Paul Slansky

The offender was convicted of twelve counts of fraud over $5000 for operating a large-scale Ponzi scheme disguised as a currency trading business.

He defrauded investors of approximately $15.6 million by misrepresenting his trading success, diverting funds for personal use, and using new investor money to pay earlier investors.

The court sentenced the offender to 9 years in prison, ordered restitution of $14.4 million, imposed a fine in lieu of forfeiture of $15.6 million, and issued a lifetime prohibition order preventing him from having authority over the money or property of others.

The defendant, Steven Nowack, facing 13 counts of fraud, brought a directed verdict motion at the close of the Crown's case, arguing insufficient evidence for conviction on four counts.

The Crown alleged Nowack made misrepresentations to investors, diverted funds, and failed to provide an accounting, resulting in approximately $15 million in losses.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that a reasonable jury, properly instructed, could return a guilty verdict on all challenged counts, including those related to Dr. Joseph Greenberg, Minton Trading Limited, Sinomec Finance Limited, and Lee Sui Fun.

The court emphasized that the Crown is not required to prove that misrepresentations were material to the losses, only that they placed the victim's economic interests at risk, and that a direct personal nexus between the fraudster and victim is not necessary.

The accused, convicted of 12 counts of fraud in a multi-million dollar Ponzi scheme, brought a motion alleging the Crown failed to make timely disclosure and failed to preserve evidence, seeking a stay of proceedings.

The court found that while there were some minor oversights in disclosure, they did not impact the accused's ability to make full answer and defence.

The court also found no duty on the police to preserve irrelevant emails and noted a lack of due diligence by the accused in requesting disclosure.

The disclosure application was dismissed.

Steven Nowack, convicted of 12 counts of fraud over $19 million, applied for bail pending post-conviction motions and sentencing.

His previous bail was cancelled due to breaches and contempt findings.

Nowack argued for bail based on alleged violations of a court order regarding hospital transport and s. 7 Charter rights due to mistreatment by authorities and reckless driving.

The court found no violation of its order, deeming the delay in hospital transport reasonable given staffing issues and an acute medical emergency involving another prisoner.

The court also found no s. 7 Charter violation, dismissing Nowack's claims of abusive treatment and reckless driving as exaggerated and lacking credibility, particularly after reviewing video evidence.

The application for bail was dismissed, and the detention order remained in place, emphasizing the need to maintain confidence in the administration of justice given the serious nature of the crime and Nowack's history of non-compliance with court orders.

The appellant was convicted by jury of attempting to knowingly participate in or contribute to the activities of Al-Shabaab, a terrorist group, and counselling an undercover police officer to do the same.

The trial judge imposed consecutive sentences of five years on each count, resulting in a total sentence of 9 years and 7.5 months with credit for presentence custody.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no merit in the conviction grounds and upholding the sentence as fit and appropriate for terrorist offences.

The appellant, imprisoned as a dangerous offender for over 30 years, launched a habeas corpus application challenging the validity of his detention and warrant of committal.

The application judge dismissed the application summarily on a motion by the respondent, finding it was plain and obvious the application could not succeed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the application should not have been dismissed without a full hearing on the merits.

The court found that the application judge misapplied civil procedure rules to a criminal matter and that the appellant's grounds were arguably unique and not frivolous or vexatious.

The applicant sought to review and set aside a security for costs order made by a motion judge.

The applicant's primary argument was that the motion judge erred in relying on his legal representation as evidence of ability to pay.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the motion judge was entitled to reject the applicant's claims of impecuniosity given significant unpaid costs awards against him, his credibility concerns arising from findings of fraud and contempt, and his refusal to answer questions about the source of funds he has used to support himself despite millions of dollars having passed through his hands.

The appellant sought an extension of time to file a notice of motion for a panel review of a security for costs order made by a single judge of the Court of Appeal.

The motion was filed outside the four-day service window required by the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The motion judge granted the extension of time, considering factors including the appellant's intention to seek review, the engagement of liberty of the subject, the non-frivolous nature of the underlying appeal, and the unpredictability of deference afforded to security for costs orders.

The motion was directed to be heard in writing by a panel rather than orally to prevent further delay.

The plaintiffs sought an order for the defendant's incarceration for contempt of court orders.

The defendant had previously been found in contempt for failing to provide a tracing/accounting of investment funds.

The court found the defendant's one-page accounting insufficient to purge contempt but granted a final opportunity to comply.

The defendant was ordered to provide a full and complete tracing and accounting, including specific details and supporting documentation, by August 31, 2017, along with amended Schedule A documentation.

Failure to comply would result in the continuation of the contempt motion.

Costs were reserved.

The applicant, Steven Forster, sought a writ of habeas corpus with certiorari in aid and relief under s. 24(1) of the Charter, challenging the validity of his 1988 dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence.

He argued jurisdictional errors by the trial court, including lack of notice, unlawful psychiatric remand, absence from court, and the trial judge's failure to exercise discretion.

The respondent, Attorney General of Canada, moved to strike the application, arguing it was a collateral attack on a decision previously appealed and that the court should decline habeas corpus jurisdiction where an appellate route was available.

The court found that the challenges raised by the applicant were available to him during his 1995 appeal to the Ontario Court of Appeal, which had upheld the indeterminate sentence and implicitly the dangerous offender finding.

Distinguishing the case from precedents like *R. v. Gamble* and *Gallichon v. Canada*, where applicants challenged ongoing deprivation of liberty due to changes in law, the court concluded that Forster's application was an attempt to circumvent appeal rights already exercised.

The respondent's motion to dismiss the application was granted.

