.

Following the settlement of a family law trial, the respondent sought costs of $11,012.50 plus disbursements.

The applicant opposed the quantum, arguing the issues were simple and the respondent's preparation time was excessive.

The court found the respondent was entitled to costs due to his reasonable offers to settle and the applicant's failure to provide financial disclosure.

Costs were fixed at $7,500 for fees plus $57 for disbursements, plus HST, and characterized as an incident of child support.

The accused was tried on charges of criminal negligence causing bodily harm and unlawfully causing bodily harm after his off-leash dog bit an 11-year-old child in a park rink.

The court held the Crown failed to prove that taking the dog off leash in the enclosed rink, in the surrounding circumstances, constituted a marked and substantial departure from the conduct of a reasonably prudent person.

The evidence did not establish prior aggressive behaviour or facts supporting objective foreseeability of bodily harm.

The court also found the alleged breach of the Dog Owner's Liability Act was not shown to be objectively dangerous on these facts.

Acquittals were entered on both counts.

In an uncontested family hearing after the respondent's pleadings were struck except for the divorce claim, the court addressed equalization, occupation rent, and divorce.

The applicant established that the respondent remained in the matrimonial home after separation, refused to facilitate its sale, failed to comply with disclosure and other court orders, and made no equalization claim.

The court accepted that the applicant had potential entitlement to occupation rent and prior costs, but on the applicant's proposal deemed the parties' net family property equalized with no payment by either side.

The application was amended to include divorce, a divorce was granted, and no further costs were ordered.