Richard Quon

The defendant was charged with two counts of failing to remain at the scene of an accident contrary to section 200(1)(a) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The prosecution sought to amend the informations to correct the dates and locations of the offences to conform with the evidence adduced at trial.

The court granted the amendment motion and found the defendant guilty of both offences based on circumstantial evidence establishing that the defendant was the driver of a vehicle involved in hit-and-run incidents on two separate dates.

This decision addresses the City of Brampton's application under s. 51 of the Provincial Offences Act to compel personal attendance of defendants represented by certain paralegals and firms accused of filing frivolous and meritless appeals to delay convictions from appearing on driving records.

The court initially ordered personal appearances to conduct proper plea inquiries but reconsidered this order, allowing statutory declarations under s. 43 of the Evidence Act in lieu of personal attendance.

The ruling extensively discusses the abuse of process and obstruction of justice doctrines, referencing prior cases including Toronto (City) v. Becerra, and highlights the ethical obligations of paralegals under the Law Society of Ontario's Rules of Conduct.

The decision underscores the importance of maintaining the integrity of the justice system and preventing misuse of appeals to "game the system."

The court considered a non-suit motion in a stunt driving case under the Highway Traffic Act, where the alleged offence occurred in a private parking lot.

The central issue was whether the stunt driving provision (s. 172(1) H.T.A.), which explicitly refers to "highway," applies to private property.

The court reviewed the common law "general rule" that H.T.A. provisions are limited to highways unless otherwise specified.

However, it found that s. 1.1 of the H.T.A. empowers the Lieutenant Governor in Council to extend H.T.A. provisions to non-highways via regulation.

Specifically, O. Reg. 455/07, as amended by O. Reg. 598/21 (effective September 12, 2021), explicitly states that s. 172 applies to "specified places," including public and private parking lots.

Applying the principle of legislative paramountcy, the regulation supersedes the common law "general rule." The court ruled that the stunt driving offence under s. 172(1) H.T.A. applies to private parking lots, effectively denying the non-suit motion.

The defendant was convicted of eight regulatory offences under three Ontario professional accounting statutes for unlawfully using foreign professional accounting designations and holding himself out as a member of professional accounting bodies without being a member.

The offences occurred between March 1, 2017 and June 30, 2018.

The court imposed fines totalling $16,000, a two-year probation order with statutory conditions, and ordered the defendant to pay $10,000 in reasonable legal costs to the Chartered Professional Accountants of Ontario.

The court found the defendant had the ability to pay despite his claims of financial hardship, noting his employment income of approximately $90,000 annually and home ownership.

The court also considered the defendant's improper conduct during proceedings, including frivolous adjournment applications and unmeritorious Charter claims, which prolonged the litigation and increased costs.

A foreign-trained Chartered Accountant from India was charged with eight regulatory offences under three Ontario accounting statutes for unlawfully using professional accounting designations and initials (CPA, CA, CMA, FCA, FCMA) on multiple websites and social media platforms while not being a member of the Chartered Professional Accountants of Ontario.

The defendant was a student of CPA Ontario who failed the Common Final Examination three times and was deregistered.

Despite receiving a cease-and-desist letter in March 2017, the defendant continued to publicly display his foreign designations on websites, LinkedIn, Kijiji advertisements, and other platforms, implying he was qualified to practice accounting in Ontario.

The court found the defendant guilty on all eight counts after determining the prosecution proved the actus reus beyond a reasonable doubt and the defendant failed to establish a due diligence defence.

The court also dismissed the defendant's Charter application challenging the constitutionality of the prohibitions, finding that while the restrictions infringed freedom of expression under s. 2(b), they were reasonable limits justified under s. 1 of the Charter.

The defendants, as registered owners of a residential property in Brampton, were charged with two offences: (1) using or permitting the use of lands for purposes not permitted by the City of Brampton Zoning By-law by establishing an illegal second dwelling unit in their basement, contrary to the Planning Act; and (2) failing to register their two-unit house with the City of Brampton as required by the Second Unit Registration By-law.

The court found that the defendants had established a self-contained basement apartment with separate kitchen, bathroom, and sleeping areas, which constituted a second unit.

The prosecution was not required to prove the existence of a tenant or a stove in the basement kitchen to establish the existence of a second unit.

The defendants were convicted on both counts.

