R.G. Juriansz

The appellant sought to appeal an order appointing the Public Guardian and Trustee as his legal representative after he was found to be a special party.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal, holding that the order was interlocutory as it related to a procedural question and not the merits of the proceeding, meaning the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and physical assault against the mother of his daughter.

At trial, the complainant testified she could not recall the incident, and the trial judge admitted her preliminary inquiry testimony for the truth of its contents.

The appellant appealed his sexual assault conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in her use of the complainant's demeanour while recanting and by relying on voir dire evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge was entitled to consider the complainant's demeanour to determine if her failure to recall stemmed from a wish to reconcile, and that the parties had tacitly agreed the voir dire evidence was admissible at trial.

Following the release of the court's decision on the appeal, the parties filed written submissions regarding costs.

The Court of Appeal fixed costs in favour of the successful respondent in the amount of $20,000 all inclusive.

The appellant applied for a declaration of a prescriptive easement over a private laneway behind its property.

The application judge dismissed the application, finding the 20-year use was by licence rather than as of right.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found no evidence to support the finding of permission.

The court held that the continuous, open, and uninterrupted vehicular use of the laneway for over 20 years raised an inference of acquiescence by the servient owner, shifting the evidentiary burden to the respondent to prove permission.

As no such evidence was adduced, the appeal was allowed and the easement declared.

The Court of Appeal issued an addendum to its oral reasons released on April 24, 2015, which allowed the appeal and dismissed the cross-appeal.

On consent of counsel, the Court added a declaration that the appellant is the sole surviving spouse of the deceased and is entitled to receive all surviving spouse pension benefits from the respondent benefit administrators corporation.

The appellant son appealed a judgment setting aside the transfer of his mother's home to him based on non est factum and undue influence, and dismissing his counterclaim for equitable remedies.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings, noting the mother's limited English, recent widowhood, and lack of independent legal advice.

The counterclaim was properly dismissed due to the appellant's lack of clean hands and prematurity.

The appeal and a related motion were dismissed with costs.

The appellants, foreign corporations and an individual, appealed a motion judge's order dismissing their motion to dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction or to stay it on the basis of forum non conveniens.

The respondent municipality sued for breach of contract, fraud, and conspiracy regarding a waste management agreement.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the respondent established a 'good arguable case' for jurisdiction based on the pleadings and evidence of agency.

The court also deferred to the motion judge's conclusion that Ontario was the appropriate forum given the torts and contract were connected to the province.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their action as an abuse of process.

The motion judge found that the appellants could have raised their allegation of being specifically targeted in prior judicial review proceedings regarding the FIT program.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, confirming that the abuse of process doctrine applies to issues that could have been determined in earlier administrative processes, and found no error in the motion judge's refusal to exercise her discretion to allow the action to proceed.

The appellant sought to add the respondent as a defendant to an action for unpaid benefits.

The motion judge declined to add the respondent as a party.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding that any liability the respondent might have for the unpaid benefits stems from a collective agreement and would be arbitrable, meaning the respondent is not a proper party to the action.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment, arguing the trial judge applied the incorrect standard of proof, made erroneous credibility findings, and improperly drew adverse inferences from his failure to testify.

The respondent cross-appealed the trial judge's decisions regarding the interest rate and costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal, finding the trial judge correctly applied the balance of probabilities standard, made no palpable and overriding error in credibility findings, and properly exercised his discretion regarding adverse inferences, interest, and costs.

The appellant developer earned municipal development credits and sold the land with an agreement that the purchaser would pay the appellant the credits once established.

The land was subsequently sold twice without this covenant, eventually to the respondent, who developed the property and received the credits.

The appellant sued the respondent for unjust enrichment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the respondent was not enriched because it had paid a premium for the property in expectation of receiving the credits.

The appellants appealed a decision finding that the respondent insurance company did not have a duty to defend them in a defamation action arising from an internet video.

The application judge had concluded that the substance of the claim did not implicate the appellants as employees acting in the course of their employment.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the application judge failed to consider cross-claims and third-party claims, which established a mere possibility that the appellants were acting in the course of their employment.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of a firearm.

He argued the trial judge erred in finding the police officer acted in good faith and in admitting the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter after finding a s. 8 breach during a vehicle search.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's good faith determination and deferring to her s. 24(2) balancing.

The appellant appealed his conviction for extortion, arguing that the trial judge provided inadequate reasons, misapprehended evidence, and misapplied the principles of R. v. W.D. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's reasons, read as a whole, provided a detailed assessment of the evidence and credibility.

The court also found that the trial judge's inferences were supported by the evidence and that she correctly applied the burden of proof.

The appellant appealed his convictions and 12-month conditional sentence arising from his attempt to board a flight with a handgun and ammunition in his checked baggage.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended his mother's testimony that she had packed the bag without his knowledge.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge misapprehended one minor aspect of the mother's evidence, the record amply supported the conclusion that her testimony was unbelievable due to multiple inconsistencies.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the court agreed that a conditional discharge would be contrary to the public interest given the need for denunciation and general deterrence.

The appellant appealed his sentence of two years less a day for several firearm offences, arguing the sentencing judge erred by not providing a specific numerical value for the credit allowed for time spent on strict bail conditions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a sentencing judge is not required to apply a precise mathematical calculation or precisely identify the credit given for pre-sentence bail.

The sentence was found to be fit given the aggravating factors.

The applicant sought leave to appeal the dismissal of his sentence appeal by the Summary Conviction Appeal Court.

He had been sentenced to 45 days of intermittent jail for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol content of 192 mg/100 ml, marking his fourth drinking and driving conviction.

The Court of Appeal found no arguable error of law, noting that the lower courts properly applied sentencing principles and that a conditional sentence was manifestly inappropriate.

The application for leave to appeal was dismissed.

The appellant sued the police and others for malicious prosecution, negligent investigation, and other torts after criminal charges against him were withdrawn but a peace bond was imposed over his objection.

The motion judge struck most of the claims, finding that the criminal proceedings had not terminated in the appellant's favour.

The appellant appealed, and one police officer cross-appealed the motion judge's decision to allow an abuse of process claim against her to proceed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and allowed the cross-appeal, concluding that the imposition of a peace bond was not a favourable termination and that the abuse of process claim was inextricably tied to the failed malicious prosecution claim.

The appellant pleaded guilty to possession of over three kilograms of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking and was sentenced to 12 months' incarceration and 12 months' probation.

He appealed the sentence, arguing the sentencing judge violated the parity principle because other mid-level participants received 18-month conditional sentences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge expressly considered the parity principle and made no error in principle.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision interpreting a Separation Agreement between the appellant and her deceased husband.

The agreement stipulated that if the husband died before his pension came into pay, the appellant would be considered the sole surviving spouse and receive all benefits.

The motion judge erred by confusing the terms for when the pension was in pay versus death before pay, and by finding a conflict between s. 48(3) and s. 48(13) of the Pension Benefits Act.

The Court of Appeal held that s. 48(13) gives statutory priority to domestic contracts.

The appeal was allowed and the cross-appeal dismissed.