Neil Weinstein

The accused pleaded guilty to obtaining a material benefit from the sale of sexual services contrary to section 286.2 of the Criminal Code.

Between April 8 and August 16, 2022, the accused facilitated and profited from the complainant's sale of sexual services through advertising, managing communications with clients, booking hotel rooms, and transporting the complainant across multiple cities.

The court imposed a conditional sentence of two years less one day followed by 18 months of probation, finding that while denunciation and deterrence are paramount sentencing objectives for sexual commodification offences, the circumstances of this case—involving a single adult victim, no violence or coercion, and the accused's rehabilitation efforts—warranted a community-based sentence rather than incarceration.

Dolain Mwamba pleaded guilty to multiple Criminal Code offences, including discharge firearm with intent, possession of a loaded restricted firearm, and breach of a firearm prohibition, as well as possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The incident involved Mwamba firing a handgun at a stranger's vehicle during a verbal argument at a gas station.

The court considered aggravating factors such as the gratuitous nature of the shooting and mitigating factors including an early guilty plea, remorse, pro-social tendencies, and a difficult background.

The court imposed a global sentence of six years, comprising a five-year mandatory minimum for discharging a firearm and a one-year consecutive sentence for breaching a prohibition order, with other charges running concurrently.

The appellant appealed his conviction for fraud over $5,000, arguing three grounds: improper judicial notice of a psychological theory, reasonable apprehension of bias from the trial judge's comments, and insufficient reasons for judgment regarding credibility and mens rea.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's reference to psychology was merely shorthand for finding the appellant's explanation implausible, his comments did not raise a reasonable apprehension of bias, and his brief oral reasons were sufficient to explain the rejection of the appellant's evidence and the finding of fraudulent intent.

The accused, Nicholas Cox and Erick Silva-Stone, pleaded guilty to unlawful act manslaughter in the death of Christopher Avery Houghton, which occurred during a robbery involving an unloaded firearm and subsequent stabbing.

The court accepted a joint submission on sentence, imposing 12 years custody for Mr. Cox (who had a youth record for similar offences) and 10 years custody for Mr. Silva-Stone (a first-time offender).

The judge considered aggravating factors including the profound impact on the victim's family, the callous nature of the crime, the use of a weapon, and the commission during a robbery.

Mitigating factors included early guilty pleas, sincere expressions of remorse, young age, and efforts towards rehabilitation.

Jake Garvin pleaded guilty to nine offences, including possession of a prohibited firearm, possession of a shotgun with a defaced serial number, criminal harassment against his parents, uttering threats to kill his dogs, two counts of causing pain and suffering to his dog (resulting in death), resisting arrest, mischief, and breach of a non-communication order.

The offences stemmed from police attending his apartment for a wellness check, finding a dead, severely beaten dog, and a hidden sawed-off shotgun.

The court considered aggravating factors such as the severe animal abuse, protracted harassment of parents, and possession of a functioning prohibited firearm, balanced against mitigating factors including the offender's guilty plea, youth, and mental health issues (FASD, bipolar disorder, substance abuse).

The Crown sought a 6-year jail term, while the defence proposed 2.5 years.

The court imposed a total sentence of 5 years, less 15 months credit for pre-sentence custody, including enhanced "Duncan" credit for pandemic conditions.

Ancillary orders included a DNA order, lifetime firearms prohibition, lifetime animal prohibition, and a non-contact order with parents during custody.

The applicant, charged with aggravated assault and assault with a weapon, brought a Rowbotham application seeking a stay of proceedings until state-funded counsel was provided.

Legal Aid Ontario had denied his application due to missing financial documentation.

The court found that the applicant lacked the financial means to retain counsel and that his limited education and reading difficulties made counsel essential for a fair trial.

The application was granted, and the proceedings were stayed until the Attorney General provides funding for counsel.

The accused was charged with attempted murder and various firearms offences after shooting a man during a drug deal.

The accused testified that he attended the apartment to sell drugs, but the victim pulled a gun and attempted to rob him.

A struggle ensued, the accused gained control of the gun, and shot the victim as he lunged at him.

The court found the accused's version of events plausible and held that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was not acting in self-defence.