The Electrical Safety Authority sought a pre-sentencing order compelling the defendant to produce personal and business financial documents to assist in determining an appropriate fine.

The defendant had been convicted of operating an electrical contracting business without a valid license under the Electricity Act, 1998.

The court held that while a sentencing court has implied jurisdiction under s. 57(3) of the Provincial Offences Act to compel production of financial documents in exceptional circumstances, the prosecution failed to establish such exceptional circumstances in this case.

The application was dismissed as premature.

Two workers employed at a Coca-Cola production facility were charged with operating equipment in a manner that may endanger themselves or others, contrary to section 28(2)(b) of the Occupational Health and Safety Act.

The charges arose from their use of cellphones while operating forklifts in the warehouse area, contrary to company safety policy.

The court found that both defendants held and used cellphones while seated on stationary forklifts in warehouse aisles and rows.

The court interpreted "operating equipment" broadly to include sitting on a stopped and turned-off forklift in an active work area where other workers and equipment were present.

The defendants failed to establish the due diligence defence.

Both were convicted.

Four defendants—two individuals and two corporations—were convicted of multiple offences under the Consumer Protection Act, 2002 for failing to provide proper direct agreements, engaging in unfair practices through false representations, and failing to provide refunds to consumers.

The prosecution sought custodial sentences for the individuals and substantial fines for the corporations.

The court rejected custodial sentences, finding that while the conduct was blameworthy, it did not rise to the level of intentional fraud seen in comparable cases where contractors absconded with deposits or provided no work.

Instead, the court imposed significant fines, probation with restitution conditions, and additional restrictions on the primary offender.

The defendant was charged with prohibited use of the left lane on King's Highway (Highway 401) while operating a commercial dump truck exceeding 6.5 meters in length, contrary to section 1(1) of Ontario Regulation 608.

The central legal issues were whether the prosecution must prove the defendant's knowledge of the prohibition, whether traffic signs are legally required on provincial highways, and whether the defendant established a due diligence defence.

The court found that the offence is one of strict liability, that no traffic sign is legally required on provincial highways, and that the defendant failed to establish due diligence.

The defendant was convicted.

The defendant was charged with two Highway Traffic Act offences: (1) driving with a hand-held communication device contrary to s. 78.1(1), and (2) failing to surrender a completed daily inspection report contrary to s. 107(7).

The defendant was observed by an MTO officer holding and typing on a cellphone while stopped at a red traffic light.

The defendant argued that being stopped at a red light does not constitute "driving" and that providing access to an electronic logbook satisfied the surrender requirement.

The court found that being stopped at a red light, when the vehicle is not in park mode, constitutes driving within the meaning of the statute.

The court also found that providing access to an electronic logbook without a completed inspection report containing all statutorily required information does not satisfy the surrender obligation.

The defendant was convicted on both counts.

A defendant was charged with disobeying a "No U-Turn" traffic sign contrary to section 182(2) of the Highway Traffic Act after making a left turn into a private driveway and executing a three-point turn to proceed in the opposite direction on a public roadway.

The defendant argued that a three-point turn using a private driveway does not constitute a U-Turn and that the Highway Traffic Act does not apply to maneuvers on private property.

The court adopted a broad, purposive interpretation of "U-Turn" under public welfare legislation principles and held that a three-point turn, whether accomplished in one continuous movement or not, and whether partly using private property, constitutes a prohibited U-Turn when the vehicle's purpose is to proceed in the opposite direction.

The defendant was convicted.

The prosecution charged an individual with smoking tobacco in an enclosed workplace contrary to section 9(1) of the Smoke-Free Ontario Act, and charged the corporate owner of the vehicle with failing to ensure compliance with the Act contrary to section 9(3)(a).

The central issue was whether hearsay evidence from a police officer regarding observations made on a vehicle ownership document and confirmed through Ministry of Transportation database records was admissible to prove the vehicle was a commercial motor vehicle and was owned by the corporate defendant.

The court held that such hearsay evidence was admissible under the principled approach to hearsay, satisfying both necessity and reliability requirements, and was further corroborated by other evidence including the licence plate configuration, absence of a personal-use sticker, and corporate ownership.

Both defendants were convicted.

