Lorne Goldstein

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired operation of a motor vehicle by a drug.

Following a single-vehicle accident, the appellant was taken to the hospital where police delayed informing him of his arrest and right to counsel.

During this delay, hospital staff drew a blood sample for medical purposes, which police later seized via a warrant.

The trial judge found breaches of the appellant's ss. 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) Charter rights but admitted the blood sample, finding it was not causally connected to the breaches.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred by reversing the burden of persuasion regarding whether the appellant would have consented to the blood draw had his rights been respected.

The Court conducted a s. 24(2) analysis, excluded the blood sample evidence, and entered an acquittal.

The accused brought a pre-trial application to exclude two videotapes containing a confession to the murder of the deceased.

The confession was obtained during a 14-month undercover police operation, which the court identified as a variation of a 'Mr. Big' scheme.

The undercover officers posed as criminals and offered to help the accused defeat an upcoming polygraph test, leading to a confession and re-enactment of the stabbing.

The court applied the Hart framework and found that while the operation triggered the presumptive inadmissibility of the confession, the Crown successfully proved the confession was reliable and its probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect.

The court also dismissed arguments that the police conduct violated section 7 of the Charter or amounted to an abuse of process.

The application to exclude the evidence was dismissed.

The accused brought a Charter application to exclude evidence seized from her residence during the execution of a search warrant targeting her partner.

The accused argued that the Information to Obtain (ITO) relied on confidential informants and lacked sufficient detail and corroboration to establish reasonable and probable grounds.

The court found that the ITO was deficient, resulting in a breach of section 8 of the Charter.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that the admission of the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute and ordered the evidence excluded.

The accused, charged with sexual assault and sexual interference, brought an application challenging the constitutionality of s. 278.92 of the Criminal Code.

He argued that the provision, which creates a presumptive inadmissibility for personal information records in the possession of the accused, violates his rights under ss. 7, 11, and 15 of the Charter.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the statutory scheme is rationally connected to its purposes of protecting complainants' privacy and encouraging the reporting of sexual offences.

The court concluded that the scheme does not violate the accused's right to a fair trial or equality rights.

The applicant, who had pled guilty to multiple counts of fraud and received a 360-day sentence, appealed his conviction and sentence.

He brought an application under s. 684 of the Criminal Code for the assignment of counsel for his summary conviction appeal, arguing his guilty plea was uninformed regarding the start date of his sentence.

The court dismissed the application, finding no arguable issue as the sentencing judge had clearly explained the sentence and the applicant, a seasoned offender, raised no concerns.

The court also noted the applicant was capable of representing himself.

A Crown motion to summarily dismiss the appeal was dismissed without prejudice due to lack of notice.

The Crown applied to have the offender declared a Dangerous Offender following his convictions for aggravated assault and assault with a weapon against five female strangers.

The offender had struck the women in the head with a hammer or hard object from behind.

The court found that the offender met the criteria for a Dangerous Offender designation under s. 753 of the Criminal Code.

However, relying on psychiatric evidence that the offender's risk could eventually be managed in the community, the court declined to impose an indeterminate sentence.

Instead, the court imposed a determinate sentence of 12 years' imprisonment, less enhanced pre-sentence custody credit, followed by a 10-year Long Term Supervision Order.

In a second-degree murder prosecution, the court conducted a voir dire to determine the admissibility of two police interviews with the accused.

The defence conceded voluntariness of the first statement but argued its prejudicial effect outweighed probative value, while challenging the voluntariness of the second statement based on inducements and oppressive interrogation tactics.

Applying the confessions rule and the principles in Oickle and Singh, the court found that the accused’s will was never overborne despite repeated assertions of the right to silence and persistent police questioning.

Both statements were therefore voluntary.

However, the court held that significant portions of the first interview containing police commentary, opinion, and criticism of the accused’s exercise of the right to silence must be edited before being admitted, and the second statement was intended primarily for potential use in cross‑examination rather than for its contents.