Civil Litigation - Defendant - SCJ

The plaintiff sought leave to amend their Amended Statement of Claim to add particulars of the defendant minor's past antisocial behaviors, arguing relevance to the negligent supervision claim against the minor's parents.

The defendants opposed, arguing the proposed amendments constituted inadmissible similar fact evidence that would unduly complicate the litigation, prolong discovery, and invade the minor's privacy.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the probative value of the proposed amendments was outweighed by the significant prejudice, complexity, and privacy concerns they would introduce, converting the trial into an inquiry about multiple past events rather than the specific altercation.

The defendants brought a motion seeking to find the non-party Robert Bortolon in contempt of court, or alternatively, to expunge the initial statement of claim.

The motion for contempt was dismissed.

The alternative motion to expunge the statement of claim, which was opposed by the plaintiff, 1947755 Ontario Ltd., was also dismissed.

The court's decision was based on a combined evidentiary record from this motion and a related summary judgment motion, both addressing the issue of who was in control of the plaintiff corporation as of February 2017.

The plaintiff obtained a certificate of pending litigation (CPL) on a motion without notice against properties owned by corporations controlled by his son, alleging the son misappropriated funds while acting as his attorney for property.

The defendants moved to set aside the CPL for failure to make full and fair disclosure, or alternatively to discharge it under the Courts of Justice Act.

The court found that while the plaintiff failed to disclose material facts regarding the son's legal representation, the CPL would have been granted regardless.

The court also declined to discharge the CPL, finding a triable issue regarding the plaintiff's interest in the properties and that the balance of equities favoured maintaining the CPL.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action for negligence and abuse of process arising from the defendants' garnishment efforts to enforce costs orders from a previous wrongful dismissal action.

The plaintiff brought a cross-motion for summary judgment seeking damages, alleging the garnishment caused his termination from his new employer.

The court granted the defendants' motion and dismissed the action, finding no duty of care is owed for bringing civil proceedings absent an abuse of process, and there was no evidence of malice or improper purpose by the defendants.

The court also found the plaintiff's action was not vexatious, and awarded costs to the defendants.

The moving parties sought an urgent interlocutory injunction to prevent the respondent from selling securities in a real estate development project pursuant to a put option agreement, or alternatively, an order freezing the sale proceeds under Rule 45.02.

The court found that while the moving parties might suffer irreparable harm if the proceeds were repatriated out of Canada, the balance of convenience favoured the respondent, who had a valid third-party offer and faced an impending mortgage expiry.

The court also held that the sale proceeds did not constitute a specific fund under Rule 45.02 as the moving parties' claim was essentially for damages.

The motion was dismissed, with leave to renew if the current sale transaction failed to close.

The defendant, 2088556 Ontario Inc., brought a second oral application for an adjournment of the trial, following the dismissal of a previous adjournment application.

The basis for the second request was a pending motion for leave to appeal the initial dismissal, which the defendant argued created uncertainty.

The court dismissed the application, affirming that the right to appeal interlocutory orders does not interrupt the course of litigation during trial.

The court emphasized that mid-trial rulings do not become final for appeal purposes until judgment is entered, and that allowing such appeals to halt proceedings would lead to scheduling chaos.

The plaintiff, Massimo Gargari, brought a motion seeking the production of a class register from 1983-1984 in a historical abuse case, arguing that former classmates might be witnesses to alleged abuse.

The defendant, Toronto Catholic District School Board, opposed the request, primarily citing prohibitions under the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (MFIPP).

The court dismissed the plaintiff's motion as premature, ruling that the plaintiff had not exhausted the statutory remedies available under the MFIPP for the disclosure of personal information, which includes a specific procedure and an appeal process.

The court emphasized the need to protect the privacy of individuals, particularly those who were children at the time the records were created.

This decision addresses costs following a trial concerning child support.

The Applicant (Mother) sought full recovery costs of $24,882.29, while the Respondent (Father) argued each party should bear their own costs.

The court found the Applicant had marginal success on the substantive child support issues but awarded her $10,000 in costs due to the Respondent's unreasonable behaviour, including failure to provide disclosure and obfuscation of income.

The award was deemed proportionate to the issues and outcome, and enforceable as an incident of child support.

The applicant, previously declared a vexatious litigant under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act, sought leave to proceed with an appeal from a jury verdict in a negligence action arising from a fire investigation and also sought rescission of the vexatious litigant orders.

The court reviewed the extensive litigation history and repeated unsuccessful attempts by the applicant to obtain similar relief before multiple judges.

The court held that leave could not be granted because the appeal had already been dismissed for delay and the materials disclosed no reasonable grounds to proceed.

The court further found no basis to rescind the vexatious litigant orders, noting the applicant’s continued pattern of relitigating decided matters and failing to comply with costs orders.

The application was dismissed and costs were awarded to the respondents.

The defendant moved to set aside an ex parte Mareva injunction that had frozen his assets pending trial.

The court held that the plaintiff failed to make full and frank disclosure of material facts when obtaining the injunction, including the existence of a prior written settlement agreement that could be dispositive of the claim and other misleading statements regarding the defendant’s financial circumstances.

Applying the principles governing Mareva injunctions and Rule 39.01(6) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court found the nondisclosure sufficient to rescind the order.

The court also declined to grant a fresh injunction, finding the plaintiff had not established a prima facie case or a genuine risk of dissipation of assets.

The defendant’s motion was granted and the plaintiff’s motion to continue the injunction was dismissed.

The court determined costs following civil proceedings between the parties.

