Monica Samir Aboul Makarm Gharabaway

The applicant, previously found guilty of eight offences including human trafficking and sexual assault involving a 13-year-old complainant, sought a stay of proceedings under section 24(1) of the Charter.

The application alleged a breach of section 7 Charter rights due to the police's loss of relevant cellphone evidence from the complainant.

The court found that the police's failure to properly label, bag, tag, or securely store a USB drive containing the downloaded cellphone contents constituted unacceptable negligence, leading to a breach of the applicant's section 7 rights.

However, the court determined that the loss was due to human error and inadvertence, not intentional wrongdoing or abuse of process.

Furthermore, the court found that the lost evidence did not cause actual prejudice to the applicant's right to make full answer and defence, as other evidence was available to him.

Consequently, the application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed, as it did not meet the high threshold of being one of the "clearest of cases."

Shaqueme Martin applied to dismiss human trafficking and sexual services charges under s. 11(b) of the Charter, alleging unreasonable delay.

The total delay from charges to the original trial date was 1028 days, exceeding the Jordan ceiling.

The court found that the delay after September 19, 2022, was attributable to the defence's refusal of an available trial date, which would have brought the total delay within the presumptive ceiling.

Consequently, the presumption of unreasonable delay did not arise.

The court also found that the case was not a "clear case" warranting a stay below the presumptive ceiling, as the overall delay was not "markedly" longer than it should have been.

The application was dismissed.

The defendant, Javar Thomas, was tried on 22 counts including sexual assault with a firearm, death threats, firearms offences, and human trafficking-related charges involving two complainants.

The court found the complainants' testimony credible and corroborated by other evidence.

The court found the defendant guilty on 20 of the 22 counts, including multiple counts of sexual assault with a weapon, death threats, firearms offences, assault with a weapon, human trafficking (transporting for exploitation, exercising control, receiving financial benefit), and procuring.

Two counts were withdrawn.

A sentencing hearing is to be set.

The accused, Tal Amdurski, was charged with multiple sexual services, sexual assault, and human trafficking offenses involving a 13-year-old complainant.

The central issue for several charges was the accused's mistaken belief in the complainant's age and whether he took all reasonable steps to ascertain it.

For human trafficking, the court also considered the elements of conduct and purpose, specifically whether the accused exploited the complainant.

The court found the accused guilty of sexual assault, sexual interference, material benefit from sexual services of a person under 18, obtaining sexual services for consideration of a person under 18, and procuring.

He was found not guilty of the primary human trafficking charge and material benefit from human trafficking, but guilty of the included offenses of trafficking in persons and material benefit from trafficking in persons, as the Crown failed to prove knowledge or willful blindness regarding the complainant's age for the higher charges.

The offender pleaded guilty to human trafficking, pointing a firearm, assault causing bodily harm, unlawful confinement, and receiving a financial benefit from trafficking.

He exercised significant control over the victim, a 20-year-old sex worker, using violence, threats, and manipulation, and kept all her earnings.

The court weighed the aggravating factors of violence and a prior criminal record against the mitigating factors of a guilty plea and harsh pre-sentence custody conditions during the COVID-19 pandemic.

A global sentence of 7 years was imposed, with 4.5 years of enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody, leaving 2.5 years to serve.

Simon Ho-On was charged with sexual assault, sexual assault with a weapon, administering a noxious thing, and unlawful confinement involving a 16-year-old complainant, B.W. The case hinged on the credibility and reliability of the two witnesses, B.W. and Mr. Ho-On, who provided conflicting accounts.

The court found B.W. to be a credible witness, but her memory was impaired regarding events at the condominium due to Xanax consumption.

Mr. Ho-On's testimony was rejected due to inconsistencies.

Consequently, Mr. Ho-On was found guilty of sexual assault with a weapon and unlawful confinement, but acquitted of sexual assault and administering a noxious thing related to the condominium incident.

The defendants, Tal Amdurski and Thomas Graff, jointly charged with sexual services, sexual assault, and human trafficking, brought s. 11(b) Charter applications for a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay.

The court applied the Jordan framework, calculating net delay and considering defence delay and exceptional circumstances, including the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court found 8 months and 19 days of defence delay attributable to Amdurski, but not to Graff due to his objections and the Crown's concession.

