Michael Strathman

In a joint trial for first-degree murder arising from a home invasion, the co-accused applied to redact portions of two videotaped police statements made by two of the accused.

The applicants argued that the statements contained inadmissible hearsay that was highly prejudicial to the non-makers.

The court applied the principles for editing co-accused statements, balancing the probative value of the narrative context against the prejudicial effect.

The court ordered the redaction of gratuitous police comments, irrelevant bad character evidence, and highly prejudicial post-offence conduct (wiping a coffee cup), but retained the core narrative descriptions of the events, holding that limiting instructions would adequately protect the co-accused.

Sentencing for two counts of possession of child pornography, criminal harassment, and breach of probation arising from sexually explicit materials involving children and persistent unwanted communications causing the complainant to fear for her safety.

The court emphasized denunciation, general deterrence, and specific deterrence, particularly given the offender's prior conviction for a sexual offence against a child, the disturbing content of a lengthy journal advocating sexual activity with children, and compelling psychiatric evidence of entrenched paraphilic interests and risk.

Applying proportionality, the court held the offender could not be sentenced on the basis of future dangerousness alone, but required a substantial penitentiary-equivalent sanction.

A global effective sentence of five years was imposed, realized through ten months' imprisonment after enhanced pre-sentence credit, followed by three years' probation and multiple ancillary orders.

The accused was charged with criminal harassment and breach of probation after leaving a series of unwanted, obsessive voicemails for the complainant at her workplace in 2012.

The accused and the complainant had no contact for 12 years following a previous criminal harassment charge and peace bond in 2001.

The court found that the accused's conduct constituted repeated communication that caused the complainant to reasonably fear for her safety.

The court also found the accused possessed the requisite mens rea of recklessness, as he subjectively appreciated the risk his conduct posed but persisted anyway.

The accused was found guilty of both charges.

The accused was charged with two counts of possession of child pornography arising from photographs and a three‑volume journal containing images and written commentary seized during search warrants.

The accused conceded possession but argued that some materials were not child pornography and that the journal fell within the judicially created private-use exception recognized in R. v. Sharpe.

The court held that several images clearly met the definition of child pornography under s. 163.1(1) of the Criminal Code and that significant portions of the journal advocated or counselled sexual activity with persons under eighteen.

The Sharpe private-use exception did not apply because the journal incorporated pornographic images sourced from outside materials rather than being created solely by the accused.

The court found the accused guilty on both counts.

The accused applied to sever a five-count indictment involving sexual assault, criminal harassment, breach of probation, and two child pornography possession charges.

Applying the balancing framework from R. v. Last, the court considered prejudice to the accused, factual nexus between counts, strategic decisions about testifying, and trial efficiency.

The court found that the historical sexual assault allegation, involving a different complainant and events more than a decade earlier, lacked a legal or factual nexus to the other charges and risked significant moral prejudice if tried together.

The remaining four charges arising from events in 2012 were also severed into two separate trials to preserve the accused’s ability to testify selectively.

The court ordered three separate trials, with the sexual assault charge to be heard by a different judge.

Following a conviction for assault causing bodily harm after a judge-alone trial, the accused brought a motion to re-open the trial on the grounds that trial fairness required such an exceptional remedy.

The accused had been self-represented for most of the trial after discharging his initial counsel.

Post-conviction, police occurrence reports were disclosed revealing the complainant's ex-partner's history of domestic violence.

The accused sought to testify and raise a self-defence claim.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the decision not to testify and the scope of cross-examination reflected deliberate tactical choices made with competent counsel, and that the new evidence was not relevant to the trial strategy actually employed.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred in principle by failing to give weight to the joint position of counsel that some time in custody was required.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence was varied to 90 days intermittent, to be served on weekends, with probation while not in custody.