Robert W. Scriven

Cattle farmers sought leave to proceed with claims against the Crown and Animal Welfare Services officers for misfeasance in public office, breach of duty of care, abuse of process, intentional interference with economic relations, and defamation arising from the removal of approximately half their herd.

The court granted leave for misfeasance in public office, breach of duty of care, and abuse of process, finding sufficient evidence of bad faith and recklessness based on the Animal Care Review Board's findings that the removal process failed to comply with statutory standards and was not necessary to relieve animal distress.

Leave was denied for intentional interference with economic relations due to inadequate pleading, and leave was not required for defamation.

A farmer and investor (plaintiff) and a younger farmer with access to dairy quota (defendant) entered into an oral agreement to purchase a farm and operate a dairy business together.

The plaintiff provided financing while the defendant contributed dairy quota.

The business failed after less than two years of operation.

The plaintiff sought a beneficial interest in the proceeds from the sale of the dairy quota (held in trust), reimbursement for cattle, custom work, and forage contributions, and damages for breach of contract and misrepresentation.

The court found that while an oral agreement existed, the defendant did not breach its terms, made no actionable misrepresentations, and failed to prove damages.

However, the court found that the plaintiff had a purchase money resulting trust interest in the quota proceeds in the amount of $560,000 (representing his contribution to the quota purchase).

The plaintiff's other claims were dismissed, and the counterclaim was dismissed.

The appellants appealed an order giving directions regarding the distribution of funds remaining in trust after the sale of Driftwood Beach Park Limited's assets and the reimbursement of funds by certain appellants to the company.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the motion judge’s determinations, including findings regarding the purchase and customization of a 2022 Honda, salary for James Kemp, and compensation for Ms. Kemp.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondents.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered whether comments about future ownership of a family farm gave rise to an enforceable assurance under the doctrine of proprietary estoppel.

The trial judge had awarded damages to Tim Metske and Amanda Herlick on the basis of proprietary estoppel, but the Court of Appeal set aside this finding, holding there was no clear promise or assurance, nor reasonable reliance.

The court upheld the trial judge’s findings on unjust enrichment and equitable set-off, resulting in a reduced damages award.

This decision interprets the will of William Archibald Stewart, focusing on the vesting and abatement of gifts of farm properties to his sons, Robert and Winfield, and the impact of subsequent events including the assignment of a mortgage to William’s widow, Edith, and her own testamentary dispositions.

The court addresses whether gifts vested at William’s death or Edith’s, the effect of the mortgage assignment, the abatement of gifts to pay estate liabilities, and related issues of constructive trust, unjust enrichment, and executor liability for tax consequences.

The court considered two motions in a family property dispute: (1) a motion to strike paragraphs from a statement of defence, and (2) a motion for summary judgment seeking a declaration of beneficial ownership of real property, or, in the alternative, damages.

The court struck one paragraph with leave to amend and another without leave, and dismissed the summary judgment motion, finding genuine issues of material fact requiring a trial, particularly regarding the parties' intentions and credibility.

The court made further orders to preserve the status quo and directed that the trial of this action be heard together with related matrimonial proceedings.

This case involved a trial of issues arising from a motion for directions brought by the Estate of John Duncan Maltman against his daughter, Jacquelyne Playter.

The Estate sought disgorgement of funds from a non-registered TD investment account and a TD chequing account, both jointly held by the deceased and Ms. Playter.

The court applied the presumption of resulting trust.

It was determined that the deceased intended Ms. Playter to beneficially receive the proceeds of the joint investment account by right of survivorship, based on clear contemporaneous banking documents and witness testimony.

Regarding the chequing account, Ms. Playter acknowledged beneficial ownership by the deceased but sought to deduct costs for her husband's services in preparing the deceased's home for sale.

The court allowed a partial deduction for these services.

The applicant sought an order declaring the enforcement of a second mortgage statute-barred and directing its discharge from title due to the expiry of the limitation period.

The respondent argued that an oral agreement extended the limitation period, relying on promissory estoppel and part performance.

The court found no credible evidence of an oral agreement, determined that promissory estoppel did not apply as there was no unambiguous promise or detrimental reliance, and concluded that the doctrine of part performance was inapplicable.

Consequently, the court declared the mortgage statute-barred and ordered its discharge.

This appeal concerns a failed real estate transaction where both parties mistakenly believed the property was subject to a prescriptive easement.

The purchaser, Roalno Inc., refused to close without a price abatement or extinguishment of the supposed easement.

The vendors refused these terms.

Roalno sued for specific performance with an abatement.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding Roalno breached the agreement by refusing to close.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, concluding that Roalno had anticipatorily breached the contract by demanding new terms based on a legally erroneous belief, and that the vendors had accepted this repudiation, thereby ending the contract.

The court also clarified that statutory rights under the Road Access Act do not constitute an easement or right-of-way under the agreement's warranties.

The applicants, the daughter and son-in-law of the deceased, sought a declaration of their beneficial ownership in two properties that the deceased had transferred into joint tenancy with them for no consideration.

Prior to his death, the deceased unilaterally severed the joint tenancies and claimed the properties were held in trust for him.

