M.S.V. Felix

The accused was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol contrary to section 253(1)(a) and operating a motor vehicle while over 80 contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The trial focused on whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was in care or control of the motor vehicle.

The accused argued she made a conscious decision to stop her vehicle on an on-ramp due to weather and alcohol consumption, with no intention to continue driving.

The court found the accused guilty of care or control while over 80 based on the rebuttable presumption in section 258(1)(a), and alternatively on de facto control.

The court rejected the accused's credibility regarding the timing and circumstances of her decision to stop, finding her conduct demonstrated bad judgment and created a realistic risk of danger.

The accused was acquitted of the operate while over 80 count due to insufficient evidence regarding the timing of operation.

The defendant was charged with impaired operation, operation over 80, and dangerous driving arising from an incident on April 9, 2013.

The central issue was the admissibility of medical information and a blood sample obtained via search warrant and production order.

The court found that while a technical breach of Section 8 of the Charter occurred regarding the manner in which information was obtained from hospital staff, the warrants could have issued based on the remaining information.

The court applied the Grant analysis and admitted the evidence, finding the breach was technical in nature and that society's interest in adjudication on the merits favoured admission.

The accused was convicted of trafficking in cocaine and possession of cannabis resin following trial.

The sentencing hearing addressed four key issues: whether to impose a parole ineligibility order under section 743.6 of the Criminal Code; the constitutionality of section 719(3.1) limiting pre-sentence custody credit; the appropriate credit for pre-sentence custody; and the admissibility of evidence from an intervening unrelated trial.

The court declined to impose a parole ineligibility order, found section 719(3.1) unconstitutional as applied, granted reduced credit for pre-sentence custody, and excluded evidence from the intervening trial.

The accused was sentenced to five and one-half years imprisonment with 730 days credit for 608 days of pre-sentence custody.

The defendant pleaded guilty to sexual interference of a five-year-old child, the defendant's granddaughter, contrary to Section 151 of the Criminal Code.

The abuse occurred over approximately two years, from when the victim was three to five years old, on multiple occasions at both the defendant's home and the victim's home.

The conduct included touching the victim's genitals under her underwear and requiring the victim to manipulate the defendant's genitals, resulting in masturbation with discharge that the victim was required to clean up.

The court imposed a sentence of 14 months imprisonment followed by three years probation, along with ancillary orders including a no-contact order, DNA order, firearm prohibition, Sexual Offender Information Registry requirement, and Section 161 prohibition order with limited exceptions.

The defendant was convicted of three counts of trafficking in crack cocaine.

The court imposed a sentence of three years on count one (trafficking nine ounces), concurrent on count two (trafficking three ounces), and one year consecutive on count three (trafficking 2.1 ounces with co-accused).

The defendant received 1.5 days credit for each day of pre-trial custody.

A 109 order for ten years and a non-communication order with respect to a co-accused were also imposed.

The sentencing balanced denunciation and deterrence as primary objectives with proportionality and rehabilitation considerations, given the defendant's youth and first penitentiary sentence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for failing to drive in a marked lane contrary to section 154(1)(a) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The appeal raised two grounds: (1) whether the Justice of the Peace had a duty to inquire if the appellant required interpreter services, and (2) whether the Justice of the Peace should have inquired into the suitability of an adjournment given that disclosure was provided on the trial date.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that no inquiry into interpreter services was required as the appellant had completed the Notice of Intention without requesting an interpreter and conducted the trial in English without apparent difficulty.

While the court acknowledged that providing disclosure on the trial date presents procedural concerns, it found that the Justice of the Peace appropriately addressed the issue by permitting a recess for the appellant to review the disclosure and determine how to proceed.

The appellant, a commercial property owner, was convicted of infractions under the Ontario Fire Code for permitting a private school to operate on the premises without compliance with fire safety regulations.

The appellant appealed, arguing that the private school was regulated by the Education Act and therefore exempt from the Ontario Fire Code under section 9.2.1.2 of Regulation 213/07.

The court dismissed the appeal, holding that the private school was not governed by the Education Act because no notice of intention to operate had been filed as required by section 16(1) of the Education Act.

The court found that the burden of proof rested on the appellant to establish the exemption and that a factual finding at trial could not substitute for the express statutory requirement of filing a notice of intention.

The defendant was charged with impaired operation contrary to section 253(a) of the Criminal Code and refuse to provide a breath sample contrary to section 254(5).

Following a traffic stop for excessive speeding, the investigating officer requested the defendant perform a physical coordination test without formal demand under section 254(2) of the Criminal Code and without proper training.

The court found breaches of sections 8 and 9 of the Charter.

Evidence from the roadside physical test and observations during its administration were excluded.

However, the defendant's statements refusing the breath sample at the police station were admitted as they lacked sufficient nexus to the Charter breach.

The defendant was acquitted of impaired operation but convicted of refuse breath sample.

The accused was charged with impaired operation and "over 80" following an investigation on February 2, 2014.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging breaches of sections 7, 8, 9, and 10(b).

The Crown conceded a breach of section 8 (unreasonable search and seizure).

The court found that the investigating officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds for arrest, possessing only reasonable suspicion.

The officer should have conducted an approved screening device demand or physical sobriety tests before arresting.

Under section 24(2) of the Charter, the court admitted breath sample evidence and inculpatory statements but excluded observations of indicia of impairment made at the police station.

In this drug trafficking trial arising from Project Wanipitee, the court applied the Carter test to determine whether intercepted communications could be admitted under the co-conspirator's exception to the hearsay rule.

The court found that a joint enterprise existed between the accused and others to traffic cocaine in the Durham Region.

The court identified the accused on intercepted communications through circumstantial evidence including surveillance, text message patterns, and physical movements.

The court convicted the accused of trafficking cocaine on two dates and possession of cocaine for trafficking purposes.

The court acquitted on charges related to marijuana possession and possession of cocaine at a separate location due to insufficient evidence of possession and control.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and "Over 80".

He brought a Charter application alleging breaches of sections 8 and 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that the police officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds to stop the vehicle and arrest the accused.

The officer's observations of driving behaviour were unreliable, his inference regarding the accused's direction of travel was unsupportable, and he failed to use available investigative tools such as an Approved Screening Device.

The court found breaches of both sections 8 and 9 of the Charter and excluded the evidence under section 24(2), resulting in acquittals on both charges.

The accused pleaded guilty to criminal negligence causing death contrary to section 220 of the Criminal Code and to operating a motorcycle without insurance contrary to section 3 of the Ontario Compulsory Automobile Insurance Act.

The accused operated a high-performance motorcycle while grossly intoxicated (blood alcohol concentration between 196-231 mg/100mL) and caused the death of a passenger.

A Gardiner hearing was conducted to determine aggravating facts.

The court found the accused voluntarily consumed alcohol, was grossly intoxicated, and that intoxication was a significant cause of the accident.

The court imposed a sentence of six years imprisonment, a ten-year driving prohibition, a ten-year weapons prohibition, and a $5,000 fine for the insurance offense.

This is a preliminary inquiry decision concerning charges of human trafficking, procuring for prostitution, and related offences against two accused.

The court applied the test from Arcuri to determine whether sufficient evidence existed to commit the accused to trial.

The judge found sufficient evidence on multiple counts relating to the exploitation of vulnerable women in the sex trade, including evidence of control, direction, and influence over complainants' movements and earnings.

The court committed both accused on various counts while discharging others where insufficient evidence was presented.