On consent, the plaintiffs were ordered to pay the defendant $107,998.61 in legal fees inclusive of GST and HST.

The court also ordered payment of disbursements in accordance with the defendant’s Bill of Costs, subject to reductions required under Tariff A of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Hotel expenses were reduced to conform with Tariff A s. 21(3), and witnesses’ travel and parking expenses were ordered recalculated under Tariff A s. 21(2)(c), with all other disbursements approved.

The plaintiffs brought a motion seeking extensive documentary and oral discovery in a motor vehicle accident action and requesting that the defendants be prevented from bringing a summary judgment motion until discovery was completed.

The defendants argued that discovery should be deferred because they intended to move for summary judgment based on a limitations defence.

The court held that disclosure obligations under the Rules of Civil Procedure are not automatically suspended because a party intends to bring a summary judgment motion.

The court found that the requested disclosure was necessary for the plaintiffs to properly respond to any summary judgment motion and to prepare the case generally.

Most discovery relief was granted, including an order requiring a formal reply to a demand for particulars identifying the owner and lessor of the vehicle, but the request to prohibit the summary judgment motion was dismissed without prejudice.

The defendant lawyers moved for summary judgment dismissing a professional negligence action on the basis that it was commenced outside the two‑year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The plaintiffs argued the claim was not discovered until evidence obtained during a later assessment hearing revealed the extent of the alleged negligence.

The court held that the plaintiffs already possessed the material facts necessary to discover their claim when they pleaded negligence in a statement of defence in earlier fee litigation.

The discoverability doctrine did not postpone the limitation period because no fundamentally new facts were discovered later.

Summary judgment was granted and the action was dismissed as statute‑barred.

The moving parties sought a without-notice Mareva injunction freezing assets in Ontario allegedly owned or controlled by a foreign state and its intelligence ministry.

The motion arose from efforts to enforce a final United States judgment awarding damages for a fatal terrorist bombing.

The court considered the requirements for a Mareva injunction, including full and frank disclosure, a strong prima facie case for recognition of the foreign judgment, evidence of assets in the jurisdiction, and a real risk of dissipation.

Evidence included expert opinion and materials suggesting certain Ontario properties were owned or controlled by entities acting as alter egos of the foreign state.

The court granted an interim interlocutory injunction restraining disposition of the identified properties pending further proceedings.

The defendant moved to set aside a default judgment arising from a motor vehicle accident action in which the plaintiffs obtained judgment following an undefended trial.

The court considered whether service of the statement of claim was regular and proper under an order for substituted service and whether the defendant satisfied the three-part test under Rule 19.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found the plaintiffs complied with the substituted service order and the defendant failed to rebut the presumption of proper service.

The defendant also failed to provide a plausible explanation for the default or establish an arguable defence on the merits.

The motion to set aside the default judgment was dismissed.

Following earlier motions seeking to set aside or vary an ex parte order and discharge certificates of pending litigation registered against properties connected to bankrupt estates, the trustee sought costs.

The moving parties argued they had achieved partial success and that costs should be in the cause or borne by each party.

The court found the trustee had been essentially successful in maintaining the certificates of pending litigation and defending the scope of the production order, notwithstanding limited clarification provided in the earlier endorsement.

After considering objections regarding time spent on cross-examinations and the factors in rule 57.01(1), the court fixed partial indemnity costs in favour of the trustee.

In long‑running commercial litigation concerning an alleged oral agreement granting the plaintiffs a 50% interest in a casino development project, the parties brought pre‑trial motions addressing potential conflicts of interest involving defence counsel and issue estoppel relating to alleged spoliation of evidence.

The plaintiffs clarified that their spoliation allegations were directed only at the defendants and not at defence counsel, and that they would not seek to call defence counsel as witnesses.

The court treated these statements as binding admissions and issued declarations preventing the plaintiffs from alleging misconduct, spoliation, or false statements by defence counsel at trial.

Remaining issues, including whether issue estoppel barred certain spoliation arguments, were left for determination by the trial judge.

The moving defendants sought to strike the plaintiff’s statement of claim alleging fraud, conspiracy, abuse of process, and related torts arising from earlier bankruptcy litigation.

The claim effectively alleged that opposing counsel, the bankruptcy trustee, and others fabricated evidence that led to an adverse judgment in prior proceedings.

The court held that the pleading failed to meet the requirement that fraud be pleaded with particularity and that the action constituted an impermissible collateral attack and relitigation of issues already decided and upheld on appeal.

The doctrines of issue estoppel and abuse of process barred the claim.

The court struck the statement of claim without leave to amend and awarded costs.

The defendant moved for additional security for costs in complex commercial litigation involving a proposed wind energy project.

The corporate plaintiffs admitted they had no material assets in Ontario and argued that they were impecunious and unable to raise funds.

The court held that impecuniosity requires full financial disclosure showing that the corporation, its shareholders, creditors, and other potential beneficiaries cannot raise funds to post security.

The evidence showed significant undisclosed financial resources and potential funding sources among shareholders and related parties, and the plaintiffs failed to meet their evidentiary burden.

Exercising its discretion under Rule 56.01(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court ordered additional security for costs in the amount of $350,000.

Following the granting of summary judgment for a lender enforcing personal guarantees, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The moving party sought substantial indemnity costs relying on contractual terms in the guarantee requiring payment of legal costs on a solicitor-and-own-client basis.

The court also found that the responding party attempted to mislead the court by manufacturing evidence regarding the circumstances of the guarantee.

Considering Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the principles governing fair and reasonable cost awards, the court granted substantial indemnity costs in the amount sought.