M.L. Edwards

Sentencing for possession of child pornography by a first offender who pleaded guilty and was found with approximately 114 videos and 895 photographs depicting severe abuse of very young children.

The court held that denunciation and general deterrence were the dominant sentencing principles, emphasized Parliament's mandatory minimum under s. 163.1(4.1)(a), and rejected the defence submission for a shorter custodial term.

Despite mitigating factors including a guilty plea, lack of prior record, family support, and a generally positive pre-sentence report, the court treated the nature of the material, the age of the children, the duration of the conduct, and the absence of specialized treatment as aggravating.

A sentence of 12 months' incarceration followed by 3 years' probation was imposed, together with prohibition, DNA, sex offender registration, forfeiture, and weapons prohibition orders.

The appellant husband sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order requiring him to pay spousal support of $2,800 per month based on his 2011 income.

He argued the support should have been based on his projected 2012 income.

The court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no good reason to doubt the correctness of the interlocutory order and noting that appeals from interlocutory family matters are discouraged.

The court awarded costs of $5,000 to the respondent wife.

The plaintiffs sought court approval for an advance payment of $1 million (the insurance policy limits) from one set of defendants to a plaintiff under disability.

A co-defendant opposed the approval, arguing the payment would only benefit the plaintiffs' counsel to fund ongoing litigation and that the Insurance Act did not contemplate such a payment without an admission of liability.

The court rejected these arguments, finding no prejudice to the co-defendant and concluding that the advance payment would benefit the plaintiff.

The court approved the advance payment and awarded costs to the plaintiffs.

The plaintiff brought a motion to amend the Statement of Claim to replace the fictitious name 'John Doe' with the name of the defendant insurer's employee, Maria Diolanda.

The defendant opposed the motion, arguing it was an attempt to add a new party after the expiry of the limitation period.

The court found that the original pleading clearly pointed the 'litigation finger' at the person who sold the insurance policy, making this a case of misnomer rather than adding a new party.

The motion to correct the misnomer was granted.