Richard Niman

This family law trial addressed parenting arrangements, a proposed relocation of children to Brussels, child support, spousal support, the parties' separation/valuation date, and equalization payments.

The court denied the respondent's request to relocate the children, finding it not in their best interests to leave Toronto where they were settled and had strong bonds with both parents.

A shared parenting schedule was established.

The court imputed income to the respondent due to intentional underemployment and ordered prospective child and spousal support, but no retroactive support.

The separation date was fixed as February 26, 2017, and an equalization payment was ordered, with prejudgment interest accruing from the date of the final order.

The applicant brought a motion to stay a timetable order pending the determination of a motion for leave to appeal.

The timetable order required the applicant to attend questioning and a settlement conference by specific dates, which she argued she could not meet due to professional commitments and medical issues.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that the applicant failed to meet the RJR-MacDonald test for a stay.

The court held that the timetable order was discretionary, raised no serious issue to be tried, and that the applicant had not established irreparable harm or that the balance of convenience favoured a stay.

The applicant brought a motion to change a court-ordered schedule for questioning and a settlement conference, citing commitments to a national project and a diagnosis of chronic fatigue syndrome.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the applicant had not provided sufficient specific details for her commitments, had previously managed her project and litigation simultaneously, and that the application was time-sensitive due to the respondent's unemployment and the applicant's history of delaying proceedings.

The court emphasized the importance of adhering to court-ordered timetables to ensure the just and timely resolution of cases under the Family Law Rules.

The respondent husband brought a motion for interim costs of $125,000 under Rule 24(12) of the Family Law Rules to defend against the applicant wife's claim for an annulment and to advance his own claim to enforce their marriage agreement.

The applicant, who has a very high net worth, conceded the merit of the respondent's case and the reasonableness of the fees, but argued he could fund his own litigation.

The court found the respondent was unemployed, had significant debts, and could not afford his legal fees.

The motion was granted, and the applicant was ordered to pay $125,000 as an advance on costs, plus $10,000 for the costs of the motion.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's decision granting primary care of a child to the respondent, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to give primacy to the principle that siblings should not be separated except in extreme and compelling circumstances.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law or principle.

The trial judge had properly considered the relevant provisions of the Children's Law Reform Act, expressly addressed the case law on separating siblings, and balanced all factors to determine the child's best interests.

The applicant brought a motion for further financial disclosure and leave to question the respondent in advance of the respondent's scheduled motion for interim disbursements under Family Law Rule 24(12).

The court dismissed the motion, finding it was contrary to a prior case management order that set a strict timetable and directed that disclosure disputes be handled at the hearing of the main motion.

Furthermore, the court held that the requested disclosure was excessive, unnecessary, and disproportionate to the issues raised on an interim costs motion, and the applicant failed to meet the test for questioning under Rule 20(5).

Following a lengthy motion concerning interim child support, spousal support, and interim costs in a high‑income family law dispute, both parties sought costs.

The court assessed success in light of the motion result and competing offers to settle under the Family Law Rules.

Although the applicant obtained retroactive interim child support, the respondent was found to have been more successful overall because the ordered support was lower than his offer and the applicant’s claims for interim spousal support and interim costs were dismissed.

The court considered proportionality, counsel rates, time spent, and the financial circumstances of the parties.

Exercising its discretion under the Family Law Rules, the court ordered the applicant to pay partial costs to the respondent.

The applicant brought a motion in a family law proceeding seeking temporary exclusive possession of the matrimonial home, an order compelling the respondent to refinance the mortgage, financial disclosure, and undifferentiated interim child and spousal support of $10,000 per month.

The respondent brought a cross‑motion seeking an order for sale of the matrimonial home.

The court held it lacked jurisdiction to compel a party to refinance a mortgage where success depends on a third‑party lender’s approval, and found insufficient evidence that exclusive possession was in the child’s best interests.

However, due to incomplete and inconsistent financial disclosure from the respondent, the court relied on a prior consent arrangement between the parties and ordered interim undifferentiated support of $10,000 monthly along with further disclosure obligations.

The applicant sought interim child support of $50,000 per month, interim spousal support of $50,000 per month, and interim costs in litigation against a high‑income professional athlete earning approximately $12 million USD annually.