The accused was acquitted of attempted murder and related assault charges, but convicted of firearms offences for possessing the restricted weapon after fleeing the scene.

The defendant, a high school mathematics teacher, was convicted of two counts of sexual assault against two 15-year-old female students, involving inappropriate touching.

The Crown sought 12 months incarceration, while the defence sought a suspended sentence.

The court considered aggravating factors including the breach of trust by a teacher, the victims' vulnerability, and the ongoing negative impact on the victims.

Mitigating factors included the defendant's loss of employment and emotional suffering.

The court also considered the defendant's prior assault conviction in 2009, which indicated a pattern of inappropriate touching.

The court found the mandatory minimum sentence of one year imprisonment under s. 271(a) of the Criminal Code to be constitutionally invalid under s. 12 of the Charter in this case.

The defendant was sentenced to two months intermittent incarceration, followed by two years of probation, a DNA order, lifetime SOIRA registration, and ten-year weapons and s. 161 prohibitions.

The applicant, Naoum Abi-Samra, sought an order to sever count one (sexual assault of a fellow teacher in 2009) from counts two through seven (sexual assault and sexual interference of students in 2013-2016).

The court considered the risk of prejudice to the applicant, the factual and legal nexus between counts, the applicant's intention to testify on one count but not others, the possibility of inconsistent verdicts, multiplicity of proceedings, similar fact evidence, and the right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The court found significant differences between count one and the other counts, particularly regarding the complainant's status (adult teacher vs. underage students) and the context of the incidents.

The applicant's objective intention to testify on count one due to a prior mediation, but not necessarily on the others, was a strong factor.

The court was not satisfied that the charges were sufficiently similar to support a similar fact evidence application.

Ultimately, the court concluded that the significant risk of prejudice to the applicant outweighed the benefits of a joint trial, and severance was required in the interests of justice.

The Applicant sought to admit extrinsic similar fact evidence against the Respondent, who was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference.

The evidence involved five non-charged witnesses who described the Respondent, a mathematics teacher, engaging in inappropriate physical contact with female students.

The Respondent argued the evidence lacked probative value as it did not amount to sexual assault and was tainted by potential collusion due to media publicity.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the prejudicial effect of the proposed extrinsic evidence outweighed its probative value, as it did not support the inference of sexual purpose and the Applicant could achieve the same objective with less prejudicial count-to-count similar fact evidence.

The accused pleaded guilty to manslaughter using a firearm after shooting and killing his former girlfriend during a confrontation with her new boyfriend.

The court found the victim's death was an unintended consequence of the accused firing at the new boyfriend.

The court denied additional pre-sentence custody credit for lockdown conditions, finding no evidence of particularly harsh treatment.

The accused was sentenced to 13 years' incarceration, less pre-sentence custody credit, reflecting the high moral culpability of bringing and discharging a loaded handgun at a residence.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with more than 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood following a traffic stop.

The Crown conceded the impaired driving charge lacked evidentiary support.

The trial judge dismissed the over-80 charge after finding that the Crown failed to establish that breath samples were taken "as soon as practicable" as required by the Criminal Code.

Multiple unexplained delays occurred: the decision to conduct field sobriety tests at a community policing centre rather than roadside caused an 11-minute delay; a 7-minute delay occurred between arrest and reading of rights; a 5-minute delay occurred before departure to the police station; and a 16-minute delay occurred at the station before the defendant spoke to counsel.

The judge found these delays collectively breached the statutory requirement and the constitutional imperative of immediacy underlying the provision.

The accused was charged with assault with a weapon causing bodily harm, unlawful entry, assault, and uttering threats arising from incidents in a former intimate relationship.

The Crown alleged a pattern of domestic violence culminating in an assault that caused dental injuries and threats to kill.

The defence argued the complainant fabricated the allegations to justify leaving the jurisdiction with the parties’ child and to counter family court proceedings concerning custody.

After assessing credibility under the framework from R. v. W. (D.) and considering inconsistencies in the complainant’s evidence and corroborating evidence, the court found the testimony unreliable and raised reasonable doubt.

The Crown failed to prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused brought a pre‑trial motion to exclude evidence consisting of oxycodone tablets discovered during a search of checked luggage at an airport.