Joane LaPrise sought to quash her committal to stand trial on charges of fraud over $5,000, money laundering, and possession of proceeds of crime, following a preliminary inquiry.

The application focused on whether there was any evidence that the accused knew or was wilfully blind to the fraudulent enterprise.

The court reviewed the evidence, including the accused's senior role in the companies, her involvement in suspicious financial practices, and her knowledge of misleading information provided to investors.

The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find knowledge or wilful blindness, and therefore rejected the application to quash the committal.

Two accused were charged with forgery‑related offences, tax fraud, and money laundering arising from a business producing false identification cards at a Toronto storefront.

The Crown alleged the moving party operated the enterprise through nominee businesses and bank accounts while failing to report significant income, thereby defrauding the federal government.

The court found that forged identification cards were manufactured and sold through the business and that the principal accused was the directing mind of the operation and the beneficiary of its revenues.

However, the evidence did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the second accused knowingly participated in the offences or benefited from the income flowing through accounts in his name.

The court convicted the principal accused of forgery‑related offences and tax fraud but acquitted the co‑accused and dismissed the money laundering counts.

The plaintiff brought an action against 39 defendants, including lawyers, police officers, and private investigators, seeking $20 million in damages for various torts including abuse of process, negligent investigation, and conspiracy.

The defendants moved to strike the claim.

The court found the action was a collateral attack on previous court orders finding the plaintiff in contempt of court.

The court dismissed the action in its entirety as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, and alternatively struck the claim for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

Substantial costs were awarded to the defendants.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a costs order made by a case management judge in favour of certain defendants after the moving party had noted them in default.

The underlying dispute arose from procedural disagreements concerning the timing of a jurisdiction motion and related examinations.

The case management judge found the default tactic unreasonable and unnecessary given the defendants’ clear intention to defend and the availability of a scheduled case conference to resolve the procedural issues.

The court held there was no basis to doubt the correctness of the costs decision and that the dispute raised no issue of general importance warranting leave to appeal.

Leave to appeal the costs order was denied.

On an appeal concerning judicial appointment eligibility under s. 98 of the Constitution Act, 1867, the appellants challenged the interpretation adopted by the Quebec Court of Appeal.

The Supreme Court held that the appellants failed to demonstrate any interpretive error in the lower court's analysis of s. 98.

Arguments relying on the prior reference regarding ss. 5 and 6 of the Supreme Court Act were rejected as inapplicable because the constitutional and statutory contexts differed.

The appeal was dismissed for essentially the reasons given by the Quebec Court of Appeal.

The accused brought numerous pre‑trial motions in a prosecution alleging forgery‑related offences, money laundering, and income tax fraud arising from a business producing false identification cards.

The motions included challenges to the Crown’s addition of counts under s. 574 of the Criminal Code, Charter claims concerning warrantless seizure of telephone subscriber information and production orders, delay under ss. 11(b) and 7 of the Charter, applications for particulars, certiorari to quash the committal, and allegations of prosecutorial misconduct and abuse of process.

The court held that the Crown lawfully added additional charges disclosed by the preliminary inquiry evidence and rejected the Charter challenges to subscriber information and production orders.

Delay claims were dismissed because most delay was attributable to inherent case complexity and defence availability rather than the Crown, and no significant prejudice was shown.

The court also rejected allegations of abuse of process and prosecutorial misconduct, finding they lacked an evidentiary foundation and did not justify an evidentiary hearing.

After a jury conviction for terrorism offences related to attempting to participate in and counselling participation in the activities of Al‑Shabaab, the accused brought a motion seeking a stay of proceedings for abuse of process.

The accused alleged entrapment by an undercover officer, improper prolongation of the police investigation, and police misconduct in creating a credibility contest through delayed wiretap authorization and deletion or loss of text messages.

Applying the entrapment framework from R. v. Mack, the court held that police merely opened dialogue and did not provide an opportunity to commit an offence until after reasonable suspicion existed.

The court rejected arguments that the investigation was improperly prolonged or that police deliberately engineered evidentiary prejudice.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The accused, charged with terrorism offences, brought a motion for a stay of proceedings, arguing that his right to make full answer and defence under s. 7 of the Charter was breached because an undercover officer deleted text messages and the police failed to retrieve data from the officer's phone.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the police conduct did not amount to unacceptable negligence and that the accused suffered no actual prejudice, as the text messages were innocuous and fully transcribed in the officer's notes.

The court concluded that a stay of proceedings was not warranted as there was no irreparable harm to the justice system or the accused's rights.

During an ongoing criminal terrorism trial, a media organization requested access to an audio exhibit consisting of recorded conversations between the accused and an undercover police officer obtained under a consent wiretap authorization.

The court had previously issued a non-publication order protecting the identity of the undercover officer to preserve his ability to continue working undercover.

The court held that the order extended to the officer’s voice because broadcasting it could reveal his identity.

The media organization was permitted to obtain a copy of the audio recording subject to signing an undertaking and complying with the prohibition on broadcasting or transmitting the officer’s voice.

The accused brought a constitutional motion challenging the validity of several anti‑terrorism provisions of the Criminal Code, including the definitions of “terrorist group” and “terrorist activity” in s. 83.01 and the participation offence in s. 83.18.

The accused argued the provisions were overbroad, vague, and violated the presumption of innocence and Charter freedoms by criminalizing attempts and counselling related to participation in terrorist groups.

The court held that s. 83.18 creates a substantive offence requiring proof of both participation and a specific intent to enhance a terrorist group’s ability to carry out terrorist activity.

Relying on appellate authority including Khawaja and Nadarajah, the court found the provisions neither vague nor overbroad and concluded that the mens rea requirements significantly limit the reach of the offence.

The constitutional application was dismissed in its entirety.