Pamela Santora

The young person, charged with second-degree murder, brought a Charter motion alleging a breach of section 8 rights regarding the search of a co-accused's mobile phone.

The applicant sought to exclude photographic and video evidence found on the device.

The court held that the applicant lacked standing, as there was no subjective or objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in images taken by another person in a group setting.

Furthermore, the court found the search warrant was validly issued based on reasonable and probable grounds.

The application was dismissed.

The accused was charged with five offences arising from sexually explicit communications and images exchanged with a 15-year-old girl who was the foster daughter of his aunt.

The Crown proved that the accused possessed and made child pornography in the form of explicit photographs and videos of the victim, as well as sexually explicit text messages depicting sexual activity with her.

The court found the accused was in a position of trust toward the victim, having served as a role model and emotional support figure since her childhood.

The accused was acquitted of counselling the victim to touch herself sexually, as she initiated that topic.

The accused was also acquitted of luring under section 172.2 due to reasonable doubt as to whether the planned sexual activity was to occur after the victim turned 16 and before she turned 18, as required by the statute.

The court applied the private use exception from R. v. Sharpe, finding that while self-created expressive material may be protected if held exclusively for personal use, the accused lost that protection by sending the explicit messages to the victim.

The offender, a bar manager, was convicted of sexual assault and voyeurism after luring an employee into a basement office, sexually assaulting her, and surreptitiously filming the assault.

The court found the predatory nature of the offence, the breach of trust, and the voyeuristic purpose to be highly aggravating factors.

The offender was sentenced to a global term of 18 months imprisonment, followed by three years of probation, along with DNA, weapons prohibition, and sex offender registry orders.

The defendant, Enzo Dario De Jesus Carrasco, was charged with sexual assault, voyeurism, and transmitting an intimate image.

The court found the defendant's testimony to be untruthful and inconsistent with text messages.

The complainant's evidence, despite some inconsistencies, was found credible and consistent with corroborating text messages.

The court convicted the defendant of sexual assault and voyeurism, finding that the touching was sexual, non-consensual, and that the complainant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the basement office where she was filmed.

The defendant was acquitted of transmitting an intimate image due to reasonable doubt regarding criminal intent, based on a text message indicating the image was sent by mistake.

Following a jury's guilty verdict for gang sexual assault and administering a stupefying drug, the court delivered reasons for sentencing Gavin MacMillan and Enzo DeJesus Carrasco.

Each offender received a total sentence of nine years imprisonment (seven years for gang sexual assault and two years consecutive for administering a stupefying substance), with credit for pre-sentence custody.

The court found that the victim never consented to the sexual activity, and the offenders had no mistaken belief of consent, rejecting their characterization of events as consensual BDSM.

Ancillary orders included DNA, lifetime prohibition, 20-year SOIRA, and non-communication.

The Crown brought an application during a trial for gang sexual assault to admit the expert testimony of an emergency room physician and a sexual assault nurse-examiner.

The proposed evidence concerned the effects of alcohol and drugs on the complainant's consciousness and capacity to consent, as well as the interpretation of her physical injuries.

The accused opposed the physician's evidence, arguing she lacked toxicological expertise and was biased due to her advocacy for sexual assault survivors.

The court admitted the evidence, finding it relevant, necessary, and reliable, and held that the physician's social media posts did not demonstrate an inability to provide impartial evidence.

The accused, charged with gang sexual assault and other offences, brought applications under s. 276 of the Criminal Code to adduce evidence of the complainant's prior sexual comments, gestures, and interest in a sex club to support their defence of honest but mistaken belief in communicated consent.

The court dismissed the application regarding the prior sexual comments and gestures, finding the evidence irrelevant and based on prohibited twin-myth reasoning.

The court permitted limited evidence regarding discussions about attending a sex club solely to provide context for a text message sent by one of the accused, with strict instructions against using it to infer consent.

Evidence of conversations immediately prior to the sexual encounters was ruled admissible.

The accused brought a pre-trial motion arguing that recent amendments to the Criminal Code eliminating peremptory challenges in jury selection should not apply retrospectively to their trial.

The court applied the rule of coordinate jurisdiction, noting that two other Ontario Superior Court judges had already ruled the amendments were procedural and applied retrospectively.

Finding no cogent reason to depart from those decisions, the court dismissed the application and ordered jury selection to proceed under the amended procedure.

The Crown sought to admit a post-arrest statement made by the accused, who was charged with multiple sexual offences.

The accused challenged the voluntariness of the statement, arguing that his English comprehension was insufficient and that the police caution regarding his right to silence was inadequate.

The court found that the accused's English skills were reasonably sophisticated and that the police officer went to great lengths to ensure the accused understood his right to silence.

The statement was ruled voluntary and admissible.

The accused, charged with sexual assault, applied to challenge prospective jurors for cause based on pre-trial publicity and the #MeToo movement, specifically the #IBelieveHer hashtag.

