M.L. Edwards

The defendants brought a motion regarding outstanding undertakings and refusals, which was resolved between counsel prior to the hearing, leaving only the issue of costs.

The plaintiff brought a cross-motion seeking various relief, including leave to file a jury notice out of time, further documentary discovery, answers to refused questions, and leave to amend the statement of claim.

The court ordered the plaintiff to pay costs for the main motion due to the failure to address undertakings in a timely manner.

On the cross-motion, the court granted leave to file a jury notice and an amended statement of claim, but dismissed the requests for further discovery and answers to refusals.

The plaintiff was ordered to pay costs for the cross-motion.

Three brothers engaged in a protracted dispute over the proceeds and operations of their family farming and construction businesses.

The plaintiffs claimed the defendant owed significant sums for personal expenses improperly charged to the company and imbalances in shareholder loan accounts.

The court found the company's records unreliable and ordered a formal accounting for the loan accounts and gas expenses.

Most other claims and counterclaims were dismissed as unproven or statute-barred under the Limitations Act, though one plaintiff was ordered to repay misappropriated fire insurance and sawmill proceeds.

The accused, charged with first degree murder, instructed his counsel to disseminate Crown disclosure to the media, alleging his video statement was altered.

Defence counsel sought directions on whether he was bound by an undertaking not to disclose the materials.

The court held that whether or not Crown disclosure is subject to a written undertaking, a deemed undertaking applies restricting its use solely to making full answer and defence in the criminal proceedings.

The application to remove the undertaking was dismissed.

The accused was charged with murder after his grandmother was found dead.

He had presented at a hospital with cuts and a bite mark, claiming his grandmother attacked him.

He made statements to police at the hospital while being treated as a victim, and later gave a video statement at the police station after being arrested and speaking to duty counsel.

On a voir dire, the court found that the statements at the hospital were voluntary and reliable, and that the video statement was voluntary, not the result of oppression or inducements, and not tainted by the earlier statements.

All statements were ruled admissible.

The defendants in a personal injury action arising from a motor vehicle accident brought a motion for a further defence medical examination by a psychiatrist.

The plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing the defendants had already received numerous psychological reports and a further examination would delay the trial.

The court granted the motion, finding that the plaintiff's recent treatment at the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health (CAMH) and a new diagnosis of major depressive disorder constituted a material change in circumstances.

The court ordered the plaintiff to attend the psychiatric assessment, noting there was little prospect the trial would be called before the assessment could be completed.

The plaintiff commenced an action seeking damages for slander.

The defendant brought a motion to strike the statement of claim under the Protection of Public Participation Act, 2015 (anti-SLAPP legislation).

The parties could not agree on a timetable leading up to the motion, particularly because the defendant failed to attend her scheduled examination for discovery due to medical reasons.

The court fixed a timetable for the delivery of materials, completion of discoveries, cross-examinations, and factums leading up to the scheduled motion date.

The accused was charged with fraud over $5,000 and theft by conversion after borrowing $150,000 from an acquaintance under the pretense of opening a restaurant.

Instead of using the funds for the business, the accused spent the money on personal expenses, a luxury vehicle, and gambling, eventually declaring bankruptcy.

The court found that while the initial receipt of the funds may have been innocent, the accused's subsequent use of the money for gambling and personal expenses with the knowledge that it put the lender's pecuniary interests at risk constituted dishonest conduct and theft by conversion.

The accused was found guilty on both counts.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendant, a former employee and son-in-law, who defrauded the plaintiffs' accounting firm of $342,170.22 by diverting client payments to a sham bank account.

The defendant sought to amend his statement of defence to plead that the claim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, arguing the plaintiffs ought to have discovered the fraud earlier.

The court granted the amendment but found no evidence to support the limitation defence.

Summary judgment was granted for the full amount of the diverted funds, plus $50,000 in punitive damages for the defendant's deceitful and high-handed conduct.

A Mareva injunction was also extended to assist with enforcement.

The Crown brought an application for the forfeiture of a $50,000 recognizance against a surety after the accused absconded to Pakistan on the morning of his sentencing for sexual assault.

The surety, the accused's wife, argued for partial forfeiture due to financial hardship and lack of fault.

The court applied the 'pull of bail' principle, finding that the surety failed to strictly supervise the accused and that absconding is the most serious breach of a recognizance.

The court ordered the full $50,000 forfeited, but stayed enforcement for 45 days to allow the accused an opportunity to voluntarily return to Canada.

The accused brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, arguing his right to be tried within a reasonable time was infringed.

The total delay from arrest to the projected end of the trial was approximately 32 months, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in Jordan.