The court found that the accused had a reasonable expectation of privacy in checked luggage notwithstanding airport security screening regimes.

The physical search of the bag by CATSA personnel and police was not authorized by law, the accused was psychologically detained without being informed of his right to counsel, and the decision to conduct the physical search was influenced by racial profiling.

Applying the test under s. 24(2) of the Charter, the court held that admission of the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The evidence was excluded.

The Crown applied under s. 657.3 of the Criminal Code to have a prior Charter ruling from a first trial applied to a second trial after the first proceeding ended in a mistrial.

The mistrial had been declared when the trial judge disclosed a personal relationship with a key investigating officer, giving rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Crown argued that, pursuant to s. 653.1 of the Criminal Code, evidentiary and Charter rulings made before the merits stage should remain binding in the retrial unless contrary to the interests of justice.

The court held that the integrity of the justice system and the requirement of impartial adjudication outweighed efficiency concerns.

Given the risk that the public might perceive the earlier ruling as tainted by unconscious bias, the Charter application should be reheard.

In a joint prosecution for drug trafficking and firearm possession, the accused brought a motion seeking disclosure of police occurrence reports relating to prior charges against each accused that had been withdrawn, stayed, or resulted in acquittals.

The request was framed as a third‑party records application under the regime established in R. v. O’Connor.

The court considered whether such materials met the first‑stage threshold of “likely relevance” in relation to credibility, character, and propensity issues anticipated at trial where each accused intended to blame the other.

The court held that occurrence reports relating to withdrawn allegations of drug trafficking and possession of stolen property could meet the low threshold of logical relevance for disclosure purposes.

Production to the court of limited police synopsis “front sheets” relating to the withdrawn charges was ordered for judicial review, subject to Crown redactions for privilege and a later balancing of privacy interests against the right to full answer and defence.

The accused applied under s. 24(1) of the Charter for an order dispensing with prosecutorial consent to re‑elect the mode of trial from judge and jury to judge alone pursuant to s. 561 of the Criminal Code.

The accused argued that anticipated evidence of prior bad acts and allegations of unrelated violent conduct could prejudice a jury and undermine the fairness of the trial.

The Crown refused consent and argued that the court could not review the exercise of prosecutorial discretion absent evidence of abuse of process.

The court held that binding authority requires proof that the Crown exercised its discretion arbitrarily, capriciously, or for improper motive before judicial intervention is justified.

As no evidentiary foundation demonstrating abuse of process or a Charter breach was established, the application to dispense with prosecutorial consent was dismissed.

During a criminal trial for trafficking in a substance represented as crack cocaine, the court ruled on two voir dires concerning evidentiary admissibility.

First, the Crown sought to admit police Booking Summary Reports and associated mug shots as business records under s.30(1) of the Canada Evidence Act without calling the identification officer who created them.

The court held that the records were administrative in nature and not caught by the investigative-record exclusion in s.30(10), making the mug shots admissible as reliable business records.

Second, the Crown sought to introduce non‑expert recognition evidence from a police officer who claimed to recognize one accused from surveillance photographs based on a brief prior interaction.

Applying the “prior acquaintance/better position” test from appellate authority, the court concluded the officer lacked sufficient familiarity to provide a reliable basis for recognition and excluded that evidence.

The offender, an Aboriginal man, was convicted of second degree murder following a brutal attack on the victim.

The mandatory sentence was life imprisonment, and the sole issue was the period of parole ineligibility.

The Crown sought 15 years, while the defence sought the minimum 10 years.

The court extensively reviewed the offender's profound intergenerational trauma, including the impact of residential schools on his parents, severe childhood abuse, neglect, and systemic racism, applying the Gladue and Ipeelee principles.

Balancing the gravity of the offence with the offender's reduced moral culpability due to these systemic factors, the court set the period of parole ineligibility at 10 years.

In a mid-trial ruling during a murder trial, the court considered whether the partial defence of provocation should be left with the jury.

The accused had armed himself with a hammer before confronting the victim, anticipating a violent response.

When the victim reached for a sword, the accused attacked him.

The court applied the air of reality test and found no evidence that the victim's reaction was sudden or unexpected by the accused.

Consequently, the defence of provocation lacked an air of reality and was not left with the jury.