The Crown prosecuted Alpa Lumber Mills Inc. and its supervisor Van Kham Sichantha for failing to ensure that a rip saw machine (Rip Saw #1) was properly shielded or guarded to prevent product or material being processed from endangering worker safety, contrary to sections 25(1)(c) and 27(1)(a) of the Occupational Health and Safety Act and section 26 of Ontario Regulation 851/90.

A worker was injured when a wooden stake was ejected from the machine at high velocity and pierced his arm.

The defendants argued they had taken all reasonable care by relying on the machine's built-in safety features, regular maintenance, and worker training.

The court found both defendants guilty, holding that the hazard of ejected material was reasonably foreseeable based on the manufacturer's own warnings, and that the defendants failed to take all reasonable steps including obtaining and reviewing the correct operating manual, implementing regular inspection of anti-kickback mechanisms, and ensuring workers did not stand in front of the infeed opening.

The defendant was charged with careless driving under section 130 of the Highway Traffic Act after his Toyota Corolla collided with the rear of a KIA Sorrento SUV at an intersection controlled by traffic lights.

The Crown's case rested on the testimony of the vehicle owner who was struck and an independent witness who observed the collision.

The defendant claimed the struck vehicle had entered the intersection on a green light and then abruptly stopped on the pedestrian crosswalk when the light changed to yellow, forcing him to brake suddenly on a wet road surface.

The court found the defendant's testimony to be implausible, internally inconsistent, and contradicted by credible independent evidence.

The court determined that the defendant failed to maintain a safe following distance and speed appropriate for the wet road conditions, and that he did not exercise due diligence to avoid the collision.

The defendant was convicted of careless driving.

Gurdeep Virk, an unregistered individual, and his wife Mokshi Virk, a registered real estate salesperson, were charged with trading in real estate without registration and furnishing false buyer's representation agreements.

The prosecution alleged that Gurdeep actively participated in open houses, contract negotiations, and provided client advice to three families (the Vandras, Kohlis, and Bardoliwalas) without being licensed.

Mokshi was charged as a party to Gurdeep's offence and separately for preparing fraudulent buyer's representation agreements.

The court found that Gurdeep engaged in conduct constituting trading in real estate without registration, and that Mokshi abetted this conduct.

However, the court acquitted Mokshi on the charges relating to fraudulent documents, finding insufficient evidence that the buyer's representation agreements were false documents.

A defendant charged with four Highway Traffic Act offences—driving while licence suspended, using an out-of-province licence while Ontario licence suspended, possessing multiple licences, and using a hand-held communication device—was convicted on counts 1, 2, and 4.

The defendant, an Alberta resident who had exchanged his Ontario licence for an Alberta licence in 2009, argued he had no knowledge of a suspension imposed in 2010 after he had already moved and obtained an Alberta licence.

The court found the defendant failed to establish the due diligence defence despite sympathetic circumstances, as he had not taken reasonable care in managing his traffic tickets before moving provinces, had not notified relevant authorities of his address change, and had not arranged for mail forwarding.

The court convicted on count 1 for the lesser offence of operating without a valid licence rather than driving while suspended, to avoid the mandatory six-month suspension.

Count 3 was dismissed as the prosecution failed to prove physical possession of two licences.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle without insurance contrary to section 2(1)(a) of the Compulsory Automobile Insurance Act.

The registered owner of the vehicle was a one-person corporation owned by the defendant.

The Crown argued that the defendant should be found guilty as the common law owner of the vehicle, alternatively as a party to the offence, or that the corporate veil should be pierced.

The court found that the defendant was not the common law owner of the vehicle, as there was no evidence of exclusive possession or dominion and control.

The court also found that the defendant was not a party to the offence, as there was no evidence that he was a director, officer, or agent of the corporation who had omitted to purchase insurance.

Finally, the court found no basis to pierce the corporate veil, as there was no evidence of fraudulent or improper use of the corporation to avoid compliance with the Act.

The defendant was charged with "turn not in safety" contrary to section 142(1) of the Highway Traffic Act following a collision between two transport trucks at a private driveway entrance.

The prosecution relied on a dashboard video recording to establish that the other truck was in motion before the defendant commenced his right turn.

The defendant raised a mistake of fact defence, claiming he honestly and reasonably believed the other truck was parked.

The court found that while the prosecution proved the actus reus of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant successfully established the mistake of fact defence on a balance of probabilities.

The court also addressed issues regarding the loss of the video evidence and the prosecution's disclosure obligations under the Charter.