R.G. Juriansz

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board, which found she continued to pose a significant threat to public safety and could not be managed by a conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's conclusions were reasonable and supported by evidence, particularly given the appellant's ongoing major mental illness, medication non-compliance, and lack of insight.

The appellant appealed his conviction and a forfeiture order, arguing that errors and omissions in the Information to Obtain (ITO) for search warrants invalidated them.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that the drafting errors were innocent mistakes.

Even assuming negligence, the Court held that the warrants could have issued based on the totality of the circumstances, including post-tip surveillance and prior police knowledge, after excising erroneous information and including omitted details about the confidential informant.

The appeal was dismissed.

The moving parties, comprising approximately 175 lenders, brought a motion to reopen a previously dismissed motion for leave to appeal.

The original motion for leave was brought by the appellants regarding an Ontario Securities Commission decision that found they traded securities without registration and ordered disgorgement.

The lenders argued they were not given notice of the leave motion and had a right to be heard on the disgorgement remedy.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to reopen, finding the lenders were not 'affected' by the order dismissing leave under rule 27.14, as the regulatory proceedings were not civil proceedings designed to compensate them directly.

The appellants achieved substantial success on appeal regarding the respondents' claim for commission earned and the personal liability of Ms. Mascall.

The Court of Appeal awarded costs to the appellants for both the trial and the appeal, with a slight reduction to account for the respondents' subsidiary success on their quantum meruit claim.

Costs were fixed at $20,000 for the appeal and $130,000 for the trial.

The appellant appealed his convictions for drug trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime, arguing the trial judge erred in finding police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest him.

The police arrested the appellant based on a tip from a confidential informant, which was corroborated by police surveillance.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the arresting officers had both subjective and objectively reasonable grounds for the arrest, applying the Debot criteria.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's declaration that a condominium corporation is a homeowner for the purpose of the warranty provisions of the Ontario New Home Warranties Plan Act.

The appellants argued that the definitions of 'home' and 'owner' in section 1 of the Act do not apply to a condominium corporation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that section 15(a) of the Act clearly deems a condominium corporation to be the owner of the common elements for the purposes of the warranty provisions.

The self-represented appellant sued the Ministry of the Attorney General for malicious prosecution and Charter damages after his criminal conviction was overturned due to the trial Crown's improper comments on his failure to testify.

The motion judge struck the appellant's amended statement of claim for failing to disclose a reasonable cause of action.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that when read generously, the pleadings contained sufficient facts to support allegations of malice and lack of reasonable and probable cause, and granted the appellant leave to further amend his claim.

The appellant husband appealed the trial judge's decisions regarding spousal support, child support, section 7 expenses, and the dismissal of his third-party claims for invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of mental distress against a former neighbour.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on all grounds except for a conceded error in calculating section 7 expenses, finding that the trial judge's determinations on income calculation, support, and the third-party claims were supported by the record and free from reversible error.

The moving party brought a motion to set aside a 2009 decision of the Court of Appeal that dismissed his appeal regarding a building permit and zoning by-law.

The court found that the proposed fresh evidence did not meet the test for admission and the motion did not meet the criteria for reopening a decision under Rule 59.06.

The court dismissed the motion as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process under Rule 2.1.02(1), and prohibited the moving party from making further motions without leave.

The appellants appealed a trial decision granting the respondents title to a disputed strip of land between their adjoining properties by adverse possession.

On appeal, the appellants argued for the first time that the finding of adverse possession did not justify granting title to the full width of the 2.03 metres vested by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that the issue of width was not raised at trial, the survey was presented on consent, and there was ample support in the record for the trial judge's finding.

The appellants appealed an order establishing a sale process for two corporations involved in an oppression remedy claim.

The motion judge ordered that the two corporations being sold could no longer be parties to the litigation to facilitate the sale.

The appellants argued this would cause tax prejudice, but the Court of Appeal found that any tax consequences could be addressed through expert calculation without flowing damages through the corporations.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment awarding a real estate broker commission on the sale of a property pursuant to a holdover clause in a listing agreement.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the broker's failure to provide written notice of the introduction of the purchaser, as required by the holdover clause, was a bar to the contractual claim for commission.

However, the Court allowed the broker's cross-appeal in part, awarding $20,000 on the basis of quantum meruit for services provided to the vendor after the listing agreement had expired.

The Court also found that the corporate principal was not personally liable for the compensation.

Following a successful appeal where the matter was remitted for trial, the Court of Appeal considered the parties' costs submissions.

The court applied the presumption that a successful appellant is entitled to costs and awarded the appellant $10,000 inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

The moving party brought a motion to review an order of Weiler J.A. and to stay a December 2013 order of the Court of Appeal pending an appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion as completely devoid of merit and moot, given that leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada had been refused.

The court noted the motion was another vexatious step in a protracted matrimonial dispute and dismissed it pursuant to Rule 2.1.02(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The appellants purchased a yacht for over $1 million and later sued for fundamental breach, returning the yacht.

After the close of pleadings, the action languished for over ten years with minimal steps taken.

The motion judge dismissed the action for delay under Rule 24 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the court's inherent jurisdiction, finding the delay inordinate, inexcusable, and prejudicial.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, confirming that the court has inherent jurisdiction to dismiss an action for delay as an abuse of process when the delay is of such magnitude.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his action as statute-barred.

He argued the limitation period should be suspended due to his psychological condition and the respondent's fraudulent concealment of documents.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant's own correspondence from 2008 demonstrated he had discovered his claim and possessed the requisite knowledge to commence an action roughly four years before he did so.

The appellant appealed an order striking his counterclaim without leave to amend.

The counterclaim alleged that the respondent made misleading statements to the US Department of Justice, resulting in his indictment.

The motion judge found the counterclaim rested entirely on malicious prosecution, which requires the prosecution to have terminated in the plaintiff's favour.

Because the prosecution was ongoing, the claim was premature.

The Court of Appeal agreed and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment that dismissed its entire claim, arguing the motion judge failed to address an alternative claim for unjust enrichment.

The Court of Appeal refused to entertain the argument because it was not raised in the factum and was advanced without notice to the respondents.

The appeal was dismissed for the reasons provided by the motion judge, with costs awarded to the respondents.

The moving party, who was incarcerated, sought to review an in-chambers decision that dismissed his motion to extend the time to perfect his appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that the underlying appeal regarding the reasonableness of representative counsel's fees and disbursements was without merit.

The court noted the moving party sought to advance issues beyond the scope of the appeal.

The applicant's appeal was dismissed by the Registrar for delay.

A single judge of the Court of Appeal granted an extension of time, but the applicant failed to perfect the appeal, resulting in a second dismissal.

The applicant then brought a motion for a further extension of time, which was dismissed by another single judge due to delay and lack of discernable merit.

On a motion to review that decision, a panel of the Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding no overriding error or application of a wrong principle in the single judge's discretionary decision.