Moiz Karimjee

The appellant appealed a lower court decision upholding a firearms officer's refusal to issue him a firearms licence.

The refusal was based on the appellant's history of mental health issues, including a diagnosis of schizophrenia and past psychotic episodes, as well as police reports of family conflict.

The appellant introduced fresh evidence of his current stability, employment, and discipline.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the lower court did not err in concluding the firearms officer's decision was reasonable given the legitimate concerns regarding public safety and the appellant's denial of his mental health history.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80.

He argued the trial judge erred in dismissing his Charter claims under ss. 8, 9, and 10(b), specifically challenging the reliability of the arresting officer's evidence, the validity of a delayed breath demand, and whether his right to counsel was provided without delay.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no errors of law or palpable and overriding errors of fact in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence and application of the law.

The applicant, an alleged leader of the Freedom Convoy 2022, sought a bail review after being detained on secondary and tertiary grounds.

He argued a material change in circumstances based on his five months in custody, health issues, and a new bail plan with four proposed sureties.

The court found a material change in circumstances and conducted a fresh review.

Despite the serious nature of the mischief and counselling charges, and new perjury charges arising from his first bail hearing, the court concluded that the proposed strict bail plan, which included relocating to Alberta and strong supervision by new sureties, adequately addressed the secondary and tertiary ground concerns.

The applicant was granted release on bail.

The Crown and the accused both sought a review of the accused's bail conditions related to charges arising from the Freedom Convoy.

The Crown alleged the accused breached her conditions by agreeing to accept an award, while the accused sought to vary her conditions to allow travel to Ontario and use of social media.

The court found no breach of conditions and determined that a material change in circumstances warranted a de novo review.

The court ordered the accused's continued release with varied conditions, maintaining the social media ban but modifying the geographic restriction to allow her to visit Ottawa outside the downtown core.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for impaired driving.

He brought a preliminary motion for the appeal judge to recuse herself based on a reasonable apprehension of bias, which was dismissed as unfounded.

On the substantive appeal, the appellant argued that fresh evidence should be admitted, that the arresting officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds, that evidence should have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, and that the verdict was unreasonable based on circumstantial evidence.

The court dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors by the trial judge and concluding that the verdict was supported by the evidence.

The respondent sought to commence a private prosecution against the Premier of Ontario regarding COVID-19 vaccine mandates, which a Justice of the Peace refused to receive.

The respondent then applied for mandamus to compel the Justice of the Peace to receive the information.

The Crown brought an application to summarily dismiss the respondent's application.

The court granted the Crown's application, finding the respondent's claims of a fake pandemic and vast conspiracy to be frivolous, vexatious, and lacking any air of reality.

The appellant appealed his summary convictions for impaired driving and driving over the legal limit, alleging ineffective assistance by his trial counsel.

He sought to introduce fresh evidence to support this claim, while the Crown applied to summarily dismiss this ground of appeal.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the fresh evidence but dismissed the appeal on the ground of ineffective counsel, finding that the appellant failed to establish the underlying facts of his allegations and that trial counsel had provided highly competent, effective, and reasonable representation.

The Crown applied for a review of a release order under section 521 of the Criminal Code.

The accused was facing multiple sets of charges, including sexual assault and breach of recognizance.

The reviewing judge found that the initial justice made errors of law by failing to apply the reverse onus under section 524(4) and by issuing inconsistent release and detention orders for the same accused.

The reviewing judge vacated the release order and ordered the accused detained on the secondary grounds, finding a substantial likelihood that the accused would commit further offences if released.

The applicant, who was self-represented, applied for an extension of time to file a Notice of Appeal regarding his convictions for uttering threats and disobeying a court order.

The court applied the three-factor test for extending time to appeal.

The court found that the applicant did not form a bona fide intention to appeal within the appeal period and that the proposed grounds of appeal lacked merit.

The application for an extension of time was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving with a blood alcohol concentration over 80mg%.

He argued that the trial judge erred in finding that the breathalyzer technician had formed his own reasonable and probable grounds for the breathalyzer demand, and that he was arbitrarily detained between his arrest and the breathalyzer demand.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no misapprehension of evidence regarding the technician's grounds and concluding that the detention was lawful under s. 497(1.1) of the Criminal Code to secure evidence.

The applicant, a retired television broadcaster charged with criminal harassment, sought a publication ban on his name, arguing that publication would violate his rights under sections 7 and 11(d) of the Charter and cause irreparable damage to his reputation.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the Charter does not protect a privacy interest to prevent media publication of an accused's name, nor does publication compromise the presumption of innocence.

