Q.C.

In an action concerning an alleged conspiracy to deprive the plaintiff of her share of her late father's estate, the plaintiff moved for further production of pre-2004 medical records from the defendant doctor and the federal government regarding her father's shock therapy in 1969 or 1970.

The defendant Birch also moved to compel the plaintiff to answer a refusal to obtain records from Bell Canada regarding an alleged wiretap.

The court dismissed all motions, finding the plaintiff's production requests lacked relevance and violated the principle of proportionality, and that Birch's motion for Bell Canada records was also disproportionate given the minimal relevance and alternative remedies available.

The appellant was terminated for cause after making violent threats to fellow employees.

He appealed, arguing his conduct was influenced by a mental disability and his termination violated the Ontario Human Rights Code.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the employer was unaware of the disability at the time of termination and fired him solely for workplace violence.

The appeal was dismissed, and the termination for just cause was upheld.

The non-party moving party sought leave to appeal a decision dismissing his appeal from a Master's order requiring the production of his post-marriage contract financial records.

The moving party argued the decision conflicted with established authority on assessing damages for breach of fiduciary duty and valuing a business using hindsight.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no conflict in legal principles and concluding the proposed appeal did not raise matters of such importance to warrant leave.

A request to stay the Master's order was also denied.

Supplementary reasons addressing implementation and costs following an appeal decision regarding a condominium dispute.

The court ordered a trial of an issue to determine the difference in value between a two-storey and three-storey townhouse unit.

The court denied prejudgment interest on the valuation amount, finding the loss crystallized on the date of the appeal decision.

The court also allocated trial and appeal costs among the parties, applying modified Sanderson orders to account for successful and unsuccessful claims against various defendants.

Supplementary reasons addressing implementation and costs following an appeal decision regarding a condominium dispute.

The court ordered a trial of an issue to determine the difference in value between a two-storey and three-storey townhouse unit.

The court denied prejudgment interest on the valuation amount, finding the loss crystallized on the date of the appeal decision.

The court also allocated trial and appeal costs among the parties, applying modified Sanderson orders to account for successful and unsuccessful claims against various defendants.

The appellant insurer appealed a decision finding it had a duty to defend its insured under a homeowner policy against a counterclaim for negligent supervision.

The insured's child was struck by a vehicle, and the driver counterclaimed against the insured parent.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the policy's exclusion for claims 'arising from' bodily injury to a household resident unambiguously applied to the counterclaim, following its previous decision in Quick v. MacKenzie and distinguishing Bawden v. Wawanesa.

The appellant sued the police and others for malicious prosecution, negligent investigation, and other torts after criminal charges against him were withdrawn but a peace bond was imposed over his objection.

The motion judge struck most of the claims, finding that the criminal proceedings had not terminated in the appellant's favour.

The appellant appealed, and one police officer cross-appealed the motion judge's decision to allow an abuse of process claim against her to proceed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and allowed the cross-appeal, concluding that the imposition of a peace bond was not a favourable termination and that the abuse of process claim was inextricably tied to the failed malicious prosecution claim.

The plaintiff, an Ontario resident injured in a bus accident in New York State, brought a motion to affirm the jurisdiction of the Ontario Superior Court.

The defendants, a Michigan trucking company and the estate of its driver, brought a cross-motion to stay the action on the basis of forum non conveniens.

While the court found it had jurisdiction simpliciter based on several connecting factors, it granted the defendants' cross-motion and stayed the action, concluding that New York was the more appropriate forum given that the accident occurred there, New York law applied, and 35 other passengers had already commenced actions in New York.

The appellant received long-term disability benefits from the respondent insurer.

Unaware that the appellant had retired and was receiving superannuation benefits, the respondent failed to deduct those benefits and overpaid the appellant by approximately $114,000 over five years.

To recoup the overpayment, the respondent reduced the appellant's monthly disability payments by 50 per cent.

The appellant sued, arguing the policy did not permit the reduction and that the insurer breached its fiduciary duty and duty of good faith.

The motion judge dismissed the action on summary judgment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the policy permitted the insurer to reduce current benefits to recover past overpayments and that no ad hoc fiduciary duty existed.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of a police officer charged with assault causing bodily harm following the 'grounding' of an arrested individual in a holding cell.

The Crown argued the trial judge exhibited a reasonable apprehension of bias by prejudging the lawfulness of the initial arrest under the Liquor License Act before hearing submissions.

The Superior Court of Justice agreed, finding the trial judge's comments created a perception that he had prematurely decided the issue.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The moving party brought a motion to strike a solicitor's affidavit filed in support of an estates motion.

The moving party argued the affidavit was an improper use of a solicitor's affidavit, contained scandalous and vexatious material, and breached settlement privilege.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the affidavit was properly used to provide non-contentious background facts, did not contain scandalous material, and that any potential settlement privilege issues were too intertwined with non-privileged material to be struck at this stage.