After accounting for 14 months and 4 days of exceptional circumstances (primarily COVID-related), Amdurski's net delay was 25 months and 22 days (below the 30-month ceiling), while Graff's net delay was 31 months and 5 days (exceeding the ceiling).

The court dismissed Amdurski's application and granted Graff's, staying the charges against him.

This ruling addresses whether section 276 of the Criminal Code, which governs the admissibility of evidence of a complainant's prior sexual activity, applies to proceedings involving human trafficking and sexual services offences.

The accused sought to cross-examine the complainant on such activity without a section 276 application, arguing these offences are not explicitly enumerated.

The court, preferring a broad interpretation consistent with Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence in R. v. Barton and R. v. J.J., held that section 276 applies to offences that have "some connection" to those listed.

Given the systemic biases against sex workers and the legislative intent to protect complainant dignity and privacy, human trafficking and sexual services offences are deemed to have such a connection.

Therefore, the accused is required to bring a section 276 application to introduce such evidence.

The Crown applied to admit the out-of-court statements of a complainant who relocated to the United States and refused to testify at trial.

The statements included a sworn video statement to police and testimony from a preliminary hearing.

The court applied the principled exception to the hearsay rule, finding that necessity was established due to the witness's unavailability and refusal to testify.

The court held that the sworn video statement met the threshold for reliability based on procedural and substantive factors, including extensive corroborative evidence.

The video statement was admitted for the truth of its contents, while the preliminary hearing testimony was ruled admissible only at the instance of the defence to challenge credibility and reliability.

Sentencing for multiple guilty pleas arising from the exploitation of two young complainants in the sex trade, including human trafficking, deriving a material benefit, advertising sexual services, assault causing bodily harm, and assault.

The court held that denunciation, deterrence, and separation from society were the primary sentencing objectives, while still giving some weight to youth, lack of record, guilty pleas, remorse, and rehabilitative prospects.

Applying the prevailing human trafficking range and the Tang-Lopez aggravating factors, the court found a fit global sentence of 8.5 years absent custodial conditions.

Because the offender endured exceptionally harsh and inhumane pre-sentence detention conditions, the sentence was reduced to 7 years and 3 months, with Summers credit leaving 23 months and 14 days to serve, together with ancillary orders and restitution.

The accused, Tal Amdurski, brought a Charter application to exclude text messages found on a 13-year-old complainant's phone, arguing a breach of his s. 8 Charter rights (unreasonable search and seizure).

The complainant's mother discovered the messages, photographed them, and voluntarily provided them to the police, along with the phone, with the complainant's consent.

The court dismissed the application, finding no s. 8 Charter breach because the evidence was voluntarily provided by a private citizen (the mother) and the complainant, not seized by state action.

Alternatively, even if s. 8 was engaged, the accused had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the messages, particularly given the complainant's age and vulnerability.

Further, even if there was a breach, the evidence would be admissible under s. 24(2) of the Charter due to the minor nature of the state conduct, minimal impact on the accused's rights, and society's strong interest in adjudicating serious charges involving child sexual exploitation on their merits.

M.E.D. was convicted of multiple sexual violence offences, including human trafficking, receiving financial benefit from sexual services, procuring, advertising sexual services, and sexual assault, committed between August 2016 and January 2017.

The Crown sought an eight-year global sentence, while the defence proposed five years.

The court considered aggravating factors such as the profound victim impact, profit motive, victim's attempts to escape, and the sexual assault.

Mitigating factors included the offender's age, difficult upbringing, mental health issues, family support, minimal criminal record, and the harsh conditions of pre-sentence custody and bail, as well as the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on incarceration.

The court imposed a global sentence of six years imprisonment, with credit for pre-sentence custody, resulting in five years and nine months remaining to serve, along with various ancillary orders including a $10,000 restitution order.

Sentencing decision following jury convictions for human trafficking, material benefit, procuring, advertising sexual services, child pornography offences, and sexual assault arising from the sexual exploitation of a vulnerable young complainant.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence under ss. 718 and 718.01 of the Criminal Code, while also weighing harsh pretrial custody conditions, lengthy lockdowns, pandemic conditions, house-arrest bail, remorse, rehabilitation prospects, and possible deportation as mitigating factors.