The court also held that the common law Mentuck test was not met, as the applicant's concerns were purely personal and lacked a public interest component.

The applicant, an Indigenous man charged with sexual assault and sexual interference involving a seven-year-old child, applied for a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code.

He sought to overturn a detention order made at his show cause hearing.

The court found that the show cause judge did not err in law or make a clearly inappropriate decision in detaining the applicant on the primary and secondary grounds, given his outstanding charges, history of non-compliance, and concerns regarding the proposed surety.

The application was dismissed and the detention order was upheld.

The applicant sought a detention review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code, arguing a material change in circumstances after pleading guilty to several charges and receiving a sentence of time served, leaving only two sets of charges outstanding.

The court found that the new circumstances, including the anticipated pre-sentence custody credit and the withdrawal of his sister as a surety, would not have affected the original bail judge's decision to detain him on the secondary ground due to his extensive criminal record, escalating violent behaviour, and near certainty of reoffending.

The application for a detention review was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for breaching an undertaking not to communicate with his former partner.

The breach occurred when the appellant engaged in FaceTime calls with the complainant while exercising access to their children.

The summary conviction appeal court upheld the trial judge's findings that the appellant had the requisite subjective mens rea, as he intentionally called the complainant knowing he was bound by a no-contact condition.

The court also upheld the trial judge's refusal to apply the defence of de minimis non curat lex, noting the public interest in enforcing release conditions in domestic violence cases.

The appeal against the suspended sentence and probation was also dismissed.

The accused, who is charged with sexually assaulting a deaf woman at a shelter, sought a review of his bail decision, arguing that the COVID-19 pandemic constituted a material change in circumstances.

The accused, who lives with paranoid schizophrenia, proposed a release plan involving supervision by the John Howard Society and living in a rented room.

The court acknowledged the accused's heightened risk of contracting COVID-19 but found the proposed plan lacked adequate supervision.

The application for bail was dismissed, and the accused was detained on both secondary and tertiary grounds.

The applicant, who had pled guilty to multiple counts of fraud and received a 360-day sentence, appealed his conviction and sentence.

He brought an application under s. 684 of the Criminal Code for the assignment of counsel for his summary conviction appeal, arguing his guilty plea was uninformed regarding the start date of his sentence.

The court dismissed the application, finding no arguable issue as the sentencing judge had clearly explained the sentence and the applicant, a seasoned offender, raised no concerns.

The court also noted the applicant was capable of representing himself.

A Crown motion to summarily dismiss the appeal was dismissed without prejudice due to lack of notice.

The applicant, who was convicted of sexual assault, applied for state-funded counsel under s. 684 of the Criminal Code to assist with his appeal.

The court found that while the applicant lacked the financial means to retain counsel, he failed to demonstrate an arguable case on appeal regarding alleged misapprehension of evidence and trial judge bias.

The application was dismissed as the applicant was also deemed capable of representing himself.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on impaired driving charges, arguing the trial judge erred in finding a breach of s. 10(b) of the Charter and in excluding breathalyzer evidence under s. 24(2).

The trial judge had found breaches of ss. 8, 9, and 10(b) due to a four-minute delay in making an ASD demand and a six-minute delay in reading rights to counsel.

The Superior Court upheld the s. 10(b) breach finding but concluded the trial judge erred in her s. 24(2) analysis by failing to assess the specific impact of the ss. 8 and 9 breaches on the respondent's Charter-protected interests, instead relying solely on the cumulative effect of multiple breaches.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted for a limited trial on the s. 24(2) analysis.

The Crown appealed a sentence of 90 days intermittent imprisonment and two years' probation imposed on the respondent for assault causing bodily harm.

The respondent and a friend had assaulted the victim under the mistaken belief that the victim was breaking into vehicles.

The Crown argued the sentencing judge misapprehended the victim's brain injury, improperly treated the respondent's 911 call as mitigating, and erred in applying the principle of proportionality.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the sentencing judge's factual findings or application of principles, and concluding the sentence was within the judge's discretion and entitled to deference.

The appellant appealed his summary convictions for assault causing bodily harm and uttering death threats against his wife.

He argued that the trial judge erred in her credibility analysis by compartmentalizing the evidence and applying uneven scrutiny to his testimony compared to the complainant's.

The Superior Court of Justice found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of credibility or application of the W.(D.) framework.

The appeal against conviction was dismissed.