Paula Boutis

A former employee and founding member of a coffee company and its related worker co‑operative sought damages for failure to redeem “sweat equity” credits earned through reduced cash wages.

The plaintiff alleged entitlement to redemption of Class B shares and pursued an oppression remedy under the Ontario Business Corporations Act, as well as relief under the Co‑operative Corporations Act.

The court held that the plaintiff’s sweat equity constituted an option or warrant to acquire shares rather than an existing shareholding, and that he had standing as a complainant but no entitlement to redemption.

The court found no oppressive conduct because the internal pay scale and resulting reduction of sweat equity value were adopted through a fair process in which the plaintiff participated.

The action was dismissed and the corporations were not required to redeem the sweat equity credits.

A non-profit housing co-operative applied under the Co-operative Corporations Act to terminate a member’s membership and occupancy rights, obtain a writ of possession, and recover rent arrears.

The respondent did not appear at the hearing despite proper service and prior notice.

The court reviewed the co‑op board’s decision on a reasonableness standard and considered whether the member received procedural fairness in the termination process.

Finding the board had provided multiple opportunities to respond, complied with principles of natural justice, and had a reasonable basis for termination based on rent arrears and ongoing disruptive conduct, the court upheld the decision.

The application was granted, membership terminated, and costs awarded.

The respondent moved to quash the appellant's appeal on the basis that it should have been brought in the Divisional Court.

The appellant moved to quash or adjourn the respondent's motion, alleging improper service, and also moved to review an order of a single judge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant's motion regarding service, finding she was properly served and prepared.

The Court granted the respondent's motion to quash the appeal, noting that section 171.16(1) of the Cooperative Corporations Act directs appeals to the Divisional Court.

The appellant's motion to review the single judge's order was dismissed as moot.

The applicant sought judicial review of a permit issued by the Minister of Natural Resources under the Endangered Species Act, which allowed for the disturbance of species at risk during the construction of a new bridge and parkway.

The applicant argued the Minister failed to apply the precautionary principle, improperly consulted experts, ignored relevant information, and was biased.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Minister's decision was a matter of public policy entitled to broad deference, the statutory requirements for consultation and opinion-forming were met, and there was no reasonable apprehension of bias given the Minister's political and legislative functions.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Minister of Natural Resources granting a permit under the Endangered Species Act, 2007 for a highway project.

At the opening of the hearing, the respondents brought a preliminary motion to strike three affidavits filed by the applicant.

The Divisional Court granted the motion, striking two affidavits in their entirety and most of the third, emphasizing that judicial review is generally restricted to the record before the decision-maker.

The court noted that fresh evidence is only admissible in exceptional circumstances, which were not present, and criticized the parties for not resolving the evidentiary record prior to the hearing.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in housing on the basis of race, colour, disability, creed, age, and receipt of social assistance, stemming from a recalculation of his rent.

The respondents requested a summary dismissal, arguing the rent was recalculated in accordance with the Social Housing Reform Act after the applicant failed to report an increase in his income.

The Tribunal held a summary hearing and found that the applicant's allegations were based on unsupported assumptions and offensive assertions, with no link to Code grounds.

The application was dismissed for having no reasonable prospect of success.

The landlord brought a motion to quash the tenant's appeal from a decision of the Landlord and Tenant Board.

The Board had permitted the landlord to withdraw its application for rent arrears and had interpreted a previous consent order regarding the tenant's relocation within the building.

The Divisional Court found that all grounds of appeal raised by the tenant were manifestly devoid of merit.

The court held that the Board properly exercised its discretion to allow the withdrawal of the application and correctly determined that the consent order did not violate the Residential Tenancies Act.

The motion to quash the appeal was granted.

The appellant appealed a motions judge's decision terminating his membership and occupancy rights in a housing co-operative and ordering a writ of possession for arrears and persistent late payments.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no denial of procedural fairness in the Board proceeding in his absence, as his failure to attend was deliberate.

The court also found no error in the motions judge ordering payment of a minimum admitted amount of arrears without determining the exact higher amount owed, and held it was not unfair to issue the writ of possession given the appellant's failure to pay any amount.

Sierra Club Canada brought a motion for an interlocutory injunction to halt demolition and construction activities for the Windsor-Essex Parkway, arguing the work would irreparably harm endangered species despite a permit issued under the Endangered Species Act.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no evidence of irreparable harm and that the balance of convenience favoured continuing the project with the permit's mitigation measures.

The respondent's cross-motion to dismiss the judicial review application for delay was adjourned to the panel hearing the application.

The moving party sought an interim injunction to halt the demolition of houses pending the hearing of an interlocutory injunction.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the moving party failed to establish irreparable harm, noting that pre-screening of the properties had found no snakes.

The court also found that the balance of convenience favoured the responding party, as the demolition plans had been public for some time and the moving party could have sought relief earlier.

The appellant tenant appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision terminating his tenancy for non-payment of rent and dismissing his applications.

At the hearing, the Board granted the landlord's motion to remove the tenant's representative and subsequently denied the tenant's request for an adjournment to obtain new representation.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the Board's refusal to grant an adjournment under the circumstances was arbitrary and constituted a denial of natural justice.

The matter was remitted to a different member of the Board.