However, the court deducted three periods of defence delay, including time when defence counsel was unavailable for offered trial dates, a scheduling error by defence counsel, and a frivolous mistrial application regarding an interpreter.

After these deductions, the net delay fell below the 30-month ceiling.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

During a jury trial for sexual assault, a juror sent a note to the trial judge reporting that another juror had shared a story with the panel about a friend who was falsely accused of a similar offence.

The trial judge conducted an inquiry in accordance with the process set out in R. v. Giroux.

The judge discharged the offending juror under s. 644 of the Criminal Code for reasonable cause, finding she could be influenced by her friend's experience and had failed to disclose this during jury selection.

The juror who reported the incident was retained, as she had appropriately followed the court's preliminary instructions.

During a personal injury class action trial arising from a VIA Rail derailment, a class member sought to qualify a chartered accountant as an expert witness to quantify past and future wage loss.

The defendants opposed the qualification, arguing the expert lacked objectivity and his evidence was unnecessary.

The Superior Court of Justice applied the Mohan framework and found the expert's evidence was not necessary, as he merely accepted the class member's uncorroborated figures without independent analysis.

The court also found the expert failed to establish a basic threshold of objectivity, rendering him improperly qualified.

The expert evidence was ruled inadmissible.

During a trial for damages arising from a railway accident, the plaintiff (a class member) sought to qualify an expert witness to provide opinion evidence on the profitability of a proposed European pipeline project, claiming a loss of opportunity.

The defendants objected to the expert's admissibility.

Following a voir dire, the court refused to qualify the expert.

The court found the expert's evidence lacked reliability due to an undisclosed prior business relationship with the plaintiff.

Furthermore, the court held the expert evidence was unnecessary because the plaintiff failed to produce admissible evidence or documentation demonstrating he could have obtained the financing required to build the pipeline.

The plaintiff was injured when struck in the face by an unknown object while riding a roller coaster at the defendants' amusement park.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the action.

The plaintiff, who was self-represented, provided no evidence of negligence or breach of the Occupiers' Liability Act, relying only on a theory that the defendants failed to properly investigate the incident.

The court granted the motion and dismissed the action, finding no genuine issue requiring a trial as the ride was inspected and in good working order.

The Crown sought to admit a video and audio statement given by the accused to the police following his arrest for aggravated assault.

The defence argued the statement was involuntary due to oppressive conditions, sleep deprivation, and police trickery, including the use of the Reid Technique and false evidence.

The court found that while the police officer lied to the accused about the evidence against him, the overall circumstances of the interrogation were not oppressive.

The court concluded the Crown met its heavy burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement was voluntary and admissible.

The third party insurer, Pembridge, moved under Rule 21 to strike the defendants' third party claim against it.

Pembridge had previously been added as a statutory third party under section 258(14) of the Insurance Act because the defendant driver was allegedly operating the vehicle in violation of her G1 licence conditions.

The court applied established jurisprudence holding that once an insurer acquires the status of a statutory third party, a defendant cannot issue a third party claim against it.

The motion was granted and the third party claim was struck.

During a defamation trial involving a municipal councillor and the mayor along with other councillors, the plaintiff sought to introduce a report by the municipal Integrity Commissioner into evidence.

The defendants objected to its admissibility.

The court ruled the report inadmissible, finding that it did not meet the necessity and reliability criteria for the principled exception to hearsay.

The court noted that under the Municipal Act, the Integrity Commissioner is not a compellable witness, meaning the defendants would be unable to cross-examine him.

The court concluded that admitting the report would be highly prejudicial and could lead the jury to afford the untested opinion undue weight.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for approval of a $10 million class action settlement and class counsel fees regarding an alleged investment leveraging scheme.

While the court found the settlement quantum and proposed counsel fees to be fair and reasonable, it refused to approve the settlement at this time due to a lack of procedural fairness.

Specifically, the settlement administrator failed to implement a transparent challenge process for class members to dispute their individual compensation amounts, as required by the settlement agreement.

The motion was adjourned to allow the parties to implement the required challenge process.

The self-represented applicants brought a motion for an extension of time to file their Notice of Appeal.

The court found that the applicants had served a Notice of Appeal within the prescribed time limits but failed to file it with the court.

Despite a lengthy delay, the court was satisfied that the applicants intended to proceed with the appeal and that the respondent would not suffer undue prejudice.

The motion was granted, with strict timelines imposed for perfecting the appeal.

The appellant husband sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order requiring him to pay spousal support of $2,800 per month based on his 2011 income.

He argued the support should have been based on his projected 2012 income.

The court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no good reason to doubt the correctness of the interlocutory order and noting that appeals from interlocutory family matters are discouraged.

The court awarded costs of $5,000 to the respondent wife.