Murdoch John Carter

Mother sought primary residence and final decision-making responsibility for a child enrolled by the father in school in Elliot Lake pursuant to his existing final decision-making authority.

The court found the father acted within the scope of the existing order, having consulted the mother multiple times over a year before enrollment, while the mother was evasive in addressing the schooling issue and failed to pursue mediation or timely court intervention.

The mother's subsequent unilateral actions regarding medical contacts and vaccinations further undermined co-parenting.

The court declined to change the child's primary residence, maintained the father's final decision-making authority with modifications, and structured parenting-time to maximize the mother's contact including weekends, holidays, and virtual access.

This endorsement addresses the temporary care and custody of a First Nation child, Z.O., who was removed from M.O.'s care and subsequently placed with his biological father, J.K. The court considered the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 (CYFSA) and the federal An Act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Metis children, youth and families.

The court emphasized the priority of placement with a biological parent under the federal legislation, finding that Z.O.'s best interests were met by remaining with J.K., given no protection concerns and J.K.'s ability to provide cultural connection.

The "without prejudice" term of a previous interim order placing the child with J.K. was removed.

The applicant, a bare trustee, sought an order for the partition and sale of a property under the Partition Act.

The respondent, the beneficial owner, opposed the sale, arguing that the applicant had no independent power to compel sale under their bare trust agreement and that a sale would be unfair given her ongoing efforts to resolve matrimonial issues and retain the home.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant, as a bare trustee, lacked the authority to compel partition or sale, and even if she had such a right, it would be oppressive to order a sale under the circumstances.

The moving party sought to set aside a 2002 default child support order, arguing he never received notice of the proceedings and was not the child's father.

The original applicant was deceased, and the arrears were being enforced by an assignee.

The court applied the Mountain View Farms factors and dismissed the motion, finding that setting aside the 20-year-old order would negatively impact the integrity of the administration of justice, as the moving party had been aware of the potential claim in 2002 but chose to ignore it.

This trial decision addresses the sole remaining issue of parenting time for the respondent mother with the child.

The applicant father sought to maintain the existing arrangement where the mother's parenting time occurred during the maternal great-grandparents' court-ordered contact.

The respondent mother sought to expand her parenting time by having the maternal grandmother granted specified contact, allowing the mother to exercise parenting time during that period.

The court found that previous orders granting contact to the maternal great-grandparents were inappropriate as they were not parties to the proceeding and had not filed the necessary affidavit.

The court declined to order specific contact for the maternal grandmother for similar reasons.

The final order maintained the mother's parenting time during the maternal great-grandparents' contact, granting the great-grandparents discretion over who may be present.

The parties, including the maternal great-grandparents, were directed to attend alternative dispute resolution to establish a more permanent long-term parenting time and contact arrangement, with proper notice to the great-grandparents if their contact is to be impacted.

The mother was also prohibited from bringing a motion to change until an outstanding costs order was satisfied and was ordered not to consume alcohol or non-prescription drugs prior to or during parenting time due to past substance misuse.

The Applicant, a paternal grandmother, sought specified contact with her grandchildren.

The Respondent mother sought contact at her discretion.

The court, applying the Children's Law Reform Act, found that while the grandmother had a right to a relationship with the children, her request for specified weekend contact was more akin to a parent's parenting time.

Given the father's unstable lifestyle and the mother's demonstrated willingness to facilitate contact, the court ordered contact for the grandmother at the mother's discretion, primarily during the father's parenting time, with a provision for mediation if contact ceases for an extended period.

Following a two-week family law trial regarding parenting time, decision-making, and support, the applicant father sought $25,000 in costs, arguing he was largely successful.

The respondent mother sought a no-costs order, arguing success was divided.

The court reviewed the trial outcomes, noting the father achieved increased parenting time and imputed income to the mother, while the mother successfully defended against joint decision-making and week-about parenting.

Finding that success was divided and the mother had a reasonable evidentiary basis to litigate certain issues, the court ordered that each party bear their own costs.

The Father applied for the child to reside with him in Sault Ste.

Marie, Ontario, while the Mother sought to relocate with the child to Schaumburg, Illinois, and have decision-making authority.

The court, applying the amended Divorce Act, found it in the child's best interests to reside permanently with the Mother in Schaumburg, granting her exclusive decision-making authority.

The Father was granted a robust parenting schedule to maintain contact.

The court emphasized the Mother's primary caregiver role and attentiveness versus the Father's relative detachment, while also acknowledging the importance of the child's relationship with his half-sibling.

The applicant father brought a motion to change a final order, seeking joint decision-making, week-about parenting time, imputation of income to the respondent mother, and termination of spousal support and child support for their 21-year-old daughter.

The court maintained the mother's sole decision-making authority but increased the father's parenting time to three weekends per month to provide more structure for the boys.

The court imputed a full-time minimum wage income to the mother and ordered spousal support to terminate in September 2023.

The court found the 21-year-old daughter remained a child of the marriage due to her ADHD and pursuit of post-secondary education, despite her estrangement from the father.

Section 7 expenses for extracurricular activities were capped at $1,500 per year.

The accused was charged with arson and manslaughter following a fatal fire at a rooming house.

The Crown's case relied heavily on two alleged confessions by the accused and his history of making threats to burn down the building.

The court found significant credibility and reliability issues with the Crown witnesses, many of whom suffered from mental health issues or had extensive criminal records.

Furthermore, the presence of a plausible alternate suspect with a motive raised a reasonable doubt.

The accused was found not guilty on both charges.