In a criminal Charter appeal, the appellant argued that trial delay became unreasonable due to a five-month period associated with a direct indictment.

The majority held that even if that period were attributed to the Crown, the overall delay remained reasonable after balancing all delay factors.

The court found no reversible error in the majority reasons below on the s. 11(b) analysis.

A dissenting minority would have allowed the appeal on the appellate dissent below.

The appeal was dismissed.

Multiple motions arising from five civil proceedings related to the Algo Centre Mall collapse sought transfer of a certified class action to Sault Ste.

Marie, trial together or common case management of related actions, and appointment of a single motions judge.

The court held that opt-out plaintiffs in separate proceedings lacked standing under rule 13.1.02 to seek transfer of the class action, and in any event failed to show that Sault Ste.

Marie was a significantly better venue than Toronto in the interest of justice.

The court further declined relief under s. 107(1) of the Courts of Justice Act because any transfer necessary to enable common case management or trial together would impose substantial cost and inefficiency, particularly given the existing class action case management structure.

Appointment of a rule 37.15 judge was also refused.

The moving parties sought summary judgment in a shareholder oppression dispute involving a closely held home-building corporation, requesting dissolution, appointment of a receiver, and related declaratory relief.

The court held that the longstanding informal manner in which the corporation had operated formed part of the parties' reasonable expectations and that the impugned conduct, including deferred and retroactive salary payments, did not amount to oppression on the record before it.

The court found that one alleged director had not been validly elected, but that his conduct nevertheless did not constitute oppressive conduct.

Applying Rule 20 and the summary judgment framework, the court denied summary judgment, determined several factual and legal issues, remained seized, and directed further steps toward salary determinations, valuation, and a possible buyout or liquidation if no buyout occurred.

The court heard a receiver's motion to vacate a Letter of Credit posted as security in a civil action arising from a commission claim connected to a real estate development.

Applying r. 59.06(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court held the moving party had not shown changed circumstances sufficient to justify cancelling the security, particularly given ongoing management concerns, accumulating expenses, and subsequent lien registrations.

The court found the plaintiff's underlying claim appeared strong and declined to leave any eventual recovery to the receiver's court-approved distribution process.

The motion was dismissed on the request to cancel the Letter of Credit, but granted as to reimbursement of the carrying costs of the Letter of Credit and discharge of the plaintiff's mortgage.

This action and amalgamated application arose from a series of informal secured and unsecured loans, mortgages, promissory notes, and related investment dealings between the plaintiff and the responding parties.

The court found that $200,000 in fire insurance proceeds received by the mortgagees as loss payees had to be treated as satisfying the secured mortgage debt to that extent, and could not be redirected to unsecured debts while the mortgagees still asserted the full secured claims.

The court held that the accounting provided by the responding parties was materially inaccurate, declared both power of sale proceedings invalid, and discharged the NUTOK mortgage.

Most unsecured promissory note claims were statute barred, but the KUL mortgage balance, the Xtra Gold debt and share proceeds, and two 2009 promissory notes remained owing.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of its application for a property tax exemption for premises it leases in four buildings.

The appellant argued that section 10 of the YMCA Act, which exempts 'buildings, lands... of the said association', should be interpreted broadly to include leased premises.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a leasehold interest is not 'land' or 'property of' the association within the meaning of the Assessment Act and the YMCA Act.

The exemption requires an ownership interest, and the plain meaning of the statute does not extend to leased properties.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

Prior to the determination of the appeal, the parties reached a settlement.

In accordance with the agreed terms of settlement, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and ordered the appellant to pay costs of $5,000 to the plaintiff respondent and $5,000 to the other respondents.

This was a post-trial costs decision arising from a lengthy commercial dispute over the purchase of a hearing clinic.

Although the plaintiff obtained only $423.20 for five minor breaches of contract, it had pursued extensive allegations of fraud, misconduct, and other wrongdoing, many of which the trial judge found were advanced through fabricated evidence and deliberate falsehoods.

Applying the costs factors under Rule 57.01(1), the court divided the case into issue-based components and awarded full indemnity costs for the fraudulent misrepresentation allegations, substantial indemnity costs for the professional misconduct-related allegations, and partial indemnity costs for most remaining contract issues.

The court also held that the directing mind behind the corporate plaintiff and its sole shareholder were jointly and severally liable for the full indemnity portion because they used the corporation to attempt to perpetrate a fraud upon the court.

On a criminal appeal concerning refusal to provide a breath sample, the Court addressed the burden applicable to proving a reasonable excuse under s. 794(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Court confirmed that the provision imposes a persuasive burden on the accused to establish an exception, exemption, proviso, excuse, or qualification prescribed by law.

The Court declined to address new issues advanced by interveners.

The appeal was dismissed, leaving the conviction in place.