The court permitted modified questions regarding pre-trial publicity but dismissed the request to ask questions about the #MeToo movement and the hashtag.

The court held there was an insufficient evidentiary basis to take judicial notice of widespread bias or that jurors would be incapable of setting aside such bias despite trial safeguards.

During a jury trial for first-degree murder, the self-represented accused brought multiple applications for a mistrial, arguing the trial judge demonstrated a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The accused alleged the judge called him a liar, favoured the Crown, withheld reasons on a Charter application, and made adverse evidentiary rulings.

The trial judge dismissed the applications, finding his actions were directed at controlling an ungovernable litigant who refused to abide by rulings, and that a fair-minded observer would not conclude there was bias.

During a trial for first-degree murder, the court held a pre-charge discussion to determine whether the lesser included offences of manslaughter and second-degree murder should be left to the jury.

The Crown argued that neither should be left, while the defence argued both should be available.

Applying the air of reality test, the court found no evidentiary foundation for manslaughter, as the forensic evidence indicated a targeted killing with no signs of a fight gone wrong.

However, the court found a gasping air of reality to second-degree murder, as a properly instructed jury could find the accused had the intent to kill but have a reasonable doubt regarding planning and deliberation.

Consequently, second-degree murder was left to the jury, but manslaughter was not.

During a trial for first-degree murder, the defence requested a jury instruction that the accused's after-the-fact conduct of attempting to collect the deceased's life insurance and death benefits had no probative value.

The Crown argued the conduct was relevant to the financial motive for the murder.

The court dismissed the defence's request, finding that the post-offence conduct was directly relevant to motive, which in turn was circumstantially relevant to the identity of the killers.

The court declined to give a 'no probative value' instruction.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought an application to stay the proceedings due to unreasonable delay under section 11(b) of the Charter.

The total delay exceeded the 30-month ceiling established in Jordan.

However, the court found that the net delay was justified by the complexity of the case, which involved international extradition, voluminous disclosure, and significant defence-caused delays.

Furthermore, applying the transitional exceptional circumstances framework, the court determined that the delay was within the Morin guidelines and dismissed the application.

During a first-degree murder trial, the self-represented accused sought to introduce evidence of the deceased's alleged 'high-risk' lifestyle, including his use of gay dating and fetish websites, to suggest an unknown third party committed the murder.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the probative value of the evidence was extremely low and based on conjecture.

The court held that the prejudicial effect substantially outweighed any probative value, as the proposed evidence relied on discredited myths and stereotypes about gay men and would distract the jury from the real issues.

In a first-degree murder trial, the Crown sought to introduce ante-mortem statements made by the deceased to demonstrate his state of mind and the accused's motive to kill.

The defence objected to the viva voce evidence of five witnesses and a Facebook thread, arguing they failed the test of necessity and were not material to motive.

The court ruled the statements admissible, finding they fell under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule and were not introduced for the truth of their contents.

The court also held the statements were material to establishing motive and their probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect, subject to minor redactions.

The accused, charged with first degree murder, brought an application to exclude sworn jurors from the courtroom during the challenge for cause process using rotating triers.

The Crown argued that recent appellate jurisprudence eliminated the trial judge's inherent jurisdiction to exclude sworn jurors.

The court held that it retained the common law discretion to exclude sworn jurors, as the Criminal Code is silent on the matter.

The court exercised its discretion to exclude the sworn jurors to prevent them from sitting idly in court for up to a week while the remainder of the jury was selected, which would diminish respect for the process.

In a first-degree murder trial, the applicants (accused) brought an application to adduce evidence of an alternate suspect.

The Crown moved to dismiss the application summarily.

The court dismissed the application on two grounds: first, for severe non-compliance with the Criminal Proceedings Rules regarding the filing of materials and factums; and second, because the proposed evidence lacked an 'air of reality' and failed to establish any sufficient connection, motive, means, or propensity linking the proposed third party to the murder.

The applicants, charged with first degree murder, brought a motion to adduce evidence at trial of a known third party as an alternate suspect.

The Crown alleged the applicants conspired to kill the deceased for insurance proceeds.

The applicants sought to introduce evidence that the deceased's former common-law partner had motive and opportunity to commit the murder.

The court applied the test for third-party suspect evidence, requiring a sufficient connection between the third party and the crime.

The court found the proposed evidence lacked direct connection, relied on hearsay, and failed to establish motive, means, or propensity.

The motion to adduce the alternate suspect evidence was dismissed.

Two co-accused, charged with first-degree murder, sought an order permitting their joint representation by a single counsel, Ms. von Achten, following a prior order removing her as counsel for one accused due to conflict.

The court considered the accused's right to counsel of choice, the potential for tactical disadvantages, and the public interest.

Despite acknowledging potential future conflicts and the risk of proceeding unrepresented, the accused, having received independent legal advice, were adamant about their choice.

The court granted the application, emphasizing the accused's constitutional right to choose counsel, provided they confirm their understanding of the risks on the record.