The court found that at the time of the transfers, the deceased intended to make inter vivos gifts of the right of survivorship to save on probate fees.

The presumption of resulting trust was rebutted, and the applicants were declared to hold a two-thirds legal and beneficial interest in the properties.

Gough Lewis brought an urgent motion seeking a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) against his mother's home, which his sister, Clarissa Lewis, was selling under a Power of Attorney.

Gough claimed an interest in the property based on constructive trust, unjust enrichment, or quantum meruit, alleging he provided extensive care for his mother, Wendy Lewis, and maintained the property for 16 years, with an understanding that the house would eventually be his.

The court dismissed the motion, finding Gough failed to establish a triable issue for an interest in the property.

The judge found Gough's evidence lacked candour and was vague, particularly regarding his contributions and the property's condition, which was contradicted by Clarissa's evidence and photographs.

The court concluded that damages would be an adequate remedy and that the balance of prejudice weighed heavily against issuing the CPL, as it would prevent the sale necessary to cover Wendy's significant nursing home and property expenses.

The net proceeds of the sale were ordered to be held in trust, with provisions for monthly payments to Wendy for her care.

The applicants, Walter Daniel Bross and Linda M. Bross, brought a motion for production of documents from MNP LLP, an accounting firm retained by the respondents, Jeff Bross and Sharon Bross.

The documents were initially provided to the applicants' counsel on a "counsel's eyes only" basis following an undertaking during a cross-examination.

The applicants sought full disclosure after their summary judgment motion (which was granted in their favour, ending the proceeding) was heard.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that Rule 30 of the Rules of Civil Procedure did not apply to applications or undertakings on cross-examinations on affidavits, and that the documents were no longer relevant as the underlying proceeding had concluded.

Costs of $3500 were awarded to the respondents.

This motion concerned competing applications between two sets of shareholders of a family farm corporation regarding the enforcement of a settlement agreement for the division of corporate assets.

The agreement included a 'tax condition' requiring each party's tax counsel approval in their sole discretion.

One party refused to waive this condition, citing tax uncertainties.

The court analyzed the duty to exercise contractual discretion in good faith, finding that the refusal was not a good faith exercise of discretion, as the concerns were abstract or previously known.

The court enforced the minutes of settlement and further ruled that a general increase in milk quota, not explicitly addressed in the settlement, should be considered an 'other asset' of the corporation to be divided equally, rather than solely benefiting the party receiving the quota.

The applicant sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis following a motion brought by the respondent.

The applicant argued that the respondent's conduct, including imposing a tight timetable and failing to provide persuasive evidence, warranted elevated costs.

The court found that the respondent's conduct did not rise to the level of reprehensible conduct or abuse of process required for substantial indemnity costs.

The court awarded the applicant costs on a partial indemnity basis fixed at $4,640.

Following a motion regarding a section 71 Land Titles Act Notice and a cross-motion for a restraining order, the parties were unable to resolve the issue of costs.

The court noted divided success and problematic conduct by both parties, including the applicant's non-disclosure and the respondent's improper registration of the notice on title.

Ultimately, the court awarded costs of $5,000 to the applicant, finding it to be a fair, reasonable, and proportional amount.

The husband sought to remove s.71 notices registered by the wife on his farm properties, arguing that an equalization claim does not create an interest in land.

The wife opposed the removal and sought a restraining (preservation) order under s.12 of the Family Law Act.

The court found that s.71 notices were improperly registered for an equalization claim, which is a monetary claim, not a proprietary interest in land.

Consequently, the s.71 notices were ordered discharged.

However, due to the husband's non-disclosure in Farm Debt Mediation and delays in financial disclosure, the court granted the wife's request for a restraining (preservation) order under s.12 FLA to protect her potential equalization payment.

The defendants brought a motion arguing that the Ontario Superior Court of Justice lacked jurisdiction over the litigation.

The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants carried on business in Ontario and that the contract for the sale of a tractor was formed in Ontario.

The court applied the real and substantial connection test and found that the defendants' activities did not amount to carrying on business in Ontario.

Furthermore, the court determined that the contract was formed in Quebec during a telephone conversation.

Consequently, the plaintiffs failed to establish a geographic connection to Ontario, and the defendants' motion was granted.

The appellant appealed from a motion judge's order dismissing his motion to set aside a default judgment dated July 4, 2016.

The appellant had been served with a statement of claim alleging he had provided an oral personal guarantee for $50,000 on a loan agreement.

The appellant failed to defend the action and was noted in default, resulting in a default judgment being entered.

The motion judge dismissed the appellant's motion to set aside the default judgment, finding that the appellant had acknowledged his debt through communications with the respondent and had deliberately delayed responding to the claim.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no overriding or palpable error or error of law in the exercise of discretion.

The defendant moved to set aside a default judgment of $50,000 and vacate a notice of garnishment.

The defendant had acknowledged the debt and offered a repayment plan but failed to defend the action.

He ignored the default judgment for over six months until garnishment was served on his corporation.

The court applied the five-factor test for setting aside default judgments and found that the defendant deliberately delayed and failed to provide a plausible explanation.

The motion was dismissed, and costs of $5,500 were awarded to the plaintiff.