Applying the principles governing credit for presentence custody and harsh conditions of confinement, the court reduced the fit global sentence from nine years to eight years.

After 36 months' credit, the respondent was required to serve a further five years, with ancillary DNA, weapons, no-contact, and SOIRA orders.

The applicant sought the return of a 2018 Jeep Grand Cherokee seized by the Toronto Police Service, arguing that its continued detention was not required for investigation, trial, or forfeiture proceedings under s. 490(11) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown alleged the vehicle was used in an assault and exploitation, and intended to seek forfeiture if the accused (D.G.) was convicted.

The court found it had jurisdiction to hear the application, confirmed the applicant was the lawful owner and innocent of any complicity, and determined that the vehicle was not required for ongoing investigation or trial.

The court further concluded that any future forfeiture application by the Crown would inevitably be unsuccessful given the applicant's innocent third-party status under s. 490.4(3) of the Criminal Code.

The application for the return of the Jeep was allowed.

The accused brought a pre-trial application seeking disclosure of a complainant's youth police occurrence report in a human trafficking and sexual assault prosecution.

The court held that the Youth Criminal Justice Act did not permit accused persons to access a youth record where no charge had been laid, rejecting the line of authority permitting disclosure through s. 123.

The court further held that disclosure was not warranted under the Criminal Code third party records regime because the report contained nothing necessary to full answer and defence, apart from the fact of a proximate police interaction, which the Crown agreed to admit.

The application was dismissed.

The accused was charged with two counts of sexual assault following an encounter with a woman he met on a dating app.

The complainant alleged she was drugged and sexually assaulted at the accused's condo.

The accused, who represented himself, testified that the encounter was consensual in its non-sexual aspects and that no sexual activity occurred, citing his severe physical and medical limitations.

The court applied the W. (D.) framework and found the complainant's evidence lacked credibility and logic, while the accused testified credibly.

The accused was acquitted on both counts.

The applicant, an Indigenous man charged with human trafficking, sexual assault, and domestic assault, sought a bail review.

The court found a material change in circumstances based on a new culturally appropriate supervision plan and an error in law by the initial justice who failed to properly apply Gladue principles.

Applying the ladder principle and considering the applicant's Indigenous background, the court found the proposed plan, which included residence at a Native men's shelter and supervision by the Toronto Bail Program, sufficiently addressed the secondary and tertiary grounds.

The applicant was ordered released on strict conditions.

On a Crown application in a jury trial for human trafficking and related offences, the court considered whether evidence of one accused's prior discreditable conduct toward a third party was admissible.

Applying the prior discreditable conduct framework, the court held the alleged baton assault had diminished probative value because the complainant did not link that assault to her decision to leave with the accused or to her fear for her safety.

The moral and reasoning prejudice of the physical assault evidence outweighed its probative value, so that portion was excluded.

However, surrounding narrative evidence, including the accused's conversation with the complainant, his statement about dealing with the third party, the verbal argument, the third party's distressed appearance, and her agreement that the complainant could leave, was admitted to explain procurement and the unfolding narrative.

The accused, charged with human trafficking and sexual assault, brought an application under s. 276 of the Criminal Code to cross-examine the two complainants on their prior involvement in the sex trade.

The accused argued the evidence was necessary to challenge the complainants' credibility regarding statements made to police about their unfamiliarity with escort work.

The court largely dismissed the application, finding the proposed questioning either relied on prohibited twin-myth reasoning or lacked relevance to a live issue at trial.

Limited evidence of prior sex work was permitted solely through an Agreed Statement of Facts to contradict specific statements made to police.

The Crown applied under s. 714.2 of the Criminal Code to have a key complainant in a human trafficking case testify via videoconference from outside Canada.

The accused opposed the application, arguing the witness's disruptive behaviour at the preliminary inquiry demonstrated that remote testimony would impede the court's ability to control the proceedings and undermine effective cross-examination.

The court granted the application, finding the accused failed to show that remote testimony would be contrary to the principles of fundamental justice.

The court permitted the witness to testify from her home, subject to strict conditions to ensure the integrity of the proceedings.