The court considered the Child Support Guidelines and jurisprudence on high‑income payors, including the presumption of table support and discretion under s. 4 where income exceeds $150,000.

The applicant’s proposed budget included a substantial monthly savings component intended to fund future housing and long‑term financial security for the child.

The court held that on an interim basis the respondent’s proposal of $28,000 per month adequately covered the child’s current expenses pending trial, while the issues of savings and discretionary spending should be fully examined at trial.

The court found the evidence regarding cohabitation and permanence of the relationship highly conflicting and declined to order interim spousal support, and also declined interim litigation funding due to insufficient evidence of current legal debt.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal decision that upheld his conviction.

The appellant argued that the unusual fact situation required the court to grant leave regarding the law of entrapment.

The Court of Appeal refused leave, finding the law of entrapment well settled and its application to the facts uncontroversial.

The applicant brought a motion seeking substantial interim child support, retroactive child support, spousal support, and interim costs arising from a relationship that produced a child.

The respondent acknowledged paternity but disputed that the parties were spouses under the Family Law Act and sought an adjournment to permit questioning regarding the applicant’s claimed budget and the nature of the relationship.

The court granted the adjournment but imposed financial terms.

It ordered interim child support of $25,000 per month retroactive to the commencement of the claim and continuing until further order or year‑end.

The court rejected both the applicant’s request for $50,000 per month and the respondent’s proposed $15,000 per month as inappropriate in the circumstances.

The appellant, a police officer, appealed his conviction and sentence arising from an incident where he retained half of a quantity of marijuana that had been turned over to him while on duty during an internal police investigation.

He argued that the police investigation constituted entrapment and amounted to impermissible random virtue testing under the principles set out in R v Barnes.

The court held that the police had reasonable suspicion based on prior information suggesting chronic marijuana use by the appellant and that the reverse sting operation was a legitimate investigative step.

The court concluded there was no entrapment or abuse of process and upheld both the conviction and sentence, emphasizing the breach of trust inherent in the conduct of a serving police officer.

The accused police officer was charged with assault causing bodily harm and assault with a weapon arising from injuries sustained by an individual during a G20 demonstration at Queen’s Park.

The Crown alleged the officer struck the individual with a shield and baton or used excessive force while moving him.

The court considered three theories of liability based on eyewitness testimony and video evidence.

The judge found significant reliability and credibility issues with the key identification witness and concluded the video evidence did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused struck the individual or used excessive force.

The Crown failed to establish any theory of liability beyond a reasonable doubt.

A court-appointed receiver moved to quash a summons issued by the Ontario Securities Commission requiring him to produce documents, including interview notes, for a hearing regarding the respondent's alleged participation in a Ponzi scheme.

The Commission granted the motion to quash, finding that a receiver cannot be compelled to produce documents for a proceeding outside the receivership.

Furthermore, the respondent failed to establish that the requested interview notes were likely relevant to his ability to make full answer and defence.

The appellant, a police officer with 19 years of service, appealed a penalty of immediate dismissal imposed after he pled guilty to seven counts of insubordination and one count of neglect of duty.

The misconduct involved over 100 unauthorized CPIC checks, inappropriate relationships with women known to have criminal records, and negligent administration of police duties.

The appellant argued that the Hearing Officer failed to adequately consider mitigating factors, including his personal circumstances and depression.

The Ontario Civilian Police Commission dismissed the appeal, finding that the Hearing Officer's decision was reasonable, properly weighed the aggravating and mitigating factors, and correctly concluded that the appellant's protracted pattern of serious misconduct warranted dismissal.

The moving party sought production of documents and information held by a court‑appointed receiver in connection with an investigation related to alleged securities fraud proceedings before the Ontario Securities Commission.

The court considered whether the principles governing third‑party production established in R. v. O'Connor and R. v. McNeil applied to records held by a receiver acting as an officer of the court.

It held that although receivers generally are not required to disclose investigative materials beyond their reports, that protection cannot override an accused’s constitutional right to make full answer and defence.

Applying the O'Connor framework, the court required the moving party to demonstrate that the requested records were “likely relevant.” Only limited categories of documents met that threshold, including certain materials from lawyers, the accountant, and recovered emails, while most requests were rejected as speculative fishing expeditions.