During a trial for arson and manslaughter, the Crown brought an application to admit the preliminary hearing testimony of two missing witnesses under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The court found the necessity requirement was met because police made reasonable efforts to locate the transient witnesses.

The reliability requirement was also met as the evidence was given under oath and subject to contemporaneous cross-examination.

The application was granted and the audio recordings were admitted into evidence.

This appeal concerned the determination of a child's Indigenous background under section 90 of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017.

The motions judge had found the child to be a First Nations person based on the father's self-identification and his maternal grandfather's identification.

The appellant, Batchewana First Nation, argued that this evidence was insufficient and that a simple statement of self-identification could not establish band affiliation for the purposes of the Act.

The Superior Court of Justice agreed, finding that the motions judge erred in law by relying solely on self-identification without a sufficient evidentiary foundation connecting the child to the community, and made a palpable and overriding error by overstating the evidence regarding the lack of contradiction.

The appeal was granted, and the matter remitted for a new hearing.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion to add the paternal grandparents as party respondents in a status review application under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act.

The grandparents had been caring for the two children for seventeen months under a child protection order.

The father consented to adding the grandparents as parties and sought a deemed custody order in their favour.

The mother opposed the motion and sought return of the children.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the grandparents had sufficient participatory rights under the statute without requiring party status.

The Children's Aid Society of Algoma brought a motion to determine whether a child born in 2018 is a First Nations child and, if so, whether the child identifies with the Batchewana First Nation.

The motion also sought orders to add the Batchewana First Nation as a party respondent and to transfer conduct of the proceeding to Nogdawindamin Family and Community Services.

The court found that the child is a First Nations child based on the father's self-identification as an Aboriginal person with Batchewana First Nation heritage and his maternal grandfather's Aboriginal ancestry.

The court granted the motion, adding Batchewana First Nation as a respondent party and substituting Nogdawindamin Family and Community Services as the applicant.

This is a child protection motion under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act involving four children and two separate applications.

Application No. 1 concerns three non-Indigenous boys (G., P., and C.) with parents A.W. and M.P. who had a joint custody order.

Application No. 2 concerns an infant (B.) with mother A.W. and father J.S., a member of Batchewana First Nation.

The society sought temporary care and custody of all children.

The court found reasonable grounds for risk of harm based on domestic violence, excessive alcohol consumption, and failure to comply with safety agreements involving J.S. However, the court declined to grant full temporary care and custody to the father for the three boys, instead maintaining the existing joint custody arrangement with conditions on the mother's care.

For the infant B., the court placed her with her maternal grandmother pending consent, with supervised paternal access for J.S.

The applicant sought an interim and final order to terminate spousal support due to retirement and reduced income.

The respondent conceded a reduction but opposed termination, proposing a higher interim amount.

The court found the applicant's retirement reasonable and a material change in circumstances, warranting a variation.

Applying the "double dipping" principle from *Boston v. Boston* to calculate the applicant's income and considering the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines, the court ordered interim spousal support of $600 per month, effective May 1, 2017, to terminate on December 31, 2018, when the respondent would be eligible for Old Age Security benefits.

The applicant's contribution to the respondent's health care plan was also adjusted.

The Children's Aid Society of Algoma brought a motion to transfer carriage of child protection proceedings to Nogdawindamin Family and Community Services, a newly designated native children's aid society.

The motion was dismissed because Nogdawindamin CAS lacked jurisdiction over the children in question.

The court found that while two of the children had First Nations heritage through their father, the other two children and their mother did not qualify under any paragraph of Nogdawindamin's ministerial designation.

Additionally, Nogdawindamin was prohibited from exercising certain functions under conditions imposed by the Minister that had not yet been lifted.

The Children's Aid Society of Algoma brought a motion to transfer carriage of child protection proceedings to Nogdawindamin Family and Community Services, a newly designated native children's aid society.

The motion involved two children whose father was a registered member of a First Nation band.

The court examined the ministerial designation of Nogdawindamin CAS, the jurisdictional limitations imposed by conditions in that designation, and the statutory framework governing native societies under the Child and Family Services Act.

The court determined that Nogdawindamin CAS had jurisdiction over the children as members of the father's First Nation band and granted the transfer motion, while also addressing broader issues regarding the interpretation of ministerial designations and the court's role in adjudicating society jurisdiction in child protection proceedings.

This is a child protection proceeding under the Child and Family Services Act involving five children from blended family situations.

The court addressed temporary care and custody motions brought by the Children's Aid Society and the father pursuant to section 51(2) of the CFSA.

The court found reasonable grounds to believe the children were at risk of harm based on evidence of physical abuse, inadequate supervision, poor home conditions, and substance use.

The court made mixed determinations regarding temporary placements: one child remained with maternal grandparents despite an unfavourable kin assessment; one child remained with paternal grandparents; one child remained with biological father; and two children were placed with their biological mother.

The court emphasized that consent orders cannot be rubber-stamped without proper legal foundation and that the most vulnerable child required protection despite parental completion of some programming.

The mother brought a motion seeking recusal of the trial judge on grounds of perceived bias.

The judge had previously presided over a summary judgment motion where she determined the children were in need of protection and could not be placed in the mother's full-time care and custody.

The mother argued that the judge's prior findings and exposure to inadmissible evidence would cloud her judgment on the remaining issue of access.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no cogent evidence of actual bias or reasonable apprehension of bias.

The judge emphasized that findings regarding full-time parenting capacity were distinct from determinations regarding access rights.